


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
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**HUMAN FACTORS
CONSIDERATIONS
OF
UNDERGROUNDS
IN
INSURGENCIES**

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UNDERGROUND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

Few insurgencies have been won or lost by large, decisive military battles. More commonly, insurgencies are won by a combination of military and political means. Much of the political leverage involved in such settlements is derived from effective psychological operations, which have structured the environment necessary for a political solution.

One objective of psychological operations is to create social disorganization and conditions of uncertainty. The resultant unrest and confusion are used as a cover to carry out underground operations. A characteristic of this kind of social confusion is a condition of general apathy among a large segment of the populace and an unwillingness to help either side. This indifference plays into the hands of the underground: apathetic people do not cooperate by supporting government programs and they seldom volunteer the intelligence information necessary for detecting underground elements and operations. A second objective of psychological operations is the creation of doubt and suspicion of government and government officials. This focuses attention and grievances on the ineffectiveness of government. A third and crucial objective of psychological operations is to crystallize attitudes and organize dissident elements to resist government action and policies.

To insurgents, and especially Communist insurgents, influencing opinions and attitudes is not an end in itself, but only a means to enhance their organizational work among broad elements of society. The Communists state candidly that they propagandize in order to expand the mass organizations attached to their insurgent movements. Once an individual commits himself to an organization, no matter how superficial his motives or how temporary his intentions, his perceptions change and, with them, his psychological receptivity. Ultimately, it is through mass organizations that attitudes are crystallized in favor of the insurgent movement.

Psychological operations deal not only with the "objective" world surrounding a person, but with the world as seen by the individual. The "real" world or the facts are relatively unimportant in psychological operations: what people believe or can be made to believe is the important thing.

Underground propagandists and agitators identify their appeals with a society's recognized, accepted values—such as "independence" and "land for the landless." Those who accept these widely held values are led into accepting the insurgency. Insurgents also offer rewards to those who are "loyal," and threaten physical reprisals against any who oppose them. Riots and passive resistance provide strong social coercion to influence the undecided or uncommitted.

Underground psychological operations are conducted in a number and variety of forms: mass media and face-to-face persuasion; leaflets and theatrical performances; programs for local civic improvement; and threats, coercion, and terror. Although the substantive content

of psychological operations during any phase is likely to be determined at the highest echelon of the organization, successful implementation depends in large part upon the ingenuity of the operators at the local level.

In attempting to influence mass action and to develop mass support, psychological operations are directed primarily to specific audiences or target groups. Occupational, religious, ethnic, and other social groups are often singled out as target groups, and tactics are tailored to be effective within a particular group. The purpose of underground propaganda may be to win support among the neutral and uncommitted; to raise morale and reinforce existing attitudes and beliefs among underground members and their supporters; to undermine confidence in the existing government; and to lower the morale of government forces and personnel.

Other psychological operations, such as terrorism, are also applied to both opponents and neutrals, to coerce them into the movement or to make them refrain from assisting the government. The underground has often killed as many neutrals to discourage collaboration with the government as they have killed members of the counterinsurgency forces. Target groups vary in reaction and must be chosen carefully. Terrorist acts by the FLN in Algeria discouraged Muslims from supporting the French, but actually increased French determination to fight. Terrorism also ensures the adherence of insurgent members to discipline.

Underground movements aim different appeals at various segments of society. Groups that are reluctant to take up arms against the government can be rallied around emotional issues and directed into passive measures. Religious or pacifist groups, women and children, or old men, can be mobilized for passive resistance. In organizing demonstrations and riots, attention is given to selecting groups most likely to respond to the agitator's call to action—student groups, dissatisfied labor union members, and groups with known grievances.

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CHAPTER NINE

PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

The Bolshevik Revolution added a new dimension to the concept of propaganda with the term "agitprop"—the combination of agitation with propaganda. To the Bolsheviks, "propaganda" referred to the dissemination of many ideas to a few people. Marxist-Leninist ideological propaganda was meant exclusively for the cadre, to provide them with instruction for carrying out their tasks and with inspiration to refurbish their morale; it was not intended for the masses. "Agitation," on the other hand, meant disseminating a few ideas to many people. It was believed that the masses did not understand complex issues, but could be aroused from their apathy by the constant repetition of simple, emotional issues which directly reflected their daily frustrations and needs.

In the practice of psychological operations today, however, the classic distinction between agitation and propaganda is less clear. Propaganda has come to be identified as themes and messages disseminated via mass media to a large audience while agitation has taken on the characteristic of face-to-face communications directed toward small selected audiences. These means of propaganda and agitation are interdependent and complementary. Typically, mass communications stresses the broader message of the movement and agitation assumes the task of translating this message and tying it to the grievances of specific people in specific situations.

PROPAGANDA THEMES

Propaganda is directed to the underground itself, the uncommitted, and the government. The target groups selected represent various identifiable segments of society. Persuasive themes attempt to create feelings of doubt and uncertainty about future events and to promote the feeling of crisis. Care is taken in propaganda to differentiate between the government and the people; and blame or fault is attributed to the actions of government. Among the themes are appeals to self-interest and specific needs and grievances, stressing local factors and conditions.

General propaganda themes are developed and adapted to specific purposes during a Communist-dominated insurgent movement. For example, if the overall objective of Communist efforts in South Vietnam—namely, the takeover of the government by military and political means—is kept in mind, it can be noted that the themes used at the onset of the insurgency are still employed, although they have been constantly adapted to new developments.

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The content of persuasive messages is more surprising in what is left out than in what is included. Very little content is devoted to the ideological basis of the cause. Exaggerations tailored to strengthen emotional commitment of members are recurrent. Several devices are used to justify the movement through a "consensual validation"—creating the appearance of majority approval.

Power and Legitimacy

All propaganda, of course, stresses the legitimacy as well as the reality of insurgent power. Thus, the Viet Cong claim to be the spokesmen of the people, in contrast to the Saigon government which is characterized as "a corrupt mouthpiece of Western imperialists and neo-colonialists." One of the principal thrusts of Viet Cong propaganda has been to present U.S. involvement as ruthless, unprincipled aggression. The Viet Cong capitalize upon the natural fear and ignorance of outsiders to develop plausible exaggerations about U.S. intervention. The United States is shown as obstructing the expression of the popular will—represented by the Viet Cong—and its physical presence in Vietnam proves its aggressive intent. As an aggressor, the propaganda runs, the United States will stop at nothing to achieve its objective of domination. U.S. activities are characterized as "atrocities," "inhuman," "brutal," and "malicious." Americans are depicted as treacherous, betraying even their staunch friends, such as Diem, whose fate awaits other "running dogs of the imperialists."

They are also described as having contempt for the Vietnamese people. To show U.S. contempt for Vietnamese religious values, the story has been widely told of U.S. planes attacking a Buddhist monastery and killing 35; and then, with fine impartiality, attacking a Catholic church and shooting 200 nuns.

Another theme of Viet Cong propaganda is that the United States is attempting to camouflage its aggressive designs and legitimize them within the world community by dragging reluctant allies and "lackeys" into the Vietnam war. Involvement of international organizations has been dismissed as a mask behind which the United States might hide its aggression.

Finally, Viet Cong propaganda points out that although the United States seems powerful, there is really no need to fear it; its forces are constantly being defeated by the Liberation Army. Constant Viet Cong victories are reported even if they must be invented, and real or purported enemy losses and desertions are emphasized to suggest an irresistible trend toward victory. New U.S. tactics will fail as certainly as past ones did. In short, say the propagandists, the U.S. efforts are the "last gasp of a dying conspiracy," so there is neither a moral nor a practical reason to support the losing and desperate Americans and their "puppets."

Nor is the Saigon regime to be taken seriously, say the Viet Cong. It is only the weak mouthpiece of the imperialistic United States. Again the Communists demonstrate their flexibility; after attacking the Diem government for years, when that government fell, the line quickly switched to point out that the "new puppets" were even more pro-American than Diem.

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Entitled a "Sea of Wrath," this drawing depicts a "mass demonstration against the U.S. aggressors." Here, "as an angry crowd engulfed the U.S.-puppet troops, a woman rushed up, grabbed two guns and thrust them aside, denouncing the soldiers. Cowed by this overwhelming wave of indignation, the enemy retreated."

(Woodcuts and drawings from Peking's Union of Chinese Artists, published in China Reconstructs, July 1965)

Shown above and on the following three pages are drawings, with captions, circulated by the Chinese Communists to demonstrate the "heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. imperialism."

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One of the principal themes of Communist propaganda is the strength and power of the Viet Cong. This drawing depicts a "heroic Vietnam people's fighter" downing a U.S.-supplied helicopter single-handedly. The caption records how he "raised his rifle and aimed; with nine bullets he brought four other helicopters crashing to the ground."

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
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This woodcut portrays the "heroic" activities of a women's guerrilla unit in South Vietnam. The caption describes how the woman leader killed several "U.S.-puppet soldiers in an ambush," and how "many soldiers fell into spiked traps."

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The caption on this propaganda drawing tells how "from morning till night the women of a village near Saigon put all their hatred for the U.S. bandits into sharpening bamboo spikes which they placed at the bottom of camouflaged traps. Every time the U.S.-puppet troops would come to 'mop up' the village they suffered heavy losses."

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In sum, the Viet Cong propagandists paint lurid alternative choices for the South Vietnamese people. On the one hand is the ineffectual, U.S.-dominated Saigon government. The United States itself is weak and is suffering constant defeats. On the other hand, the Viet Cong stands for the people, for humane values, and for religion. Finally, Viet Cong victory is assured by historical necessity. What is there for the people to do? The propagandists' answer is clear: they can accelerate the process of historical determinism. Their actions, under the guidance of the Communists, can influence events and speed up the change from the present civil war and colonialism to peace and happiness. The propagandists suggest that the people can act in ways which are not only "patriotic," but also serve their self-interest. For instance, youths are urged to resist being drafted into the "losing" government army.

The Communists in South Vietnam, as elsewhere, try to increase the appearance of legitimacy by emphasizing the external support received for their cause. There is continual insistence that the insurgent movement has the support of foreign peoples even if it does not have the recognition of their governments. To present this facade, propagandists frequently misquote, cite out of context, or use isolated minority statements from non-Communist countries as expressions of mass support for the insurgents.

Local Appeals

A chief focus of underground propaganda is the local population. A study of propaganda activity in the Korean War and the Malayan and Philippine insurgencies indicates that government forces largely aim their propaganda at enemy fighters, while the insurgents seek to influence local civilians.²

The experiences in these three countries indicate that the government, because of the composition and approach of its propaganda effort, is often unable to maintain continuous contact with the local populace. Rarely does a government effectively influence the local population or help the people defend themselves against underground agitators.³

The underground, on the other hand, focus most of their propaganda effort on the local populace. The insurgents' greatest vulnerability lies in their dependence upon the cooperation of the population.⁴ If the government turns the people who tacitly support the underground against the insurgents, it can decisively affect both the underground's material support and morale.

Emotional Appeals

Underground propaganda usually emphasizes emotional arguments in expressing appeals that involve local civilians, avoiding theoretical arguments or concrete statements of programs

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of action. The underground also restructures the situation by getting those who cannot be convinced of the rightness of the movement to see it in terms of who will win and who will lose rather than whether in the long run they are right or wrong. Emotional appeals, outweighing the rational ones, tend to reinforce the bandwagon effect.

Threats

Threats also have been effective techniques of underground propaganda. Insurgents have been able to frighten large numbers of citizens into submission, cooperation, or at least passivity. Most often this has been achieved through recurrent threats of violence.⁵

Appeals to Self-Interest and Specific Needs

Communist propagandists often cater to the self-interest of the local population. By promising more food and better clothing and housing, they appeal to those disaffected from the government as well as to the economically deprived. When many people are unemployed, as they were in Korea, for example, the Communists find a ready audience.⁶

In Malaya and the Philippines, the insurgents were reported to have used a wider variety of topics in their propaganda than did the government forces. Rather than giving ideological reasons for the support they requested, they offered tangible advantages, such as more land, more food, and other material acquisitions to their supporters.⁷

Exploitation of Prejudices

Another example of Communist adaptation to local conditions is manipulation of long-established prejudices. In Malaya, propaganda exploited ethnic problems: the Malaysians were provoked against the Tamils, an ethnic minority group, while the Chinese, who provided the chief support for the guerrillas, were depicted as pro-Malayan and benefactors of the poor.⁸

Action Propaganda

During periods of uncertainty, people tend to be suspicious of what they hear and rely on their personal experiences, believing only those things which they have seen with their own eyes. When action immediately follows promises, this is called action propaganda. There are two forms of action: one focuses on specific actions which alleviate hunger and suffering among the people and demonstrate the insurgents' ability to accomplish set goals, while the other

focuses on military acts, violence, sabotage, and punishment of traitors among the local population. Both show that the insurgents are powerful in spite of being outnumbered.

In Korea, the Communist Party gave conspicuous assistance to impoverished families when no government aid was forthcoming. Cooperative food stores were started in the Philippines and in Korea; community pools of money and goods were set up in both these countries and in Malaya. Villagers in Korea frequently were abducted, exposed to propaganda, and returned the next day well-fed and unharmed.⁹

A directive from the North Korean guerrilla bureau argues that words alone cannot persuade the masses that their lot will improve under communism; therefore, deeds, however small, are needed to convince the people of the superiority of the Communist system.¹⁰

MASS MEDIA

The underground makes use of such mass media as leaflets, newspapers, and radio, mainly because of the rapidity with which the information can be disseminated and the size of the audience it can reach.

Leaflets and Newspapers

Leaflets and newspapers are both important tools of propaganda, though they have different functions. Leaflet messages can be produced quickly to reflect sudden developments and one of the foremost tasks of an illegal party is to utilize every occasion which strikes the public imagination to interpret events to its own advantage.¹¹ Lenin recognized this and called for a wide distribution of leaflets. Widely scattered printed material also has the advantage that the opposing forces find it difficult to trace the source.

In underground operations, when the content of the propaganda message is geared to individual interests, the techniques of dissemination usually stress personal contact. In the Philippines, Malaya, and Korea, leaflets were passed surreptitiously from person to person by hand or by chain letter. Giving a leaflet thus implied a proof of confidence, an honor, and a privilege. It was reported that people saw, read, and remembered more of the leaflets handed to them personally than those received by mass distribution.¹²

An experiment was conducted in six Korean villages. Progovernment leaflets were dropped by air and Communist propaganda had been circulated personally. It was found that the villagers had a more accurate memory of the wording of the Communist leaflets than of government messages.¹³

Clandestine newspapers are a classical means of spreading the underground movement's message to its adherents and potential supporters. They are for many people the voice of the

movement, presented in the most favorable terms. But the importance of newspapers extends beyond information and propaganda. They can become a rallying point for and even lead to the formation of an underground movement.¹⁴ Lenin's Iskra is reported to have performed this function in Russia. This paper, whose distribution ranged between 4 and 15 thousand copies, held together the party which led the revolution in 1905.

Clandestine newspapers must be organized so as to provide security for the personnel involved in publication. Typically, this involves a high degree of compartmentalization and division of labor. Functions are divided and members of the staff may work separately without knowledge of other members. Editorial units draft the news and editorial articles. Couriers pick up the copy and deliver it to a composition team. Another courier delivers it to the printers. There may be a separate staff to collect funds and keep books, while a supply group obtains paper, ink, lead, etc. Thus, if one part of the publication staff is arrested, the other units are not necessarily compromised.¹⁵

The critical task of distribution can be carried out in various ways, depending on the local situation. Volunteers may distribute the papers individually or the regular mail may be used. If control measures are strict, various disguises can be used. For example, the Viet Cong has used the government's own materials to disguise their propaganda. In a number of villages, security forces have found Viet Cong propaganda booklets with the same covers as government booklets.¹⁶ During World War II, the Belgian underground also used a variety of disguises for their propaganda.* One method of disguising the transmission of propaganda materials into a target country is through the diplomatic channels of embassies friendly to the underground cause. In October 1962, the Chilean Government intercepted a crate which had been shipped by the Cuban Government to its embassy in Santiago. The 1,800-pound crate was labeled "samples of Cuban products and cultural and commercial material" but actually contained subversive propaganda addressed to various Chileans who had visited Cuba within the previous few months.¹⁹

In the years just before the Bolshevik Revolution, the transportation of revolutionary material into Russia had been made exceedingly difficult. When the traditional ruse of the double-bottomed trunk became too risky, a method was devised whereby thin sheets of printed paper could be glued together to form boards, which were then made into cases, cartons, bookbindings, and backs of pictures. With this method, false bottoms were no longer needed because the trunks themselves could be constructed of revolutionary literature. The recipient needed only a bowl of warm water to unstick the special glue and separate the papers.²⁰

*A small booklet calling for people to resist the Nazi occupation and giving instructions on how to slow up production might have a railroad timetable as a cover; a book of sabotage instructions might bear a pro-German-sounding title, such as The Duty of Each in the New Order.¹⁷ A false edition of the German-controlled newspaper Soir was published by the Belgian underground. The false Soir reported German admissions of defeat and failures and ridiculed Hitler and the German generals.¹⁸

Lenin claimed that one central newspaper is more efficient than a number of local ones.²¹ Local news can be distributed through leaflets, but a central newspaper is a necessity. An underground press can communicate tactics and instructions in relation to specific targets and enemies. Furthermore, newspapers can serve as a training ground in which members of the organization can practice gathering and distributing information; they also learn to estimate the effects of political events on various sections of the population and to devise suitable methods to influence these events through the revolutionary party. In Lenin's words: "Arranging for and organizing the speedy and proper delivery of literature, leaflets, proclamations, etc., training a network of agents for this purpose, means performing the greater part of the work of preparing for future demonstrations or an uprising."²²

Underground newspapers can help to immunize the population against official propaganda, counteract fear, defeatism, and indifference, and maintain an uncompromising hostility to the regime.²³ The printed medium gives more information and more ideas than even good oral propaganda. It spreads information and ideas uniformly and so is instrumental in tying its readers into a close mental community.

Undergrounds not only produce illegal newspapers, but also use existing legitimate newspapers for their own ends. In Kenya, during the Mau Mau insurrection, press criticism of certain aspects of local authority provided fertile ground for implantation of rumors about public officials. With the press background, rumors that a particular police official was "being investigated" were easily believed; accusations of police brutality or ill-treatment of prisoners were made against officials who were learning too much about or causing excessive difficulty to the Mau Mau organization.²⁴

Radio

Radio broadcasts are widely used by contemporary undergrounds and have a number of advantages over printed materials. A broadcast can simultaneously reach a large number of persons over a considerable range of territory. The same coverage by newspaper takes longer and is much more dangerous for the publishers, distributors, and recipients. A radio broadcast used in conjunction with an underground movement's agitation operations can enhance the credibility of the message and lend an appearance of strength to the organization.

An added advantage of radio is that broadcasts can be made from abroad, as in the case of Algerian FLN broadcasts over Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus. The Communist Greek underground operated Radio Station Free Greece which pretended to broadcast from within Greece, although it probably was located in Albania or Rumania.²⁵ Latin-American subversive groups such as the Dominican Liberation Movement, the Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Struggle Movement, and the Guatemalan Information Committee transmit hostile propaganda against their respective governments through the facilities of Radio Havana.²⁶

In its early period, the Viet Cong operated a weak transmitter in the South, apparently from a junk. Subsequently, they used a much stronger transmitter for Liberation Radio to broadcast news features and commentaries in five languages: Vietnamese, English, Cambodian, French, and Chinese.²⁷ Radio Hanoi lent official support to the insurgents.

Propaganda Content

Messages transmitted by mass media during an insurgency essentially have three types of content: attention-getting, instructional, and persuasive. When people are under stress, they avidly seek information bearing upon the current crisis. As one way of capturing people's attention, underground newspapers and clandestine radio broadcasts usually contain news and information about the progress of the insurgency, what others are saying about the insurgency, events external to the conflict, and other newsworthy events. People will listen or read communications in order to get the news, but in the process they are exposed to the persuasive content of the insurgent's message.

In order to provide continuity and uniformity, selected themes are assigned and transmitted at regular intervals to all propaganda organs of the movement. Many of these instructions are transmitted undisguised through clandestine radio broadcasts. In addition, information about potential collaborators and government tactics are also contained in material distributed through mass media.²⁸

The Communists have been particularly effective in the use of the "double language" routine, in which propaganda materials simultaneously give instructions to the Communist cadre. This technique had been employed in different ways. During the early phase of the Bolshevik Revolution, only indirect language was used to call for the overthrow of the government. Revolutionary propaganda resorted to "hints" which were understandable, through previous training and indoctrination, to party members of sympathizers, who in turn explained them to the people.²⁹

More frequently, the Communists have used this double language propaganda technique to disguise specific instructions to the cadre. For example, one observer of the South Vietnamese insurgency has reported that it is difficult, when sorting through a pile of captured Communist documents, to say which are meant as general propaganda and which as training or instructional materials for internal use.³⁰

When the Viet Cong want to pass instructions rapidly to the cadre about policy changes or a new propaganda line, they usually avoid written directives, which may take a week or more, and employ instead hidden instructions in Radio Liberation propaganda broadcasts. Since such broadcasts are overheard by the government, it is essential to make instructions appear routine and inconspicuous. Part of the cadre's training is learning to interpret camouflaged messages and to apply them to local circumstances.³¹

The persuasive messages of mass media are designed to bolster the morale of the insurgents, to undermine confidence in the government and its policies among a mass audience, and to win active supporters or at least sympathizers to the movement. The messages are phrased in highly emotional terms and may make use of distortion or complete fabrication.

Distrust of government officials is stressed and allusions to government manipulation and dishonesty are made. Other themes bring out the helplessness of individuals and the strength of the insurgent movement. A recurrent theme is that the country has an abundance of material goods for everyone but that the listeners are being excluded from their just share. Themes which stress anxiety are also included, along with warnings of disaster unless immediate action is taken.³²

Internal Communications

Insurgencies in rural, agrarian, low-literacy societies face many obstacles both physical and psychological, to the free flow of communications: the absence of electricity limits the use of radios, illiteracy limits the use of newspapers, inadequate transportation routes limit travel, and so on.

Word-of-mouth communication has, in most of these areas, been the traditional means of contact with the outside world. Recently, forms of mass media have, to some extent, been incorporated within the traditional channels. News from the urban areas may reach a remote village through a person who has a portable radio or acquires a newspaper. This person then becomes the source of information to the entire village. Travelers— itinerant storytellers or peddlers—are another source of outside news. Institutions such as the village bazaar have taken on the function of disseminating information first planted by mass media.³³

Word-of-mouth is an efficient means of communicating factual news of particular events, as a survey taken in 198 villages in India illustrates. Several months after the 1962 Chinese-Indian border fighting, the survey revealed that of the 83 percent of the villagers who had heard the news, 40 percent heard it from friends, shopkeepers, or similar sources. This is compared with a similar study made in the United States where 93 percent of the people surveyed had heard of particular news events within 24 hours; 88 percent of these heard the news through the mass media.³⁴

The substantive and interpretive news of the journals and radio reports are usually effective only within the frame of reference of urbanized audiences. Therefore, the persons who pass news to the villages have an opportunity to add interpretation to the news they pass on by word-of-mouth. In an insurgency situation, the underground agitator seeks to take advantage of the communication process and passes on his own news with his own interpretations. His news may come from an authentic mass-media source—Pravda, Radio Hanoi, Radio Free Cuba, or whatever source is supporting the movement—and his interpretations are fitted to the attitudes and level of his audience and the local situation.

The agitator, to insure a maximum degree of credibility, tries to bar other external sources of information from his target group or area. This is done through the confiscation of

radios, threats to rural newspaper distributors, and impairment of government access to the area. In effect, he seeks to develop a captive audience in order to facilitate his job of influencing attitudes and behavior and generating popular support for the underground movement.

AGITATION

Agitation is essential in creating mass support, for it takes more than a presentation of information to a group of people for them to accept an idea and be persuaded to it. Exposure to information does not imply absorption of it. There are psychological as well as physical barriers which inhibit the flow of information and ideas. There may be general apathy in which a large portion of the population is unfamiliar and unconcerned with particular events—the chronic "know-nothing" group. Another barrier is the phenomenon of "selective exposure": a tendency to hear only information congenial to individual tastes, biases, and existing attitudes. There is also "selective interpretation": information understood only in terms of prior attitudes. Frequently, only differential changes in attitude appear, in which individuals who do alter their attitudes as a result of information do so only in terms of their prior attitudes.³⁵

The task of the agitator lies in overcoming these barriers and putting over a message that is credible and meaningful. He must reach the indifferent; he must blend his theme with the existing attitudes of his target group; and he must make the resultant attitude one which can be converted to mass action. The agitator must also dislodge any complacency that exists among a group of people, intensify their unrest, and channel it to suit the purposes of the underground.³⁶

Armed Propaganda

The concept of armed propaganda illustrates the integrated nature of military and political operations in an insurgency and stresses the relative importance of psychological and political operations. According to General Vo Nguyen Giap's view, the first of three phases of insurgent conflict is the psychological warfare phase. In the second phase, propaganda and agitation continue but armed struggle comes to the forefront. In the final phase, when victory is near, the emphasis returns to political propaganda. Before, during, and after the armed conflict, military units are charged with carrying out propaganda missions. Likewise, the political arm of the movement has armed enforcing units to support its psychological and military missions.³⁷

In Vietnam, Viet Cong agitation is carried out by armed propaganda teams and cadre agit-prop agents, supplemented by relatively simple village propaganda subcommittees.³⁸ A Viet Cong indoctrination booklet succinctly describes the nonmilitary responsibilities of its soldiers in a political struggle:

Because of their prestige, the members of the armed forces have great propaganda potentiality. If the fighter with a rifle in his hand knows how to make propaganda, to praise the political struggle and to educate the masses about their duty of making the political attack, his influence may be very great. But if he simply calls on the population to join him in the armed struggle he will cause great damage. He must say, "Those who do political struggling are as important as we who fight with rifles. If you do not take up the political struggle we will be unable to defeat the enemy with our rifles." This will make our fellow countrymen more enthusiastic and will also help to promote the political struggle.³⁹

Armed propaganda companies serving each province, although primarily military, are also responsible for psychological warfare. These units (such as those of the NFLSV in Vietnam in 1960) infiltrate by night those villages which by day are controlled by government troops. They may sometimes even enter during the day, assemble the villagers, make their appeals, and leave before government troops can respond. The armed propaganda units range in size from a squad to a company. Their duties include agitation, recruitment, and selective terrorism through enforcement of death sentences. They make periodic visits to villages to carry out propaganda sessions. When visiting a village, the armed unit may suggest that all villagers attend the meeting and will usually ostensibly excuse one or two reluctant persons. However, if many of the villagers fail to attend, the team may find it necessary—in the name of patriotism, of course—to enforce attendance.⁴⁰

The possession of weapons gives such teams an air of prestige before a village audience. As a leading figure in the Philippine Huk movement stated: "The people are always impressed by the arms, not out of fear but out of a feeling of strength. We get up before the people then, backed by our arms, and give them the message of the struggle. It is never difficult after that."⁴¹

The tactics of armed propaganda teams vary, according to the local situation, from a simple display of armed strength to disemboweling an uncooperative village chief. In one operation in Vietnam in January 1962, 100 youth group leaders were captured by a Viet Cong armed propaganda unit. Most were released several weeks later after a period of intensive political indoctrination. Seven incorrigibles, however, were held back and probably murdered.⁴²

Techniques of Agitation

The methods involved in armed propaganda can be illustrated by describing a typical visit of an agitprop team to a village in Vietnam.⁴³ Such a team includes a young man from the Youth and Student Liberation Associations; a farmer and a woman who work with the Farmers' and Women's Liberation Associations, respectively; and additional members, depending on the team's area of responsibility. Before entering the village, the team confers with an agent or sympathizer who has been in the village to investigate the people and their attitudes. If he

reports that the villagers are despondent because the rice crop is poor or there are cases of cholera, this is noted as a vulnerable point.

Around dusk the team parades into the village, attracting attention by shouting and enthusiastically greeting old friends. The team suggests that everyone gather for a meeting. They are armed, so the suggestion is particularly persuasive. The team's leader tells the assembled villagers how happy the team is to see old friends, but notes that there is unhappiness in the village. To provide an informal, social aura, he may suggest that they all begin by singing old Vietnamese songs. This provides an emotional setting for the team's presentation. After a few songs the leader suggests that the people try new lyrics, dealing with the liberation of the country from imperialism. By having the audience learn and sing the new lyrics, the team conveys its message and has it repeated by the group.

The team leader then brings up the specific problems of poor crops and disease. He announces that the Americans are in the country destroying crops by chemicals—a process called defoliation. He explains that although this isn't being conducted in the immediate area, the wind carries the hateful chemicals great distances. He goes on to explain that what the villagers think is cholera actually is a rare, incurable disease resulting from American germ warfare. He concludes by asserting that if the people want better crops and better health, they must drive out the Americans.

After the leader has delivered his message, the team sings more songs and acts out a lively and humorous skit, to revitalize the audience's attention and create a stereotype of the enemy. In the skit a swaggering and boastful American makes indecent advances to an innocent young Vietnamese girl on a street in Saigon. The American is then bested by a capable, witty, and loyal Vietnamese taxicab driver.

The team, to reinforce its message, brings out a portable radio in time for the late evening news from Liberation Radio or Radio Hanoi. The broadcast tells of great victories of the National Liberation Army and the failures of American helicopters. This adds an aura of organizational strength. After the news the team gets feedback from the audience by calling for questions and comments on any subject. This will bring out specific grievances and point out potential recruits for the movement.

After the public meeting, the audience is broken up into groups—farmers, women, and teenagers. In these group discussions, the team members explain how the revolution suits their specific interests, they also determine any special grievances and make note of potential talent.

After the group sessions have broken up, the team distributes leaflets through the village, nails posters on trees, raises a National Liberation Front flag, and leaves. The next day government troops from a nearby post see the flag, come to the village, and make the people take the flag down and burn it. A few days after the team's visit, a cadre agitprop agent comes

to the village and singles out those persons whom the team had noted as potential recruits. He remains in the village to establish local cells or subcommittees to provide the essential follow-up and to repeat the message planted by the visiting team.

The techniques employed in such operations can be outlined:

Attention-Getting. The people's attention is aroused by loud fanfare, music, drums, displays of armed force, or any other device which creates interest and draws attention to the team's exhibition.⁴⁴

Attention-Sustaining. People in rural areas are usually starved for entertainment and their attention can be sustained by songs, plays, motion pictures, vaudeville, magic lantern shows, etc. The agitators mix their propaganda theme with humor and entertainment by putting revolutionary lyrics to old songs and by playing skits in which the "enemy" is depicted as the villain.

Action Propaganda. Where possible, action themes rather than words or vague promises are stressed. The agitprop team makes simple promises which can be immediately implemented, so as to enhance the credibility of other propaganda themes.

Repetition. Underground "resident agents" or members of the local subcommittee set up, continue the work, and follow up the message by incorporating underground themes into everyday experiences.

Feedback. After the propaganda message has been put across, the villagers are organized into discussion groups so they can ask questions and voice complaints. The agitator thus gains insight into the specific grievances of the group and also learns the local jargon and notes activities among the villagers.

Special Interest. Agitators take advantage of social norms to add credibility to their message. They learn of special-interest grievances and adjust their theme and approach accordingly in the course of the conversation in the discussion groups.

Simplicity. The agitprop agent keeps his message simple and direct, closely related to the audience's specific interests and grievances. Later these specifics are developed into generalities.

Captive Audience. The agitator, by capitalizing on the information void in the rural areas, in effect makes the target group a captive audience.

Mass Media. Radios and newspapers are not able to carry the entire burden of persuasion or even of transmission of information in the rural areas of undeveloped nations. The agitator uses mass media mainly as a secondary, reinforcement tool.

Scapegoat. The agitator makes functional use of human tendencies to fear and reject outsiders and to transfer guilt and blame to other groups or individuals. Some distinctive physical characteristic or cultural tradition is used as a symbol at which all blame for frustration and failures is directed.⁴⁵ If the agitprop operation is successful, the target group's fears and

grievances are directed toward selected outsiders such as landlords, government tax collectors, or "beak-nosed Americans."

Organizational Factors

The Communists, in building an agitprop network, follow certain tactical principles. First, all members of the party's committee in the area of operation must be "thoroughly indoctrinated about the significance of the project before they are presented with definite plans and instructions for carrying out the program." Likewise, the local committees must be convinced of the urgency and importance of the system. The network must follow a we-do-what-we-propagate policy in order to make the message timely and stimulating.⁴⁶

The network must seek out aggressive elements or "activists" among the target group and train them as agitators. Such people are often effective agitators because in addition to having a personal grievance they are familiar with the local people, know the attitudes, conditions, and jargon of the group, and are readily accepted.

The network is built gradually through a process of experimentation. Systems and techniques are tested in selected areas before the program is implemented generally. A propaganda plan is then drawn up at the party committee level. The plan is disseminated to local committees for further experimentation and implementation. Once the campaign is underway, its successes and failures are reviewed.

The network emphasizes one campaign at a time. Party members point out that revolution is a mass movement, that mass actions involving the population in general must concentrate on a very few definite and clearly expressed objectives. Only after one objective is completed is it replaced with another. Likewise, only after one general slogan has been learned does a second one appear.

The slogans must be combined with actual tasks in order to be meaningful and understandable to the people. In the Chinese "Resist-America Aid-Korea" campaign, agitators were supposed to make the people understand why they should hate America and what they could do individually to help oppose American "aggression." This meant such concrete actions as increased individual production or specific donations of money to buy airplanes and artillery.⁴⁷

Communists try to transform the sentiments of the masses into an idea which appears to represent what the people want, while actually representing what the party wants. The ideas of the party must sound as though they came from the people.

The following outline is an example of a Communist propaganda plan. It was prepared for use in a small village in China:

A. Objectives and Requirements of Propaganda

1. There are 16 families in the section. Each of us will take care of 8 families. We both guarantee that every member of the 16 families will receive constantly the education of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement. At the end of half a month, we will compare notes to see which one of us is doing a better job of propaganda.
2. In addition to the fixed objectives of propaganda (the 16 families), we will talk to anyone whom we meet. The motto is not to waste one single minute on any single individual. We should change the "conversation on personal affairs" into a "conversation on current affairs" and thus develop the habit of carrying on propaganda at all times and places.
3. The general task of the propaganda in the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign should be united with the propaganda of the actual tasks carried on in the community. In the patriotic movement of increasing production, we will not only set up our own plans of production but will also mobilize all the people in the community to do the same. We will aim at mobilizing people to plant 40 acres of cotton and 60 trees and to invest in 30 shares of the local co-op; persuading 55 people to sign the Peace Appeal (Stockholm) and vote in the movement for solving the problem of Japan by a united effort (as opposed to the Peace Treaty signed with Japan by the United States and most of the other belligerents of San Francisco); organizing 30 people to participate in the demonstration parade in celebration of May 1; and directing the masses to do a good job in suppressing the counter-revolutionaries.

B. Content of Propaganda

1. To make everyone in the community understand that to oppose America and aid Korea is the only way to protect his home and defend the country; that the actual task of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement is to increase production and do a good job in one's own field; that the Chinese and Korean armies will definitely win the war, and that the American devils will eventually be defeated. Meanwhile we would point out the possible difficulties that may be encountered, explain the experiences in China's War of Liberation, and enable the masses to understand correctly the victorious situation at present and not to be disturbed by temporary setbacks.
2. To speed up . . . production and organize the masses of the people to participate in the movement through these principles.
3. To propagate current information on the suppression of counter-revolutionaries on the basis of the "Law on the Punishment of Counter-revolutionaries" recently made public by the government.
4. To propagate the advantages of a close relation between co-ops and the people and thus encourage people to purchase shares.

5. To propagate the meaning of signing the World Peace Appeal and voting on the Japanese question, and to explain the reasons for participating in the demonstration parade on May 1.

C. Source of Material for Propaganda

1. To attend the meetings for propagandists punctually, listen carefully to the lectures, and study the propaganda materials.
2. To read newspapers, propaganda handbooks, and any other material handed down from the higher Party organization and to keep constantly in touch with the secretary of the Party branch.
3. To gather reactions from the masses.
4. To maintain constant contact with the ch'u committee of the Party through letters and in person.

D. Forms and Methods of Propaganda

1. To organize four group discussions during this month. At least one of them should be a discussion meeting of women.
2. To conduct individual propaganda or informal conversation at least twice a day and make it a habit to do so.
3. To organize a newspaper-reading group, and read the Ta Chung Pao (The Daily of the Masses, published in North Kiangsu) every three days. We will take turns in reading newspapers.
4. To put out a "propaganda bulletin board" on current affairs and local news. The board is to be supplied with new material every three days.
5. To grasp every opportunity for propaganda such as working, walking, etc.
6. To make use of the aggressive activists in the masses. It is our plan to make use of Tsu Chang-yu [name of a child] to carry on propaganda among the 18 children in the community. We are planning to educate and use Siao Chi-yuan [name of a woman] to carry on propaganda among the 12 women in the section.⁴⁸

Agitation Operations

Province-level agitation units conduct workshops on general themes to be disseminated through the lower echelon districts and cells. The cadres then conduct surveys in their precincts and districts and adapt the themes to the local conditions of their areas.⁴⁹ In late 1964, there were estimated to be 4,000 Viet Cong trained agitprop cadres working in the rural areas of South Vietnam.⁵⁰

The goal of agitprop operations is to transform grievances into power, to develop mass support which can be mobilized into mass action. The four phases in these operations are investigation and infiltration, involvement, crystallization, and commitment.

Investigation and Infiltration

The agitprop operation begins with an investigation phase, designed to familiarize the cadre with actual conditions among both enemies and allies. Mao Tse-tung's formula is "investigate first, propagandize next." Mao emphasizes this by stating:

Without investigation no comrade has the right to speak. . . Take our propaganda work for instance. If we do not understand the real propaganda situation of the enemy, allies, and ourselves, we cannot correctly determine our propaganda plan. In all tasks of every department we should first have an understanding of the existing conditions so that we can do our work well.⁵¹

In Vietnam the normal pattern is for an agitprop team (5 to 10 men) to penetrate an area or village to investigate the local psychological and administrative strengths and vulnerabilities. The underground agitators live among the people, propagandize the insurgent cause, and organize local committees. Selective terrorism is carried out against those who fail to respond to the team's overtures.⁵²

A captured Communist directive to North Korean agitators operating in the U. N.-controlled city of Seoul outlined their duties, which included organizing and reviving cells within the city, keeping close check on the attitudes of the population within each precinct, and recording all incidents of South Korean civilian cooperation with the U. S. forces.⁵³ The purpose of this was to identify all who were friendly or unfriendly to the government.

The investigation stage, then, determines what the local tasks are, who the friendly activists are, and what the attitudes and sentiments of the people are. According to a captured Viet Cong province propaganda chief: "You must be patient in listening to people's problems. You must know what they are talking about and, most of all, you must leave the impression that their specific grievance is your main concern. With peasants you discuss land reform and maybe you promise education to youths. You don't go far on generalities."⁵⁴ Armed with inside information on the particular grievances of a village and the individuals in it, an agitprop team can prepare a program.⁵⁵

In areas where there is little or no government control, agitprop teams can move relatively freely. Even where there is substantial government control the teams can often gain access to villages. In Malaya, for example, the Communists operated in bands of 100 or so and could overwhelm the small police force (usually a sergeant and 10 men) in Malayan villages. The Communists usually murdered all government officials and any known supporters in the village. With this background, the Communists established secret agreements with many of the rural

police posts. If the police would permit the Communists to have the village at night, they could continue to run the village during the day. Mock raids were staged so that the police could drive the Communists off; thus the operations were covered up and the police even won awards. When the people of the village became aware of the deal, which they soon did, they too cooperated with the Communists.⁵⁶

Involvement

Once an area has been infiltrated, efforts are focused on getting individuals to involve themselves with the underground movement through some overt act. At first, all that is needed is any symbolic act, such as flying a flag, cutting a single strand of barbed wire in a strategic hamlet fence, or constructing a nail board to be used against government soldiers. Once a villager is involved even superficially, it is comparatively easy to expand his activities into full-scale active support.

After he is established in an area, an agitator turns his attention to public health, sanitation, and education.⁵⁷ Humanitarian endeavors are undertaken to win sympathy and create social indebtedness. The agitators look for families who have lost everything, those who have not received needed assistance from the government, the unemployed, and the sick. Special attention is paid to the families of government soldiers and officials. A favorable word from a mother, father, or a close friend can have a greater impact than any slogan.⁵⁸

"Action propaganda" is used to create popular support. The "actions" include helping peasants in the fields, distributing captured food to the population, repairing churches and shrines, and reopening schools.⁵⁹

In the involvement phase the agitator also aims to confuse the opinions and emotions of his audience, so that even if they do not support the underground cause, they at least are uncertain about supporting the government.⁶⁰

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Crystallization

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Traditional concepts and customary ways of thinking must be dislodged in order to create a "mobilizable" mass base for the underground movement. A successful agitprop operation must not only gain people's attention, it must provide a channel for their tensions.⁶¹ Crystallization is the phase of ideological preparation in which the goal of the agitator is to transform grievances into hatred of the enemy, whoever he may be; to convince the people that the movement serves them and that their personal interest demands their support of the cause; to teach the people the way and how of the political struggle; and to develop faith and enthusiasm for the movement.⁶²

One technique used by Communists in developing crystallization is "thought-revealing and grievance-telling" sessions. In these sessions agitators draw out and expose the mental processes of their audience. A basic rule is to have everyone talk, for talking helps a person convince himself. Since everyone has some grievance, the agitator encourages them to express their grievances to the group. Then he supplies the "correct" interpretation of the expressed grievances, coupling them with the goals of the movement.

Two basic methods are used in grievance-telling sessions. The first method is the "from far to near" approach in which the meetings deal with things in the past and then focus on present happenings. For example, the agitator may start with some esteemed national leader in history who symbolizes certain societal ideals. Slowly he ties the past symbol into the current movement—wrapping his message in the cloak of patriotism.

A second method is the "from few to many" approach: the agitator encourages a few activists in the group to initiate the grievance process and then persists until everyone rises to pour out his grievances. Each time a person offers a grievance, the agitator suggests that others have similar grievances; this involves them in the discussion and relates their grievances to current underground themes.⁶³

Commitment

After the group has been investigated, infiltrated, involved, and rallied around a common motive for fighting, it must be impelled to take the desired mass action. This action may be in the form of protest demonstrations and parades or the election of a new slate of local government officials. Village youths can be recruited into military units while other villagers provide logistic support, food, intelligence, and weapons. At this "action-taking" phase the agitator truly has a captive audience.

The agitator communicates ideas and information to the people through organizations. These organizations can be old-established institutions (labor unions, rural cooperatives, etc.) which the agitators now control, or they can be newly established ones. The Viet Cong, for instance, generally prefer to create new organizations for specific motivational and control purposes.⁶⁴

If an underground is successful in gaining control of the government, agitation operations can then develop popular loyalty and support for the new regime. People usually lose interest in a movement when their immediate grievances, such as the demand for land, have been satisfied. The agitator serves as a liaison between the controlling element and the public by passing on information and directives through his regular techniques. His new themes emphasize that apathy and opposition to the movement are wicked and hopeless.⁶⁵

FOOTNOTES

¹The source used for the following description of propaganda themes was the periodical published by U.S. Army, Headquarters of Broadcasting and Visual Activity, PAC, APO 331, "Communist Propaganda Trends." The periodical gives weekly and monthly summaries of Communist propaganda and shows its direction and trends.

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⁴Ibid., p. 3.

⁵Ibid., p. 90.

⁶Ibid., p. 29.

⁷Ibid., p. 90.

⁸Ibid., p. 43.

⁹Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 25.

¹¹Otto Bauer, Die Illegale Partei (Paris: Editions La Lutte Socialiste, 1939), p. 131.

¹²Barton, Paramilitary Warfare, p. 84.

¹³Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁴Bauer, Illegale Partei, p. 128.

¹⁵George K. Tanham, "The Belgian Underground Movement 1940-1944" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1951), pp. 221-26.

¹⁶Seth S. King, The New York Times (March 17, 1965).

¹⁷Tanham, "Belgian Underground," p. 202.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 238-40.

¹⁹Edwin Martin, "Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere," Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1963, p. 350.

²⁰Michael Furtell, Northern Underground (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), pp. 39-40.

²¹V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?," Collected Works, Vol. 5 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), pp. 346-529.

²²V. I. Lenin, "Letter to a Comrade on Our Organizational Tasks," Collected Works, Vol. 6 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 240.

²³Bauer, Illegale Partei, p. 132.

²⁴Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), p. 46.

²⁵Andrew R. Molnar, et al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), p. 307.

²⁶Martin, "Communist Subversion," p. 350.

²⁷Douglas Pike, "The Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus in South Vietnam," unpublished manuscript, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, circa 1964; and unpublished Special Operations Research Office working paper, pp. 30-32.

- 28 Ibid., pp. 2-5.
- 29 The Communist use of double language is discussed more fully in Louis F. Budenz, The Techniques of Communism (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), especially pp. 41-44.
- 30 Pike, "Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus," pp. 2-42.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, "Portrait of the American Agitator," Public Opinion and Propaganda, eds. Daniel Katz, et al. (New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 470-77.
- 33 See Wilbur Schramm, et al., Mass Media and National Development (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 72-87, 104; and Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer (eds.), The Emerging Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961).
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- 35 Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail," Public Opinion and Propaganda, eds. Daniel Katz, et al. (New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 522-31.
- 36 Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," Principles of Sociology, ed. Alfred McClung Lee (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1951), pp. 202-205.
- 37 General Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), see especially pp. 76-81.
- 38 Pike, "Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus," pp. 19-20.
- 39 Ibid., p. 39.
- 40 Ibid., pp. 22 and 38.
- 41 William J. Pomeroy, The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 43.
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- 43 Pike, "Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus," pp. 22-26.
- 44 Frederick T. C. Yu, The Strategy and Tactics of Chinese Communist Propaganda, As of 1952, HRRI, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, June 1955), p. 17.
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- 46 Yu, Chinese Communist Propaganda, pp. xii, 13-14; and Frederick T. C. Yu, The Propaganda Machine in Communist China—With Special Reference to Ideology, Policy, and Regulations, As of 1952, HRRI, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, 1955), pp. 29-30.
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 Yu, Propaganda Machine, pp. 25-26.
- 49 Luis Tarue, Born of the People (New York: International Publishers, 1953), p. 132.
- 50 Pike, "Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus," p. 22.
- 51 Yu, Chinese Communist Propaganda, p. 14; Mao Tse-tung, "The Reform of Learning," Cheng Feng Wen Hsien (Documents of the Party's Ideological Remoulding Movement).
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⁵³ Fred H. Barton, North Korean Propaganda to South Koreans (Civilian and Military), Technical Memorandum ORO-T-10 (EUSAK) (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, 1951), p. 109.

⁵⁴ Stanley Karnow, "Captured Red Gives Clues to Viet-Nam War," The Washington Post, May 19, 1964, p. A-16; see also Taruc, Born of the People, pp. 37-38.

⁵⁵ Pike, "Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus," p. 23.

⁵⁶ Richard L. Clutterbuck, Speech at Special Operations Research Office on December 18, 1963; see also Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Communist Defeat in Malaya: A Case Study," Military Review, September 1963, pp. 63-78.

⁵⁷ Denis Warner, The Last Confucian (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 124.

⁵⁸ Molnar, Underground, pp. 59-60; Barton, North Korean Propaganda, p. 110.

⁵⁹ Alexander Dallin, Ralph Mavrogordate and Wilhelm Mill, "Partisan Psychological Warfare and Popular Attitudes," Soviet Partisans in World War II, ed. John A. Armstrong (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 255.

⁶⁰ Pike, "Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus," p. 21.

⁶¹ See Blumer, "Collective Behavior," pp. 204-205; and Yu, Chinese Communist Propaganda, pp. 15-16.

⁶² Pike, "Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus," p. 25.

⁶³ Yu, Chinese Communist Propaganda, pp. 18-19.

⁶⁴ Pike, "Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus," p. 27; and United States Information Service, Inventory of Communist Documents (Saigon: U.S. Information Service, December 1, 1963).

⁶⁵ See Warner, Last Confucian, p. 127.

CHAPTER TEN

PASSIVE RESISTANCE

Nonviolent passive resistance has long been a method and corollary of human conflict, playing a role in many underground and revolutionary activities. Although both the role and, particularly, the process of passive resistance have sometimes been obscured by philosophic and religious considerations, its tactics remain much the same, whether practiced by a Gandhi from moral and religious convictions or by a pragmatic underground as an expedient. Typically, the underground organizes and directs passive resistance techniques, and persuades the ordinary citizen to carry them out.

OBJECTIVES

Passive resistance implies a large, unarmed group whose activities capitalize upon social norms, customs, and taboos in order to provoke action by security forces that will serve to alienate large segments of public opinion from the government or its agents. If the government does not respond to the passive resisters' actions, the resisters will immobilize the processes of public order and safety and seriously challenge the writ of government.

Passive resistance rests on the basic thesis that governments and social organizations, even when they possess instruments of physical force, depend upon the voluntary assistance and cooperation of great numbers of individuals.¹ One method, therefore, of opposing an established power structure is to persuade many persons to refuse to cooperate with it.

The principal tactic used to induce noncooperation—tacit withdrawal of the populace's support of the government—is frequently described as persuasion through suffering. One of the persistent myths of passive resistance is that persuasion through suffering aims only to persuade the opponent and his supporting populace by forcing him to experience a guilty change of heart and a sense of remorse: "The sight of suffering on the part of multitudes of people will melt the heart of the aggressor and induce him to desist from his course of violence."²

This conception of the role of suffering makes the fundamental error of presuming that only two actors are involved in the process of passive resistance: the suffering resister and the opponent. Actually, passive resistance operates within a framework involving three actors: the suffering passive resister, the opponent (the government and security forces), and the larger "audience" (the population). Every conflict situation is dramatically affected by the extent to which the audience becomes involved. One political scientist has called this phenomenon "the contagiousness of conflict."³ A great change inevitably occurs in the nature of the conflict when the audience is included as a third actor. The original participants are apt to lose control or,

at the least, the outcome is greatly influenced. It is most important in politics to determine the manner and extent to which the scope of conflict influences the outcome, and how to manipulate it. Passive resistance techniques, particularly the function of suffering, provide one insight into the manipulation of "the contagiousness of conflict." More than anything else, the objective of passive resistance is to create situations that will involve public opinion and direct it against the established power structure. When this happens, the position of the passive resisters is legitimized.

When the passive resister suffers at the hand of the government, it demonstrates his integrity, commitment, and courage, while showing the injustice, cruelty, and tyranny of the government. The essential function of suffering is comparable to the interaction that takes place between a martyr and a crowd. The passive resister's token of power in the face of the security force is his capacity to suffer in the eyes of the onlooker. The courage and dedication of an unresisting martyr can have tremendous impact on the imagination of a crowd.⁴

If the passive resister provokes a response from the security forces or government which can be made to seem unjust or unfair, his charges of tyranny and persecution are confirmed. Should the government fail to act, it abdicates its control over the population, over the enforcement of law, and over the maintenance of order. Passive resistance techniques suddenly thrust upon a government the initiative, and also the responsibility, for uninvited conflict with unarmed citizens.

The primary function of passive resistance suffering is to redraw the political battlelines in favor of the resister. There are, of course, a number of variables in the effectiveness of suffering. One is the attitude and orientation of the opponent; success seems dependent on whether the opponent really cares how a population views him, whether or not he is attempting to win favor. Also, the coercive effect depends on whether or not the opponents are the passive resister's own countrymen; if they are, common identity and nationalism tend to induce empathy. In some societies passive suffering is viewed with contempt and is seen as masochism or "an exploitation of the rulers' good-natured reluctance to allow unnecessary suffering, denying attributes of personal courage or virtue to the sufferer."⁵

In addition to alienating public opinion from a government, underground-sponsored passive resistance has two other equally important objectives. The first is to lower the morale of government officials and security forces. This goal is most relevant to occupying forces. A second objective is to tie down security forces. By organizing and encouraging a citizenry to use techniques of passive resistance, the underground can successfully divert security forces from other tasks.⁶

TECHNIQUES

The arsenal of the passive resister contains a number of weapons of nonviolence. One reason they may be effective is that the government forces may not know how to cope with nonviolence. Police and soldiers are trained to fight force with force, but are usually "neither trained nor psychologically prepared to fight passive resistance."⁷ Actions of passive resistance may range from small isolated challenges to specific laws, to complete disregard of governmental authority, but the techniques of passive resistance can be classified into three general types: attention-getting devices, noncooperation, and civil disobedience.

Attention-Getting Devices

Passive resistance in the early stages usually takes the form of actions calculated to gain attention, provide propaganda for the cause, or be a nuisance to government forces. Attention-getting devices include demonstrations, mass meetings, picketing, and the creation of symbols. Demonstrations and picketing help advertise the resistance campaign and educate the larger public to the issues at stake. Such activities provide propaganda and agitation for both internal and external consumption.

An example of this was the 1963 Buddhist protest in South Vietnam. The self-immolation of a Buddhist monk was strategically timed to insure that newsmen and photographers—particularly U.S. newsmen—would be present to record the event. The leader of the Buddhists, Thich Tri Quang, wanted publicity in the U.S. press and took pains to make U.S. reporters welcome.⁸

The creation of symbols is also a common passive resistance device. Besides gaining attention, the Buddhist monks who immolated themselves—particularly the first, whose heart was preserved and displayed in Saigon's Xa Loi Pagoda—also became symbols for the resistance campaign. An example of another kind of symbol is seen in the Danish resistance movement against the Nazis. King Christian became a symbol embodying the spirit of the passive resistance struggle. The King's traditional morning ride through Copenhagen on his statuesque horse, unaccompanied by police or aides-de-camp, even months after the Nazi occupation, gained national attention. As the Danish poet, Kaj Munk, wrote then: "It does us good, as if it says to us, Denmark is still in the saddle."⁹ The King also kept his royal standard flying both day and night over his palace, indicating he was always ready—either to negotiate with the Germans or

lead his people. The tales of his veiled rudeness to German officials set the tone for all Denmark. A German general led a sizable force in an inexplicable attack on the weakly guarded palace, killing several Danish soldiers who put up courageous resistance. The King's sarcastic greeting to him—"Good morning, my brave general"—was told and retold throughout the nation.¹⁰

Jokes are often used to provoke an enemy and demonstrate contempt. This technique was used by most passive resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe. Sometimes it took the form of shouting anti-Nazi jokes in a cinema hall showing German films, or of little jokes made in public about Nazi repression policies, like the Danish streetcar conductor calling out, "All saboteurs change here."¹¹

Ostracism campaigns, accusations, whispering campaigns, and refusal to speak or be friendly are also frequent techniques. In the anti-Nazi resistance, these occasionally developed spontaneously; later, they were often organized by the undergrounds. In Denmark these techniques were labeled Den kolde Skulder (the cold shoulder) policy, and many people wore buttons initialed DKS or SDU (Smid dem ud, or throw them out). Open contempt was displayed: "If a German military band gave a concert in a public place, they did so without a single listener. If Germans entered a cafe, at a given signal all Danes then rose and left."¹²

In Belgium similar activities were organized. One illustration of the type of witticism which helped the Belgian morale and enraged the Germans centered on the proposed German invasion of England: "An attractive housewife entered a store just before a German officer, who of course told the storekeeper to help the lady first. The lady declined and stated she did not wish to delay the officer who was probably in a hurry to catch his ship for England."¹³ Also, anti-German inscriptions began to appear on the sides of buildings, on sidewalks, and on streets. In fact, one ingenious Belgian reportedly cut letters spelling "Down with the Boche" in the rims of his automobile tires, then filled them with paint, so that the slogan was painted continuously down the middle of the street.¹⁴

Such programs served as a two-edged sword: they lowered the morale of the Germans while at the same time raising the morale of the populace, creating a feeling of defiance and unity which could be channeled later into more significant resistance activity.

Nuisance activities vary greatly. They may be offensive personal acts against the opponent, such as the Algerian children publicly spitting on French soldiers. If a soldier struck a child, public opinion against the French would solidify all the more. The soldier felt humiliated and was clearly shown how the populace felt about his presence.

Another nuisance device is to overload the government security system with reports of suspicious incidents and persons. By following government instructions, large numbers of people can turn in false alarms or make unfounded denunciations of people who are suspected of aiding the enemy and in this way so overload governmental authority that valid reports cannot be handled. This technique has frequently been used against the block-warden surveillance system of countering underground activities.¹⁵

A black and white photograph of a person in a suit sitting in a chair, with a framed picture on the wall behind them. The person is wearing a dark suit jacket, a light-colored shirt, and a dark tie. They are sitting in a dark, upholstered chair. Behind them is a large, rectangular framed picture on the wall. The picture appears to be a landscape or a scene with a building. The overall image is grainy and has a high-contrast, almost stencil-like quality.

[illegible]

The creation of symbols is a common device in passive resistance. Here, South Vietnamese Buddhist monks demonstrate against the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, using the picture of the fiery sacrifice of a monk as the symbol of resistance.

GOVERNANCE

Noncooperation

Techniques of noncooperation call for a passive resister to perform normal activities in a slightly contrived way, but not so that police or government can accuse him of breaking ordinary laws. Such activities as "slow-downs," boycotts of all kinds, and various forms of disassociation from government are all examples of noncooperation.

There are numerous examples of noncooperation in the anti-Nazi resistance movements, including falsification of blueprints and deliberate errors in adjustment of machine-tools and precision instruments.¹⁶ Workers in shipping departments of Nazi factories addressed shipments to the wrong address or conveniently forgot to include items in the shipment. Feigned sickness was widespread.¹⁷ These acts of noncooperation impeded the war effort while appearing simply to be honest mistakes. In Yugoslavia railroad workers used a particularly effective noncooperation technique: during an Allied air raid they deserted their jobs and, after the raid, they stayed away for 24 hours or more because of "feigned fear." This seriously delayed railway traffic.¹⁸

Noncooperation is a principal tool of passive resistance and has been shown to be most effective in disrupting the normal processes of society and severely hampering and challenging the writ of a government—all in a way that is difficult for the government and its security forces to challenge. Many individuals altering their normal behavior only slightly can add up to a society behaving most abnormally.

Civil Disobedience

Mass participation in deliberately unlawful acts—generally misdemeanors—constitutes civil disobedience. This is perhaps the most extreme weapon of passive resistance; the boundary between misdemeanors and serious crimes can be considered the dividing line between non-violent and violent resistance.

Forms of civil disobedience include the breaking of specific laws, such as tax laws (non-payment of taxes), traffic laws (disrupting traffic), and laws prohibiting meetings, publications, free speech, and so on. Civil disobedience can also take the form of certain kinds of strikes and walkouts, resignations en masse, and minor destruction of public or private property.

In Palestine, after the Haganah raided the British and hid in a nearby village, passive resistance by the Jewish population was effective in preventing their capture. When the police began a search, people vigorously refused them entrance to their homes, stopping only short of using arms; often hand-to-hand fighting with bricks and stones broke out, and first-aid stations were set up to treat the injured. At the first sign of a British cordon, a gong or siren would sound, at which signal villagers from nearby settlements would rush into the area, flooding it

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with "outsiders" and effectively preventing British recognition of which "outsiders" had taken refuge in the village following the raid and which had come simply to create confusion. ¹⁹

Civil disobedience is a powerful technique, but to be effective it must be exercised by large numbers. There is a calculated risk involved: the breach of law automatically justifies and involves punishment by the government and security forces. However, the more massive the scale on which civil disobedience is organized, the less profitable it is for the government to carry out sanctions. For example, during a Huk-led strike in the Philippines, as police were attempting to arrest the leaders, Luis Taruc used the tactic of demanding and forcing the government to arrest everyone participating in the strike. "We must crowd the prison with our numbers," he said. "If there is no room for us [in the police vans], we will walk to jail." It quickly became unfeasible for the security forces to use the threat of jail. ²⁰

During the Indian independence movement, Gandhi effectively used the same tactic. He led so many millions in the breach of law that it proved impractical, if not impossible, for the British to jail all offenders. As British officials saw, such widespread disrespect for a law makes its enforcement ridiculous and counterproductive. ²¹ Yet, if a government cannot enforce its writ, it must abdicate authority. As the jails became impossibly full, Gandhi's position for pressing his demands on a government searching for ways to pacify the population was increasingly enhanced. ²²

Organizers of passive resistance are selective about the laws that are to be broken. The laws should be related in some manner to the issues being protested or the demands being made. Examples are Gandhi's selection of the salt tax in India, which was considered a hardship tax on the peasants and representative of unjust British rule; the Negro sit-ins in the United States, which are directly related to discrimination in public places; and the Norwegian teachers' strike against the Nazi puppet-government's demands that teachers join a Nazi association and that Nazi Socialism be taught in the schools. If the laws that are broken have little or nothing to do with the issues involved, it is difficult to persuade a citizenry to risk government sanctions.

In summary, the underlying consideration in most passive resistance techniques is whether they serve to legitimize the position of the passive resister while alienating or challenging the government.

ORGANIZATION

Obviously, the success of passive resistance rests largely on its ability to secure widespread compliance within the society. A government cannot be robbed of the popular support upon which it depends if only a few individuals act. A boycott, for example, requires participation by great numbers.

Organization is of critical importance to passive resistance. Although a few individuals can launch a passive resistance movement, in order to succeed they must be joined by thousands

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whose participation is strategically channeled. How is widespread social compliance secured? What forces and factors induce people to practice passive resistance?

Normative Factors

One method by which leaders of passive resistance movements secure widespread compliance is by clothing their movement and techniques in the beliefs, values, and norms of society—those things people accept without question.

For example, the earliest stages of the Norwegian resistance against the Nazi occupation and Quisling puppet government were led by the clergy. From pulpit and parsonage, the religious leadership of Norway coalesced public opinion against the Nazis by invoking the voice of the church. "When the Nazis established a new ecclesiastical leadership, the bulk of the old established Church ignored the orders of the new hierarchy. Through nonviolent action it preserved its integrity," simply refusing to cooperate in religious affairs with the Nazi occupation.²³ Because the institutions of religion were held in high esteem, and because the clergy appealed within the framework of religious values, the Nazis never were able, even in the later stages of the occupation, to break the church's resistance.

In India, women were used on the front lines of demonstrations, making it awkward for British forces to break up the crowd without inflicting injuries on the women and further stirring up public opinion.²⁴

Consensual Validation

The technique of "consensual validation"—in which the simultaneous occurrence of events creates a sense of their validity—is often used to coalesce public opinion. For example, if demonstrations take place at the same time in diverse parts of a country, the cause which they uphold appears to be valid simply because a variety of persons are involved. A minority group can organize a multitude of front organizations, so that seemingly widely separated and diverse organizations simultaneously advocate the same themes and give the impression that a large body of opinion is represented. Passive resistance organizers effectively use the psychology of "consensual validation" to rally public opinion.

Mystical Factors

Rare or extraordinary factors such as charisma play an important part in mobilizing public opinion in a passive resistance movement. Gandhi's leadership of India's independence struggle verged on the mystical. Thousands of villagers from rural India, who perhaps could not be

touched nor aroused by any modern means of communication or organized population pressure, were stimulated into action by Gandhi's fasts and his religious mystique. Hundreds of thousands of peasants gathered to meet Gandhi although they often did not understand his language and could barely see him. It is difficult to estimate the role of Gandhi's mystique in coalescing public opinion against the British, but it is clear that resistance to colonial rule had never appeared on such a large scale before Gandhi.

Pressure for Conformity

The same techniques used by passive resisters against the government can be used to ensure widespread social compliance within the resistance movement. Ostracism is frequently used to apply pressure on individuals not participating in the passive resistance campaign. Instances of organized ostracism of collaborators can be found in all the underground resistance movements in Nazi-occupied countries during World War II. In Denmark, the underground published blacklists that were "feared by all those who acted in the interest of the enemy."²⁵ Informal, everyday pressures of conformity also help secure widespread compliance. The fact that passive resistance generally appears during times of crisis or of popular unrest indicates that at such times there is often a greater sense of nationalism, of a particular "we" arraigned against "they." There are then strong pressures demanding conformity.

Communication and Propaganda

As noted earlier, the first phase of passive resistance is characterized by a period of attention-getting propaganda activities: parades, demonstrations, posters, newspapers, and other forms of communication, either clandestine or open. Once the resistance movement is launched, there must be continuing means of "spreading the word." No movement can operate without some form of communication between the leaders and the led. The underground press in Denmark played an important role; the first illegal newsheet appeared on the very first day of the German occupation.²⁶ Within a year, nearly 300 illegal newspapers were being published once or twice a month. They had an estimated circulation of 70,000, and each copy was read and passed on by large numbers of people. Ironically, "as the German domination became sharper, so did the free press become more and more powerful."²⁷

Similar examples can be found in Norway, Poland, France, and the Netherlands during the Nazi resistance. Besides providing "objective" information on the course of the war, using Allied news-broadcast reports, the clandestine papers instructed the populace in passive resistance techniques and procedures.²⁸

Clandestine methods of communication resembling those used by espionage organizations were also developed. One of the earliest and most successful acts of resistance in Norway was

the dramatic resignation in 1941-42 of 90 percent of Norway's teachers, as a response to Nazi pressure to teach National Socialism and join a Nazi teachers' association. The manner in which this dramatic rebuke to the Nazi regime was carried off, and the means used to communicate the plan to all of Norway's teachers, are related in the following personal account:

A friend telephoned me one afternoon and asked me to meet him at the railway station. There he gave me a small box of matches.

He told me we teachers were to follow the lead of those [teachers] who had met secretly in Oslo, and that all the possible consequences had been discussed.

The box of matches contained a statement [which all teachers were to make simultaneously to the Nazis]. My job was to circulate it secretly among the teachers in my district. That was all I knew. I didn't know who the "leaders" were who met in Oslo.²⁹

Such impersonal communication was obeyed, even though the leaders were never known, because each communicator was trusted and people were assured others were going to take similar action.

Training

Once organizational steps are taken to secure widespread social compliance, an effort must be made to instruct and train passive resisters. The idea is to erect a mental barbed-wire fence between resisters and authority. This instruction often takes the form of codes of "do's and don'ts." Many undergrounds have found that it is easier to tell people what not to do than what to do.³⁰

Training is particularly critical when positive, not just negative, actions are desired. Non-cooperation and civil disobedience are positive acts that necessarily involve training, organization, and solidarity on the part of the resisters, whether they operate in the open or clandestinely.

Gandhi placed great emphasis on nonviolent training, not only because he looked upon non-violence as a moral creed, but because he understood that it was essential for effective passive resistance. He required his followers to swear to an oath and he developed a code for volunteers.³¹ When individual suffering is involved, and when individuals must invite suffering through civil disobedience, considerable discipline is required. The American Negro civil rights movement followed the Gandhi example and applied it in planning the 1958 "sit-in" movement. Special schools were established to train young people to withstand physical violence and tolerate torment without responding with violence which might negate the entire stratagem. Any violent response on the part of the passive resisters might provide a justification for the use of violent procedures in quelling demonstrations.

Parallel Government Structure

One method that is frequently used to both undermine public confidence in a government and secure population compliance to passive resistance is the establishment of parallel structures of government. If a population must depend upon an underground-sponsored "government," it will be forced to comply with the underground's passive resistance program and de facto withdraw its support from the regular government.

In India, for example, Gandhi felt that the highest form of passive resistance would be the establishment of parallel institutions of government—not only because they would be a potential weapon against the British colonial government, but for their positive value in creating a sense of unity and community within the diverse Indian population. Indeed, many observers assert that the importance of the passive resistance movement in India was not so much what it did against the English as what it did for the Indians: It shaped a new Indian nationalism and provided an opportunity for Indians to repair the wounds in national self-esteem inflicted during more than 100 years of outside rule.³²

Similarly, in Poland the underground passive resistance movement helped the Polish people maintain a sense of national identity and unity in the face of Nazi harshness. The establishment of a "secret state"—of underground courts, schools, and civil government—maintained a continuity and identification with nationalism, thus denying loyalty to the occupier.³³ In Algeria, passive resistance served to solidify the Arab community. Although unfavorable environmental, social, and political conditions had existed for generations, there was no insurgency until Arab grievances crystallized into national consensus. In Palestine, the insurgent-led passive resistance campaigns did as much to develop a strong feeling of unity and nationalism as they did to harass the British forces. The main effect was to lead people away from any form of support for the official government. Thus a consensual validation of the values and objectives of the insurgents was provided.

The techniques and societal values capitalized upon to undermine popular support of the government also serve the positive function of solidifying public opinion around a larger sense of community and national identification.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

TERRORISM

Few liberation or underground movements have abstained from terrorism. Insurgents have seldom relied solely on the attractiveness of their appeals or on the persuasiveness of their goals to secure popular support; they have generally assumed that people never entirely pursue idealistic goals or do what "logic" might tell them is most beneficial. Coercive means are therefore used to focus public attention on the goals and issues identified as important by the insurgents. Negative sanctions are employed to ensure that recalcitrant individuals comply and do "what is best for them." Essentially, terror* is used to support other insurgent techniques and operations, such as propaganda and agitation.

OBJECTIVES OF TERRORISM

The utility of terror for a subversive movement is multifarious: it disrupts government control of the population, demonstrates insurgent strength, attracts popular support, suppresses cooperation with the government by "collaborators" and "traitors," protects the security of the clandestine organization, and, finally, provokes counteraction by government forces.

Disruption of Government Control

A common aim of terrorism is "the destruction of the existing organization of the population"—that is, the disruption of government control over the citizenry. Terrorist acts are directed toward governmental officials and key supporters, making it unsafe to be a government official and, through systematic assassination, crippling the actual functioning of government.

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9 - *Terror may be described as a state of mind. Its effect upon individuals cannot always be
8 - determined from an objective description of the terrorist act. That which threatens or ter-
7 - rorizes one individual may not affect another in the same way. Essentially, however, the
6 - process of terrorism can be viewed in the following manner: The stimulus is the threatening
5 - or terroristic act, and the response is the course of action, or inaction, pursued by the indi-
4 - vidual upon perceiving and interpreting the threat. If the perception of the threat leads to dis-
3 - organized behavior such as hysteria or panic or the inability to take appropriate action, the
2 - individual is said to be in a state of terror.

1 - Terror is not a static phenomenon: As threatening acts accumulate or escalate, the degree
of terror heightens. A stimulus can be anything from an act of social sanction to threats of
physical violence or actual physical attack. The corresponding interpretation of these threaten-
ing acts is a heightening state of terror. The response may vary from coerced compliance to
acquiescence, from physical flight to psychological immobilization and breakdown.

The theory that subversive use of terror intimidates and disrupts government was popularized and applied as early as 1892 by the Russian terrorist, Stepniak, in the terrorist campaign against the Czarist regime. Stepniak understood that terrorism would not obtain the immediate, decisive victory that a military battle would.

But another victory is more probable, that of the weak against the strong. . . . In a struggle against an invisible, impalpable, omnipresent enemy [the terrorist], the strong is vanquished . . . by the continuous extension of his own strength, which ultimately exhausts him. . . . Terrorists cannot [immediately] overthrow the government; but having compelled it, for so many years, to neglect everything and do nothing but struggle with them, they will render its position untenable.²

The application of this theory can be seen in South Vietnam, where the Viet Cong have reportedly weakened government control in certain regions by killing and kidnapping province chiefs, police officials, village guards, and landlords. It has been estimated that in the 5-year period between 1959 and 1964, more than 6,000 minor Vietnamese officials were murdered by the Viet Cong.³ School teachers, social workers, and medical personnel have also been favorite targets. The allegiance of the people is the chief prize in an insurgency, and since school teacher, as one observer noted, "form young minds and educate them to love their country and its system of government, to close such schools or to cow the teachers into spreading anti-government propaganda can be a more important victory than to defeat an army division."⁴ Almost 80,000 South Vietnamese school children had been deprived of schools by 1960 because of terrorist action: 636 schools were closed, approximately 250 teachers were kidnapped, and another 30 were killed. The Viet Cong also disrupted the South Vietnamese social welfare and medical program; a highly successful malaria-eradication program, for example, was stopped in 1961 because of high casualties among its personnel caused by terrorists.⁵

To underscore the unprofitability of being, or becoming, a government servant, the Viet Cong carried out assassinations by unusual, brutal, or mysterious methods. Vietnamese village headmen suspected by the Viet Cong "of cooperating with the government or guilty of 'crimes against the people' were disemboweled and decapitated, and their families with them."⁶ The attention value of such acts in the press and through word of mouth has been great and the implied threat to others obvious.

When, through the simple process of attrition, the machinery of government in one area comes to a virtual standstill, the Viet Cong reestablishes social order by setting up a "shadow government" with its own "officialdom" to collect taxes, operate schools, and implement population control measures.⁷

The proper selection of targets is important. Viet Cong terrorists were particularly directed to seek as first targets government authorities who were corrupt or unpopular; after murdering them they could then boast: "We have rid you of an oppressor." A captured copy of the Viet Cong "Military Plan of the Provincial Party Committee of Baria" specifically orders

"squad in charge of villages and agrovilles to carry out assassination missions . . . and prime targets should be security forces and civil action district officials, hooligans and thugs."⁸ By relieving the community of undesirables through selective assassination, Viet Cong terrorists seek to win popular support while crippling the operation of government.

However, terror can politically boomerang if the target is unwisely chosen or the assassination unwisely timed. An example of this occurred in the Philippines when a contingent of Huk insurgents ambushed and killed Aurora Quezon, wife of the Philippine president, along with her daughter and other distinguished citizens. Since she was widely known and respected by the people, Mrs. Quezon's death was a serious setback to the Communists. Reacting to the nation's feeling of condemnation, the Huk leaders declared that the terrorists acted without orders.⁹

Demonstration of Strength

In a terrorist campaign, the individual citizen lives under the continual threat of physical harm. If government police are unable to curb the terrorists' threats, the citizen tends to lose "confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety."¹⁰ The use of terror, when effective, convinces the people of the movement's strength. Captured Viet Cong documents indicate that this is one of its primary objectives in South Vietnam. Through a demonstration of strength by effective assassination of government and village leaders, it attempts to "convince the rural population that the regime in Saigon cannot protect them."¹¹

In order to publicize the movement's strength, some terrorist activities are conducted publicly. The FLN in Algeria used this tactic. Witnesses of terrorist acts were not eliminated but were spared in order to confirm the FLN success.¹² Muslims who supported the French were warned by letters bearing the FLN crest to desist from cooperating with the French; if a Muslim refused, the FLN execution order was attached to the victim's dead body. "By this method, the FLN silenced its opposition, weakened the . . . French by depriving them of the support of . . . Muslim leaders, and at the same time, assassination enhanced the prestige of the FLN . . . by affording tangible proof of the organization's effectiveness and intrepidity."¹³

However, in pursuing a similar tactic, the Communist insurgency in Malaya got itself in a difficult position. Unable to carry out and win a guerrilla war, the Communists attempted by mass terror to demonstrate their strength and neutralize the members of the population who were supporting the government. They soon received complaints from their political arm, the Min Yuen, that indiscriminate terror was alienating the voluntary support upon which their long-range success depended.¹⁴

It has been said that "terror is a psychological lever of unbelievable power—before the bodies of those whose throats have been cut and the grimacing faces of the mutilated, all capacity for resistance lapses. . . ."¹⁵ However, there is evidence to suggest that without positive

inducements or popular support it may also backfire. For example, in Algeria terrorism in the name of nationalism largely won support from or cowed the Muslim population, but it had an opposite effect on the French community. Although thoroughly unnerved by the FLN terrorist offensive of 1956, they were never on the point of surrendering. In itself the dramatic nature of the terrorist challenge ensures a dramatic response to the call for counteraction. The effect of FLN terrorism on French policy was to strengthen the resolve to stamp out the rebellion, indeed to make it politically impossible to follow any other course."¹⁶

Punishment and Retaliation

The threat of punishment to collaborators and informers within the general populace is a common feature of insurgent terrorism. In fact, many insurgencies against occupying powers have taken a higher toll of indigenous citizenry than of the occupying forces. For example, the Greek Cypriot terrorist organization, EOKA, killed more Cypriots—as "traitors" or "collaborators"—than it did British security forces or government officials.¹⁷ During the early days of the Cypriot insurgency, the population, "easy-going by nature and tradition," seemed not to be taking the rebellion seriously. EOKA immediately began an offensive to punish "collaborators"; the slogan "Death to Traitors" was scrawled on walls to make the threat visible, and selected murders of Greek Cypriots "drove the point home." A concrete example of this occurred on October 28, 1955, when Archbishop Makarios publicly called for the resignation of all Greek village headmen.

The date was symbolically chosen, for October 28th, known as Okhi ("No") Day, is the anniversary of the Greek refusal to submit to the Italian ultimatum in 1940. Only about a fifth of the headmen had responded by the end of the year, however. EOKA then went into action by murdering three headmen. Within three weeks, resignations reached 80 percent.¹⁸

Luis Taruc, the leader of the Huks in the Philippines, bragged that by using "old women in the town markets, young boys tending carabaos in the fields, and small merchants traveling between towns, every traitorous act, every puppet crime, every betrayal through collaboration" was known to the Huks. After a warning of impending "punishment," the Huks would blacklist offenders and agents were authorized to arrest or liquidate them.¹⁹

The Polish underground also utilized techniques of "terror propaganda" against "collaborators." Usually, specific collaborators were morally condemned in the underground press; next, they were blacklisted and perhaps "death sentences" were published. Further, the underground press frequently lumped the crimes of collaborators with the names of Nazi officials, listing the names of German officers who would be brought before war crimes tribunals after the war. In most cases, individuals thus condemned were later executed by the underground.²⁰

Terror can be used in retaliation against or as a counterbalance to terror. The "Red Hand" terrorist organization used "counterterror" against the nationalists in Algeria and against Algerian agents outside the country seeking sources of financial and weapons support for the nationalist movement. The organization was composed of colons—Europeans in North Africa—and allegedly operated with the tacit consent of the French Government.²¹

Maintenance of Security

To bring about the failure of government countermeasures, the security of the clandestine organization must be maintained. There are two ways in which an underground movement can protect its own security: "It can police the loyalty of its members and take steps to see to it that a complete picture of the movement is held only by a limited few, or it can employ the threat of terror against informers."²²

Terror is used by insurgent organizations against their own membership in order to protect the security of their operations. It is always implicit, and often made explicit, that they who defect or betray the cause will be severely punished. To demonstrate the "reality" of the threat, undergrounds characteristically have organized "terror squads" which enforce threats and punish "traitors." Most frequently, punishment means death.

Terrorist Oaths

In Kenya in 1952, the Kikuyu tribesman who was being admitted to the select terrorist cadre of the Mau Mau had to swear himself to a "brotherhood of murder."

1. If I am called upon to do so, with four others, I will kill a European.
2. If I am called upon to do so, I will kill a Kikuyu who is against the Mau Mau, even if it be my mother or my father or brother or sister or wife or child.
3. If I am called upon to do so, I will help to dispose of the body of the murdered person so that it may not be found.
4. I will never disobey the orders of the leaders of this society.²³

This murder oath was often accompanied by rituals involving "bestial and degrading practices," the object of which was to make the initiates become "outcasts who shrank at nothing. The acts performed were intended to be so depraved that, by comparison, the mere disemboweling of pregnant women, for instance, would seem mild." Further, this degradation would alienate the initiate from the Kikuyu community, ensuring that he could never fully return to normal life and betray Mau Mau secrecy. But where such "tribal superstitions . . . proved inadequate, the gap was filled by fear of personal violence or death."²⁴

Enforcing Squads

An example of underground enforcing squads is the "Traitor Elimination Corps," which was one of the first units organized by the Communist underground in Malaya. By its very existence, recruits to the underground were quickly impressed with the importance of "discipline" and with "the severity of the Party's means of enforcing discipline." However, one source cites evidence that the Malayan Communist Party also utilized lesser threats, hoping to avoid liquidating agents who broke discipline, yet always reserving the implied "escalation" of the threat of death.²⁵

Interviews with numbers of surrendered Malayan insurgents revealed that although 80 percent said they feared bodily harm, the "real" reasons for their fear were "lower," more subtle threats. Nearly all said they feared most "the Party's practice of disciplining its members by depriving them of their firearms; . . . they claimed this was something to be dreaded because, without their weapons, they would be defenseless." Coupled with social ostracism, physical defenselessness threatened "the very basis of the man's sense of personal security As one surrendered guerrilla reported: My friends wouldn't even look at me. I didn't know what would happen to me. I couldn't sleep at night."²⁶

The Huk underground in the Philippines also used terror to maintain the security of its operations, executing its threats through a special "terror force."²⁷ Similarly, the FLN in Algeria enforced discipline in its urban underground networks by summarily executing "traitors" when discovered. The security of the Yugoslav Communist underground was maintained by a "secret police" called the Department for the Defense of the People (O. Z. Na.). This group provided intelligence on the behavior of underground comrades, and was authorized to liquidate those who were disloyal to the partisans.²⁸ During the Moroccan independence insurgency, the counterterrorist "Red Hand" guarded its secrecy by eliminating defectors through mysterious "accidents."²⁹

Provocation

Insurgent movements frequently utilize terrorism to provoke a counteraction which may be strategically useful. This tactic was employed by the OAS, the French secret army organization in Algeria, to provoke the nationalist FLN into upsetting the "cease-fire" upon which negotiations between the French Government and the FLN were based. By indiscriminate terrorist attacks on Arab civilians, "the OAS leadership evidently believed it would so exacerbate French-Algerian relations that the Algerians would be provoked into massive countermeasures, that full-scale war would be resumed, and that no settlement would be possible."³⁰

A similar use of terror to create a provocative situation is the deliberate assassination in a riot of an innocent bystander in order to create a martyr and provoke the populace into further actions against the government.

ORGANIZATION FOR TERRORISM

A key feature of terrorism is detailed preparation. To demonstrate insurgent strength and sustain momentum, early success is essential. Targets are selected so that the terrorists are free to choose the time and place that will best insure the success of the mission.³¹ Effective use of terror requires a thorough knowledge of localities, people, customs, and habits; it requires extensive and secret reconnaissance activities.

"Unorganized" Terrorism

Normally, unorganized terrorism involves unplanned acts against unselected targets. Such acts are the incidental result of more generalized attacks. The distinguishing feature of unorganized terrorism is that it is committed by individuals in large units which do not have terror as their sole function.

Undergrounds usually are careful to avoid wanton acts of terrorism against the populace. Such notable experts as China's Mao Tse-tung and North Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap counsel extreme restraint, advising that great care be taken to avoid bringing undue suffering to the populace and unduly alienating public opinion.³²

Support Terrorism

As noted earlier, terror squads are frequently used as an enforcing arm for underground political units. For this purpose, terroristic acts are specifically designed to support the underground's political goals and are usually carried out by specially trained and organized squads.

An example of this is the organization of the Communist Party underground in Malaya. Just as propaganda and political units were attached to the party's Liberation Army to assist in its "military" activities, terrorist squads were attached to the party's political arm, the Min Yuen to enforce support of its political activities.³³ Somewhat similar to the "Blood and Steel Corps," these terrorist units consisted mostly of "trusted party thugs who, in addition to perpetrating acts of extortion and intimidation against those designated by the Party, were ordered to strengthen the treasury by engaging in payroll robberies and raids on business establishments."³⁴

Another dimension of terroristic activity used in support of insurgent political goals is seen in the plan for urban insurgency adopted in 1961 by the Castro-Communist supported insurgents (FALN) in Venezuela. Here the insurgents attempted to organize terrorist units or shock brigades to serve as the catalytic agents for urban revolution. The tactic was to induce a state of paralysis and alarm within the urban public through an extended period of urban violence,

eventually undermining the support and power of the government, and leading to a rapid victory. Terror squads, called Tactical Combat Units (TCU), were used for robberies, sabotage, arson, murders, and the creation of street violence and riots. The units were usually organized in detachments of about 30: 5 to 8 men engaged in the bolder terrorist actions while the rest filled lesser supporting roles.³⁵

The success of many of the units' terrorist actions was largely attributable to careful advance preparation, including written operations plans; although much of the street violence appeared to be spontaneous, careful examination reveals a pattern: attacks on Venezuelan-owned properties were usually limited to robbery, whereas those on U.S. properties involved some use of incendiaries or explosives. The terrorist units operated in the mobile hit-and-run style, usually proceeding to and from their targets in stolen automobiles. Although the TCU's attempted on numerous occasions in 1963 to induce an atmosphere of mass terrorism in Caracas through stepped-up sniper fire and associated acts of violence, these operations failed. Although they interrupted normal patterns of urban life, they did not succeed in producing mass terrorism of the sort that would immobilize or cripple the functioning of government.³⁶

Specialized Terrorism

Nearly every underground movement organizes specialized terror units to conduct "professional terrorism." Such units are characterized by well-planned operations carried out by a small, highly trained professional elite, usually organized on a cellular basis. The targets are usually selected individuals of special importance, and the weapons are frequently unique and tailored to secure the safe escape of the terrorists.

In Cyprus, one of the first steps taken by George Grivas, the leader of the Greek Cypriot insurgents, was to organize a cadre of specialized terrorists. Never numbering more than 50, this small group "terrorized half a million people."³⁷ Significantly, Grivas developed his cadre of terrorists only from the very young. His study of Communist tactics used during the Greek insurgency convinced him that only youths in their late teens or early twenties can be molded into assassins "who will kill on order, and without question." Young men combine youthful daring and, after indoctrination, fanatical conviction, and can be made to believe they are behaving in an heroic way. Such motivation makes for an absolutely trustworthy cadre of terrorists. Grivas groomed the youths for their role as specialized terrorists through a process of escalating acts of lawlessness: first they smeared slogans on walls, then they advanced to throwing bombs into open windows or bars. Only after an extended period of testing and training were the youths given their first "professional" assignment of killing a selected target.³⁸

The salient features of professional terrorism are also demonstrated in the revealing accounts of Nikolai Khokhlov, a captain of Soviet Intelligence who defected to the West in 1954.³⁹ Prior to his defection Khokhlov was head of an elaborate terrorist plot by Soviet Intelligence to

liquidate Georgi S. Okolovich, leader of a small émigré anti-Soviet underground headquartered in Frankfurt, West Germany.

Dubbed "Operation Rhine," Khokhlov's two-man assassination squad was the second organized attempt by Soviet Intelligence to eliminate Okolovich. The first, in 1951, involved a group of three German Communist agents equipped with ampules of morphine, syringes, fifteen thousand German marks, and an order "to stupefy Okolovich with a morphine injection and take him into the Soviet zone. In case it was impossible to kidnap him, it was permitted to end the mission with a 'liquidation.'"⁴⁰ Because of poor intelligence, however, the mission failed: Okolovich was not to be found. Further, to add insult to injury, two of the German agents voluntarily surrendered. In planning 1953's "Operation Rhine," Soviet Intelligence placed Khokhlov, one of their own senior officers, in charge. From reports of Communist agents in West Germany, Moscow obtained pictures of Okolovich and his house, had a complete layout of his neighborhood, and detailed data about his organization. However, it was necessary for Khokhlov's team to get the "on-the-spot" intelligence, such as determining Okolovich's daily routine, how well guarded he was, where the best escape routes were, and where the assassination might best be committed.

To plan the action, the squad was brought to Moscow. Khokhlov's two German assistants, Franz and Felix, underwent special training, learning judo and how to handle various special weapons, mastering the art of following other cars and of overtaking a target car and shooting through the windows, and learning techniques of surveillance and countersurveillance.⁴¹

Khokhlov reports that they even rehearsed possible versions of the murder: a "morning" version when Okolovich was leaving his residence for work and an "evening" plan when he was returning home. In this plan,

...the instructor impersonated Okolovich, I his escort. Franz practiced walking past and shooting "Okolovich" in the back after I drove away, while Felix left his car, with motor running, across the street, strolled past in time for Franz to slip him the cigarette-case weapon—and also to check on the effectiveness of Franz's noiseless shots. In case Franz missed, Felix was to use his own two-shot cigarette case; then he was to stroll back to his car, drive off leisurely, and pick up Franz a block farther on.⁴²

To help insure the success of the mission, Soviet intelligence developed special weapons: cigarette cases were refitted to encase steel blocks in which chambers for noiseless charges were drilled out. With a slight press on a small button, a chamber noiselessly discharged a bullet. The principle behind it, according to Khokhlov, was rather simple. "A steel chamber, in it, a disk. The gunpowder explodes and pushes the disk. The disk throws out the bullet and at the same moment closes the opening. All the sound remains inside."⁴³

Besides giving the agents noiseless and camouflaged weapons, special consideration was given to various escape routes and plans, large sums of money were on deposit and available in case of emergency, and a variety of "cover" documents was prepared, including "authentic" Swiss and Austrian passports.

"Operation Rhine" was never executed, however. Soviet Intelligence again failed, not because of inadequate planning, but because of the human element: Khokhlov defected to the West and disclosed the entire plot.

The conduct of "Operation Rhine" nonetheless demonstrates the four essential steps in the organization of professional terrorism: intelligence, planning of action, devices, and escape-and-evasion.

Intelligence

Careful intelligence work is a prerequisite for all terrorism, particularly professional terrorism. The target is special and therefore the underground must find concrete answers to "who," "where," and "when." Intelligence must both identify the target and document his modus operandi. A local person may identify the target for outside agents who then execute the plan; while a local person can facilitate identification, it is difficult for him to commit the assassination because of local loyalties and the difficulty of escaping. Another approach is to have outside agents undertake both the intelligence work and the execution.

The difficulties of requiring local agents to assassinate local people are illustrated in an experience of the Red Hand counterterrorists in Morocco. In 1954 the underground's entire security was severely jeopardized after it assigned a local terror squad to murder the editor of the local Moroccan nationalist newspaper, Maroc-Press. One of the members of the Red Hand squad was a close friend of the editor and, learning of the plot, he became remorseful and defected. The result was that the Maroc-Press, "the only important French-language paper in Morocco not in sympathy with the counterterrorist Red Hand, became the best informed about their activities."⁴⁴ However, the repentant Red Hand agent soon met with sudden accidental death.

10 Planning

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8 The second step in organizing for professional terrorism is planning the course of action—
7 where and when it is to occur, and how to arrange for the target to be there. A variety of tech-
6 niques has been evolved to aid the assassin in making contact with his target. If the target's
5 schedule is totally unpredictable, sometimes a meeting which he must or will attend is called.

3 Devices

2
1 Another important element in organizing professional terrorism is the choice of devices to be used. Most often they are carefully tailored to the kind of job to be done—blowing up

a car in which the target is riding, or assassinating the target at a public concert. Further, the devices must be designed to facilitate the terrorist's escape.

To this end, professional terrorism has developed a devilish array of weapons. Besides the cigarette-case guns described in "Operation Rhine," Khokhlov reports that Soviet intelligence developed guns encased in fountain pens. Another popular device is the auto booby-trap technique employed by the Red Hand in Morocco. Because the technique is quick and avoids visual tampering with the car, it is considered more advanced than attaching bombs to an automobile's starter. Two magnetic holders are attached to a metal case containing a powerful charge of TNT (about 280 grams) mixed with some 350 steel pellets. It is easily attached directly under the driver's seat. The detonator, a lead weight connected by a nylon thread, is placed on the exhaust pipe of the automobile in such a way that the thread is stretched taut. The moment the driver starts the motor, the vibration of the exhaust pipe topples the lead weight, which pulls on the thread and sets off the explosion. The container (wider on the top than at the bottom, with a lid thinner than side walls) is designed so that the main thrust of the explosion is directed upwards at the driver's seat.⁴⁵

Escape-and-Evasion

The final organizational consideration is the method of escape-and-evasion. Because professional terrorists are usually highly trained and skilled in their craft, they are obviously valuable to any underground. The problem of safe escape after executing a mission receives considerable attention.

The Communist-led underground in Greece in 1945 developed a cell of three agents whose identities were secret and who were unknown to each other. This unit, called a synergeia, was formed any time a professional terrorist job was required. "When the mission was accomplished, the members of the group dispersed, changed their addresses, habits, and clothes, and concocted alibis."¹⁰

9 - In Cyprus, the EOKA adopted a number of techniques to secure the escape of its terrorists. 10
8 - One method used was for a terrorist, posing as a journalist-photographer, to be followed down 9
7 - a street by two or three young girls. When he sighted the man he was to kill, he shot him in the 8
6 - back and immediately threw the revolver to one of the girls trailing him, who slipped it into her 7
5 - purse and vanished. The terrorist remained briefly on the scene under the pretext that he was 6
4 - a journalist.⁴⁶ 5

BEHAVIOR UNDER THREAT

General Behavior Patterns

The effect of terrorism upon individuals differs widely. Similar threats or acts affect individuals differently. Behavior patterns are affected to a large extent by personality and previously established behavior habits. For instance, those individuals who feel unable to manage or control their everyday personal affairs generally are least efficient in devising ways of meeting threat emergencies.⁴⁷

Since personality variables affect an individual's perception of threat, the vagaries of human perception are the keys to understanding behavior under stress. It is not the "objective" character of the threat that determines an individual's behavior so much as his "subjective" evaluation of the situation.⁴⁸

Human response to threat also varies according to the nature of the threatening situation—whether it is specific or uncertain. The terrorist may wish to have the threatened party do a particular act and may issue a highly specific threat. Where threat is clearly defined and specifically communicated to an individual, with demands, alternatives, and consequences apparent and persuasively stated, an individual's reaction is probably based upon a relatively clear assessment of known variables and he may comply out of fear of having the threat carried out.

However, the terrorist may seek to cause disruptive behavior or panic by issuing an uncertain generalized threat. The very ambiguity of the situation makes rational decision-making and assessment functions break down and leads to hysteria and panic.⁴⁹

Some writers emphasize an important distinction between "anxiety" responses and "fear" responses: "fear is apt to produce a prompt reaction either to remove the object of fear from oneself or oneself from the object of fear," whereas anxiety "is chronic and vague . . . one does not know quite what is the cause of his anxiety and, partly for that reason, he does not know quite what to do." Thus, "the more specific the threat, the more fear-inducing it is; the more vague the threat, the more anxiety-inducing it is"—making an individual hypersensitive to ordinarily neutral situations and causing disruptive behavior.⁵⁰

It has also been postulated that the relative intensity of threat—regardless of whether it is vague or specific—determines if a person will be able to take effective action.⁵¹ Thus, unlike the previous "specific vs. uncertain" threat theory, where individuals respond rationally and positively to specific threat, and rather hysterically to uncertain threat, this theory suggests that whenever the magnitude of threat is great, it tends to produce an ineffective or irrational response regardless of vagueness or specificity of content. Others argue that threats or threatening acts need not necessarily grow in magnitude for terror to "heighten" or "intensify"; the mere continuance of threat over a period of time is sufficient to intensify the reaction.⁵²

Regardless of whether a threat is specific or uncertain, or different in magnitude and danger, an individual's vigilance response generally evolves in five phases:⁵³

1. Recognition: The threat, or threatening situation, is perceived by some cue or message.
2. Probability: An estimation of the probability of the threatening event occurring is made; the validity of the threat is checked.
3. Assessment: The qualitative nature of the threat is assessed (whether physical pain, loss of loved ones, loss of property, etc.). There is some attempt to define the situation: nature, timing, and magnitude of threat are assessed and an estimation made of the means of coping with it, the probability of success, and the cost to the individual.
4. Defense: Commitment to an avenue of escape and adaptation; progressive use of a "lattice of defense," in which the failure of one defense leads to another more extensive defense.
5. Reassessment: When first defense routes fail, other avenues are attempted, but under the stressful or threatening situation, the individual tends to become overcompensatory, excessively sensitive, or exhibit other nonadaptive responses; psychological immobilization or breakdown may occur at this stage.

This sequence can be terminated at almost any point, and the phases "may telescope so that they are virtually simultaneous."⁵⁴ Where threat demands and consequences are apparent, rational assessment is relatively easy. Where they are ambiguous or uncertain, the likelihood of irrationality and hysteria is increased. The most debilitating factors in human response to threat are uncertainty and ambiguity, since the individual tries to resolve the uncertainty before he takes action to escape the threat. The more difficult of resolution the uncertainty appears, the more unnerved the individual becomes.

When uncertain threat leads to a state of hysteria, the individual attempts to remove the ambiguity of the threatening situation by identifying some certain source—even if the "source" has little or nothing to do with the real origin of the threat.

A corollary human response to hysteria is the predilection to suggestion—"wish-fulfillment beliefs."⁵⁵ In trying to identify the source of threat and redefine the uncertain situation, an individual succumbs to "pipedream" rumors and suggestions which explain, report, or predict some favorable outcome of the uncertain condition.

A further feature of vigilance under threat is that individuals narrow or restrict their span of attention. Becoming hypervigilant, they focus their attention on the threat and the threatener, to the virtual exclusion of other stimuli. Thus, hypervigilance leads an individual to concentrate on the demands and suggestions of the underground threatener and reduces his attention to communications from the government or security forces.

"Stress over which one has some influence can be borne with much less evidence of stress reaction. . . ." If an individual can perceive no avenue of escape from a threat, he develops a sense of helplessness and this sense increases his stress reaction.⁵⁶ If the purpose of a threat is to achieve compliance with certain demands, a threat that leaves the individual with no

influence over the outcome may backfire. The individual either breaks down and is unable to comply or he pursues an opposite, hostile course. For example, the Nazi policy of threatening reprisals in occupied Greece during World War II tended to operate against the German objectives of population control. Indiscriminate reprisals against the Greek populace left the individual citizen helpless to influence the outcome: guerrilla band activity near a village, over which the villager had no control, brought the threat of death. "The wanton nature of the retaliation—the picking of victims at random—meant that pro-German Greeks or their relatives suffered as much as anti-German Greeks. Under these circumstances there was little advantage in being a collaborator. As the reprisals continued they tended to give credence and prestige to the guerrillas. . . ." Further, indiscriminate "burning of villages left many male inhabitants with little place to turn except to the guerrilla bands." ⁵⁷

Different behavior patterns emerge from situations in which there are conflicting threats. The individual usually succumbs to the threat which appears most imminent or is greatest in magnitude. This is illustrated by some experiences of the Philippine Army during the Huk insurgency. To counteract Huk terrorism or to dissuade a village from giving strong support to the Huk movement, the Philippine Army gathered the villagers, including the mayor and village policemen, in an open area. Approximately 200 yards away Philippine troops, in full uniform, would line up a number of "captured Huks." Then they ushered out each Huk blindfolded and executed him by bayonet. As one Philippine officer reported, "While we were killing them, some were shouting out the name of the mayor, the names of the policemen, and . . . the names of their principal suppliers. Seeing the Huks killed before their eyes, hearing themselves named as the supporters of those we had just massacred, these civilians naturally expected to be next on the death lists." ⁵⁸

In reality, the villagers had witnessed a mock execution of regular Philippine troops equipped with chicken blood and stage presence. But the "executions" had the desired effect of making the government counterthreat apparent. Afterwards, officers talked individually with the villagers, explaining that they now knew everything about the village and that those who "confessed" or cooperated would not be treated like the captured Huks. To protect the villagers from further Huk threats, the officers established several meeting places that evening where individuals could report to give information. The threat of the government was thus made more pressing and real than the Huk terror; effective responses were obtained. ⁵⁹

Cultural factors are also a significant variable in human behavior under threat. Unique cultural mores and beliefs frequently affect an individual's sense of threat—his "state of mind" or terror. One needs only to think of the role voodoo terror plays in certain areas, such as Haiti, where the threat of the pin-in-the-doll is reputedly used with some effectiveness by agents of Haitian dictator Dr. Francois Duvalier. In Angola, it is believed that a mutilated body cannot enjoy an afterlife. The Angolan administration capitalized on this fear during the

1961 rebellion. While the tribesmen "will occasionally charge fearlessly into a barrage of machine gun fire," reports one writer, "they will think twice about attacking anyone armed with a machete."⁶⁰

Phrasing a Threat

On the basis of these general patterns of human behavior under stress, two essential principles of phrasing a threat can be postulated. First, there are specific threats in which the demands and consequences are communicated so that they cannot be misunderstood. Use of specific threat rests on the basic assumption that an individual confronted with persuasively stated, clear-cut demands and imminent harmful consequences, will take the line of least resistance, which is compliance. Rather than endanger himself, his family, or his property, the individual will accept, albeit reluctantly and as evasively as possible, the threatener's alternative. This, at any rate, is the theory on which the threatener bases his hopes for success.

In specific threats, the threatener seeks to secure compliance without actually being required to execute the threat. Persuasive communication, leaving little room for misunderstandings, is essential for effectiveness. For example, Viet Cong guerrillas attacking a South Vietnamese fortification during the night call over loudspeakers saying: "We only want to kill the Americans. All the rest can go free if they leave their weapons." Surrounded by superior Viet Cong forces and offered a clear alternative to further resistance, South Vietnamese militia have been known to throw down their weapons and leave the Americans to fend for themselves.⁶¹ Occasionally the Viet Cong varies this kind of threat by distributing leaflets saying they will fire on government troops only if they are accompanied by U.S. military advisers.⁶²

The tactic of "escalating" warnings has often been employed by terrorists. A mild first warning is followed by more harshly stated threats and then by an imminent show of action. World War II resistance movements in occupied Europe provide numerous illustrations of

specific threats issued to "collaborators" to make them desist from supporting the Nazis. The threat often began with a "blacklisting" of the individual's name in an underground newspaper, escalated to a warning note delivered directly to him, and ended with an "execution order." All the while, the demand behind the threat was specifically stated.

If a threat is to affect a large number of people, it must be related to a clearly discernible act, so that all learn the lesson demonstrated by the enforcement of the threat. The Viet Cong terrorists in Vietnam, after several implicit or explicit warnings to a prominent villager or government official, send a signed "death sentence." When the threat—usually assassination—is carried out, "the tale of Communist omnipotence is then spread by the terror-stricken widow and children," who still have the written death sentence. "The bandwagon effect sought in these cases is to convince the inhabitants of the village that they had better obey the Viet Cong or the same fate may be theirs."⁶³

Another requirement for the effectiveness of specific threat is that the threatener must have visible means of administering punishment if he is to be persuasive. The threatener must be able to determine that the threatened person did not in fact comply with the demands before inflicting punishment; otherwise the situation of a specific threat changes to one of general terror.⁶⁴

The phrasing and structuring of specific threats vary according to the kind of compliance that is sought. Essentially, there are three kinds of threat demands. First, a threatener may choose to demand actions toward which the populace is already predisposed. This is the easiest kind—the one for which compliance is most easily secured. It may be of considerable advantage for an underground to use this tactic, for its easy success gives the threatener a disproportionate amount of credit for power and influence. For example, in Algeria the OAS, in order to demonstrate its displeasure against the French Government, demanded that all Algerians stay off the streets during the evening hours and turn off their lights, and threatened to punish anyone found on the streets during the evening hours. These demands on the populace were consonant with what an individual might do on his own during any kind of disorder.⁶⁵ Thus compliance was easy.

A second kind of demand seeks to induce an individual or group to change specific behavior by demanding alternative actions. This is more difficult than the first and requires clearly stated alternatives and persuasively stated (and perhaps demonstrated) consequences for refusing.

The third and most difficult kind of demand is one that orders an individual to refrain from a course of action he is already pursuing: the demand sharply conflicts with current behavior.

Generalized or uncertain threat is the second pattern of phrasing. The generalized threat does not delineate behavior or specify demands and consequences; these are left to the imagination of the threatened individual. Uncertain threats are used to create terror among the populace, making them vigilant and sensitive to terrorist suggestions. The threatener captures attention at a point when persons under stress are desperately searching to eliminate uncertainty and ambiguity. He may suggest escape routes and alternatives, and make compliance demands which are readily accepted in order to eliminate the uncertainty of the threat and reduce terror. Occasionally, terrorists do not even seek compliance to specific demands, but rather hope to cause "flight" or psychological and morale breakdown of a population.

The South Vietnamese Army utilized uncertain threat in a counterterror campaign, dubbed "Operation Black Eye," against the Viet Cong. Selected Vietnamese troops were organized into terror squads and assigned the task of working with rural agents in penetrating Viet Cong-held areas. Within a short time Viet Cong leaders—key members of the clandestine infrastructure—began to die mysteriously and violently in their beds. On each of the bodies was a piece of paper printed with a grotesque human eye. The appearance of "the eye" soon represented a

serious threat. The paper eyes, 50,000 copies of which were printed by the U.S. Information Service in Saigon, turned up not only on corpses but as warnings on the doors of houses suspected of occasionally harboring Viet Cong agents. The eyes came to mean that "big brother is watching you." The mere presence of "the eye" induced members of the Viet Cong to sleep anywhere but in their own beds. It was an eerie, uncertain threat.⁶⁶

Generalized terror seems to have limited effectiveness over a period of time. Uncertain threat reaches a point of diminishing returns when the populace finally either "breaks" under the stress of ambiguity or focuses hostility on some object it perceives, correctly or not, as the source of threat.⁶⁷ Once such a "hostile belief" develops, the populace's openness to suggestion ends.

The essential distinction, then, between "specific" and "uncertain" threat is the difference between threat used to secure specifically stated demands—known and planned in advance—and threat designed to debilitate and/or sensitize a populace to later suggestions.



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FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER TWELVE

SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION OF CROWDS

The underground use of subversively manipulated crowds and civil disturbances has added a new dimension to the problem of maintaining internal security. The difference between civil disturbances which are subversively manipulated and those which are not can be expressed in terms of objectives. Strikes, riots, and demonstrations usually have limited goals, such as better working conditions or social changes. The aims of the underground movement are the overthrow of the government and the seizure of power.

The manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances is just one of the means used to accomplish the objective of seizing power. The internal security forces, who bear a major share of the burden of maintaining order, should understand that the control of subversively manipulated crowds requires special considerations. Standard priorities of force may be adequate for dispersal of ordinary civil disturbances, but in dealing with a subversively controlled riot, internal security forces must be alert to situations or acts which compel them to respond in ways that the subversives can politically exploit.

The security forces of a nation are usually composed of paramilitary and military units and civil police. The function of maintaining internal security may be performed by one or any combination of these forces.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

One method for improving our understanding of this phenomenon is to study the strategy and tactics of subversion. Underground strategy is to separate the existing government from its base of power by capturing the institutional supports upon which it rests, by alienating mass support from the government, and by overtaxing internal security forces with problems of unrest. It has been said that "revolutionists in modern society do not so much 'seize' power as destroy and re-create it."¹ The simple creation of disorder does not automatically bring an underground group to power. It can, however, create a vacuum into which new organizational instruments of power can move.

When the habit of obedience to law breaks down among a populace, a tense, highly emotional state ensues, which gives the underground a chance to channel dissatisfactions. The tactics of internal subversion involve the subgoals, methods, and techniques of creating social disorganization. One such tactic is the creation or manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances for the purpose of advancing the overall strategy.

The population target group of the underground may be a large minority with certain crystallized grievances, or it may be a highly organized group, such as a labor union or regional political party, that is continually bargaining for a more favorable position in society.

The community conflicts fomented by or capitalized upon by the underground follow a pattern. One of the peculiarities of social controversy is that it sets in motion its own dynamics which carry it forward on a path which may bear little relation to its beginnings.² When there are deep cleavages of values or interests in a community, specific grievances have a tendency to give way to general issues, and groups that set out to protest a specific issue end up disagreeing with the entire civil administration.

As a controversy develops, new and different issues, unrelated to the original, frequently emerge or are introduced. These added elements may reflect deep-seated prejudices or individual grievances. They are characteristically one-sided, so that response can be in only one direction, and are structured so as to capture the attention of the members of the community. The new issues increase solidarity among old members and attract new members.

Another significant complication is the progression from simple disagreement to violent antagonism. The generation and focusing of hostility can sustain social conflict without the aid of specific facts and issues. This results in a tendency to see the opposing group as all bad and the interest group as all good.

An interesting change takes place in the social organization of the community. Long-standing relationships among individuals and groups are terminated and new groups polarize around the issues in conflict. New leaders tend to take over the dispute. The social geography of the community is altered. At this point in the social process the underground attempts to manipulate at least one of these groups by directing and channeling its grievances, grasping the leadership, and speaking for it.

RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

The subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances involves a relatively small number of undergrounders who try to guide and direct "legitimate" protests. They attempt to direct the crowd toward emotional issues and arouse them against authority.

The emotional perceptions and beliefs of the crowds that participate in civil disturbances often do not coincide with objective reality, and the individuals involved do not realize that their grievances are being manipulated in politically subversive ways. The following accounts of riots and demonstrations illustrate underground attempts to incite or exploit civil disturbances.

Colombia (1948)

The incident called El Bogotazo (Blow at Bogotá) demonstrated the effectiveness of the riot technique. It is particularly significant in that the techniques for provoking street crowds into rioting learned in the demonstration are used as training material for revolutionaries. A Venezuelan Communist defector from Castro's training school—the Tarara Training Center in Cuba—has reported that the classroom materials include diagrams of the tactics and descriptions of how the crowds were manipulated in the 3-day riot that wrecked the Ninth Inter-American Conference and left the Colombian capital in ruins.³

The Ninth Inter-American Conference had been called for March 30, 1948, to discuss the pledge among member nations for mutual defense and resistance to the threat of international communism. According to testimony before the Judiciary Committee of the 86th U.S. Congress, intercepted Communist communiques reveal that the party immediately went into action; the combined forces of the Latin American Communist Party apparatus set about making plans to disrupt the conference.⁴ A high-ranking official of the Colombian Communist Party (which claimed at that time a membership of 10,000 out of a total population of 11 million) said that the Inter-American Conference must be blocked, but that this action was not to be known as a Communist activity; he admonished the party to refrain from open activity so as not to jeopardize or curtail party functions.

The Communists devote considerable effort to preparing for any proposed riot; they seldom rely exclusively on spontaneity or accidental occurrences, even though they attempt to capitalize on such events. By January 29, 1948, arms and explosives had already been stored in 17 houses. A Communist dispatch dated February 2 included the information that plans called for organization of mass public meetings, organization of 16 meetings of cells in outlying districts, recruitment of new members to the party, organization of 15 syndicates and unions, further organization of cells within the syndicates, and distribution during the conference of 50,000 handbills and 3,000 posters. A committee of the Communist Party was assigned to supervise these arrangements. A dispatch dated March 30 laid out the program of agitation and attacks upon the United States, Chilean, Brazilian, and Argentine delegations, all of which were especially anti-Communist. During the middle of the first week in April, the Communist-controlled Latin American Conference (CTAL) adopted resolutions in Mexico City condemning the conference.

On April 9, a well-known figure, Dr. Jorge Gaitan, was killed by four bullets from a revolver fired by an unidentified person. Dr. Gaitan, a 47-year-old lawyer, was the leader and former presidential candidate of Colombia's liberal movement. Although it was reported that

the Communist Party had supplied money through an intermediary for the support of Dr. Gaitan and his movement, he had maintained an independent attitude toward the Communists. Rumors of Communist plans to disrupt the conference caused Dr. Gaitan to publicly repudiate all acts against the conference, saying that these were acts against democracy and the unity of the Americas. Although his assassin was never identified, both the personality of Dr. Gaitan and the circumstances surrounding his death inspired at least one observer to say that the Communists, needing an appropriate victim whose death could prevent the holding of the conference, selected a prominent person. Colombian President Ospina Perez also suggested that the man who killed Dr. Gaitan apparently had Communist affiliations and that the entire affair was a Communist maneuver.

A wave of mass violence was triggered by the assassination, which took place within the sight of thousands. The Communists channeled the high emotions into anti-U.S. feelings and acts of violence against U.S. property and individuals. Within 15 minutes of the attack on Dr. Gaitan, radio broadcasting stations in Bogotá had been taken over and the Communists were issuing instructions and inciting the people to revolt against the government, the conference, and Yankee imperialism. Orders were given to plunder arms depots, hardware stores, gunsmith shops, department stores, government buildings, police precincts, and army barracks, and to organize a "popular militia." The radio also transmitted orders to specific individuals to assault specific places and gave locations where additional weapons could be obtained. Instructions were given on how to manufacture Molotov cocktails. During the broadcasts, fighting could be heard in the background, reportedly between the Communists and a group of students, for control of the radio facilities; the armed Communists forced the students out of the station. By controlling communications, the Communists could incite attacks against the symbols and instruments of power within the government. Within each group of demonstrators in the crowds were organized agitators chanting similar slogans. Prompted by the Communist agitators, a crowd entered the parliament building where the Inter-American Conference was being held and destroyed most of the interior. The rioters concentrated on destroying offices of the Chilean and United States delegations. Mob action almost completely suspended transportation, created obstacles for the police, and made the crowd that much more difficult to control.

Led by the Communists, less than 5 percent of the population carried on the riot for three days. Shops, churches, public utilities, and institutions of public service were attacked. Red flags were evident throughout the crowd and in every group orders could be heard directing the mobs. The word "abajo" (down with) was heard frequently. There was heavy sniper fire.

The first burnings of buildings may have been simple, random gestures of protest, but a consideration of which buildings were burned showed a subversive pattern. On the afternoon of April 9, the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Palace of Justice, the Ministry of Government, the Episcopal Palace, the detective headquarters, and the Identification Section for natives and foreigners were all attacked and

burned. The Confederation of Colombian Workers, which represented 109,000 organized workers, called for a general strike throughout Colombia.⁵

After declaring a state of siege and imposing martial law, President Perez eventually restored order. But the Communists had achieved their tactical objective of disrupting the conference and, in the process, had effectively demonstrated the practicability of their methods.

Venezuela (1960-62)

The significance of the Venezuelan Castro-Communist insurgency is its expansion of the tactic of riot into strategic prolonged urban violence, planned to paralyze the functioning of government.⁶ This strategy, unlike long-term, rural-based insurgency, was aimed at achieving a "rapid victory." The urban insurgency movement first focused on organization—the establishment of secret "activist nuclei" in Caracas, around which terrorist groups could later operate.

Then, beginning in early 1961, it launched a program of violence in the form of riots and subversive demonstrations. According to the Venezuelan Ministry of Interior Relations, a total of 113 "significant riots" occurred in the course of the year. The most common technique was to mass hundreds of students, largely those enrolled in leftist youth organizations of the Central University and various secondary schools, and move them toward the center of the city. En route, buses and automobiles were burned and flaming street barricades were erected. Older students were frequently armed with Molotov cocktails, and some carried pistols or acid. Students posted within the university grounds (which are off-limits to police because of the university's autonomous status) added to the confusion and casualties with sniper fire.

The third stage of the urban insurgency featured the introduction of "shock brigades"—small units (called Tactical Combat Units) which served as auxiliaries to the main body of student rioters. While security forces were occupied with the main riot center, "shock brigades" fanned out to create numerous points of street violence with sniper fire, burning of vehicles, blocking of traffic, and destruction of property.

Although the Communist underground markedly improved its techniques of street violence through increasingly effective organization, the repeated riots and urban violence failed to achieve a rapid victory. The student riots in Caracas were of little practical value because the general public stayed aloof from the violence and was content to wait for government forces to restore order. The Communists never succeeded in employing the two most formidable techniques of urban insurrection—large-scale rioting and a revolutionary general strike—mainly because they could never coalesce public opinion behind them.

South Vietnam (1964)

In South Vietnam, the Viet Cong have used tactics similar to those used in Bogotá in 1945. Captured documents and questioning of prisoners have disclosed several phases in developing

riots.⁷ In the first phase, the Communists established safe zones in sections of the city. Within these areas, they stored arms and identified places where insurgent personnel could gather secretly. The Communist infiltrators were to disguise themselves as students or workers and were then instructed to infiltrate legal and semilegal clubs and associations or, for that matter, any organization which could be used as a vehicle for countergovernment propaganda.

In the second phase of the operation, Communist youth groups armed with clubs and knives for "self-defense," instigated street quarrels to create tension and manufacture further incidents. Agitators were to mix with the crowd, yelling inflammatory slogans to whip up excitement. The instructions stressed the importance of creating martyrs to focus the crowd's attention on the injuries and deaths caused by the government forces. Armed groups were instructed to assassinate city officials and seize police weapons.

The Viet Cong underground identified shopkeepers and homeowners who would be willing to shelter demonstrators as they fled from the police and who would hide the cadres of agitators during police searches.

The Viet Cong clandestine radio and Radio Hanoi called for urban uprisings in daily broadcasts. During one mass demonstration a 15-year-old youth was killed. The next day, during a dramatic funeral procession for him, paratroopers seized 10 youths who had knives hidden under their shirts, thus breaking up plans for new violence.

Peru (1964)

In Peru, a Chamber of Deputies committee investigating the so-called Sicuani Massacre found that Cuban-directed Communists had planned and forced unwilling peasants to join in "land-grab leagues."⁸ Despite the extreme socioeconomic underdevelopment of the Department of Cuzco and the unfortunate land tenure conditions—alone sufficient to enable the Communists to obtain support from the peasants—it was found that Communist peasant leaders threatened to inflict bodily harm on unwilling peasants unless they demonstrated for the land seizures. During the demonstrations women and children were placed in front of the men in peasant encounters with the civil guards. The investigating committee found that after stones had been thrown at the police, one of them hitting the Chief of Police, the civil guard units fired into the crowd, resulting in the "massacre."

Colombia (1965)

On January 21, 1965, Colombian President Valencia made a speech announcing that government forces had reestablished control after several days of rioting in Bogotá. The riots had the appearance of a general strike but in his speech the President pointed out to the Colombian

people the subversive nature of the riots and the subsequent wave of bank holdups and kidnappings. The government had intercepted Communist communications directing the course of the demonstrations. These communications revealed that Communist youth groups had been instructed to mobilize the masses through meetings in centrally located places. Factory cells had been instructed to incite strikes, but not to let the connection with the Communist Party show. The cadres had been instructed to avoid confrontation with the police and the possibility of being jailed. They had been instructed to launch a popular front demanding the abolition of the sales tax, the resignation of the government, and the installation of a popular junta with elements from all political parties. They had been further instructed to organize factory meetings at district and zonal levels and to speak for a single front made up of liberals, conservatives, and Communists. They had also been instructed to launch attacks on U.S. business firms, to release prisoners from the Bogotá jail, and to invite army personnel and armed police to join them. The targets selected for seizure were the National Radio Station, press telephones, and public water and power works. The Communists had printed posters and appealed for the formation of "public salvation committees" in all cities and villages throughout the country which were willing to confront the situation and take on the responsibilities of government.

PHASES OF SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION

Subversively manipulated civil disturbances may be considered as having four phases: (1) the precrowd phase; (2) the crowd phase; (3) the civil disturbance phase; and (4) the post-civil disturbance phase.

The Precrowd Phase

In the preparation or precrowd phase, the underground elements are primarily concerned with building an organization. Lenin maintained that training a network of agents for the rapid and correct distribution of literature, leaflets, and proclamations accounted for the greater part of the work of preparing for a demonstration or uprising. He concluded that it is too late to start organizing literature distribution at the moment when a strike or demonstration is about to start.⁹

Selected individuals are given special training in the subversive manipulation of crowds. They are taught how to build barricades and conduct street fighting, how to mobilize blocks in the city and workers in plants, how to develop a local strike into a general strike and general strike into a city uprising, and how to coordinate these into a national uprising.¹⁰ Outside specialists are often brought in to direct the training activities.¹¹

COPY BLOCK

BOTTOM

Some sort of planning on the part of the underground must take place. It may vary from rudimentary to highly sophisticated. Underground agents are instructed to infiltrate target groups by joining formal organizations, clubs, or any association which gives them access to such audiences. ¹²

Next comes the selection of a population target. It is chosen primarily for its potential to bring about community conflict or increase its intensity. Any group that is not susceptible to manipulation, at least after some preparation, is not considered to be a part of the "masses," in Communist terms. Groups identified by their common interests (e.g., ethnic minorities, labor, farmers) offer great potential for covert manipulation, because attention can be centered on bread-and-butter issues rather than on complicated ideological sensitivities. ¹³

The desired change in attitude of the members of the target group is usually accomplished through distribution of selected communications, the contents of which are designed to increase anxiety and emotional stress. Word of mouth, radio, telephone, and leaflets and other printed material have been effectively used. Pistols, rifles, materials for making Molotov cocktails and explosives, and other weapons, such as clubs and lengths of pipe, and handbills, signs, arm-bands, and banners, must be acquired and stored. In recent riots, such weapons as handguns, rifles, and Molotov cocktails have been employed. The rifle has proved particularly useful for creating additional chaos by the killing or wounding of members of the crowd or internal security forces from relatively safe distances. ¹⁴

Arrangements for members of the underground group to flee the area must be completed. These consist primarily of establishing routes of escape containing safe houses or other hiding places. Safe zones are established with householders and shopkeepers where demonstrators may seek cover when fleeing from the police. ¹⁵

In places where demonstrations or strikes can be planned in advance, the underground mounts a campaign directed at preconditioning target groups. Chosen themes are constantly repeated. By concentrating on local and specific grievances, a group is conditioned to phrases and slogans to which its members may later react under conditions of emotional stress. ¹⁶

The Crowd Phase

The indispensable element in civil disturbances is the crowd: not just any crowd, but a crowd made up of individuals who have been conditioned either by subversive manipulation or by other events.

Organizations

There are several ways to assemble a crowd. Cell members infiltrate mass organizations so that strikes or mass meetings can be changed into armed demonstrations. There are built-in

sanctions within labor unions or other disciplined organizations which can be used to punish members who do not comply with the decisions of the organization. Therefore, if the infiltrated union or organization calls for a strike or demonstration, its members can be brought into a particular place at a particular time. Student groups are highly volatile on many social issues and can be induced to participate in demonstrations for the sheer excitement.

Informal Gatherings

Demonstrations can be brought about at parades, street parties, dances, or during normal rush-hour periods. During Vice President Richard M. Nixon's trip to Caracas, Venezuela, on May 13, 1958, crowds of students and other onlookers were turned into rioters by slogans and chants. Eventually they attacked Nixon's car with heavy rocks, jagged cans, eggs, and tomatoes, and beat the windows with clubs. The traffic jam which permitted Vice President Nixon's car to be attacked was prearranged. Two trucks collided and the drivers then just walked away. The street was also packed with banner-carrying youngsters primed for action.¹⁷

Hired Demonstrators

In addition to the local people at the demonstration against Vice President Nixon, many top Latin American Communists from nearby countries had converged on the capital. Party agents went into areas where criminal elements lived and hired as many as they could, arming them with long wooden clubs and iron bars. Gustavo Machado, a Venezuelan Communist Party leader, later admitted to organizing the demonstration in Caracas.¹⁸

Before James Hagerty's trip to Japan to prepare for the visit of President Eisenhower, the Communists began planning and organizing the demonstrations that were to greet him. To assure large participation in the riots, the organizers paid 1,000 yen (approximately \$2.78) to persons who would attack Hagerty's car, and 350-500 yen to persons for general participation. In addition, workers from the Sohyo labor federation received a half-day's salary for participation. Applicants were recruited from the employment offices to such an extent that police were able to predict the large demonstration by the absence of applicants in the offices.¹⁹

The Precipitating Event

The precipitating event which results in the formation of a crowd depends for a great deal of its effectiveness upon communication, especially upon distortion of the event. If the event is fabricated by the agitator, the distortion is built in. If the event is factual, he makes it fit his issues or capitalizes on the natural distortion which accompanies word-of-mouth communications. The precipitating

issue or event can be a martyred individual, a report of police brutality, or a symbolic act such as the desecration of a flag.

Mob-Management Techniques

Although the Communist Party of Iraq in the militant period of 1948-50 was a tiny mincrity, it succeeded in creating the impression of large numbers and great support by successful mob management. The Communist elements were organized into an external command, well removed from the activity, which could observe the demonstration, and an internal command located in the crowd, which was responsible for directing the demonstration. There were bodyguards who surrounded and shielded the internal command from the police and if necessary facilitated their escape, messengers who carried orders between the internal and external commands, shock-guards who were armed with clubs and acted only as reinforcements, created diversionary violence when Communists became engaged by the police, thus permitting them to escape, and banner carriers who switched from banners expressing general grievances to those reflecting direct Communist propaganda at the appropriate time. The cheering sections consisted of special demonstrators who had rehearsed the slogans and chants and the order in which they were to be raised.²⁰

The Agitator

After the crowd has been formed, the agitator assumes a significant role.²¹ His function has been described as bringing to flame the smouldering resentment of his listeners through emotional appeals and then giving social sanction to their actions. The agitator in the crowd plays upon the audience's suspicion of things they do not understand. He points out that there is material abundance for everyone but that the crowd does not get its proper share. He generally points to a premonition of disasters to come and plays upon the fears of individuals and the uncertainty of life in the community. The agitator then points to the politicians and the police as representatives of government and alludes to fraud, deception, and falsehoods among them. The agitator seldom invents issues, nor does he have to, since his appeals are vague and he plays upon the basic emotions of fear and insecurity. The agitator seldom justifies his facts, nor does he need to, since he chooses emotional themes common to all men.

The Riot Leader

After the crowd has been emotionally aroused, some event must set it in motion. Often it begins its riotous activity by following a leader who merely shouts "follow me, let's go." The

NOT REPRODUCIBLE



(United Press International Photo)

One of the techniques used by undergrounds in assembling crowds for demonstrations or riots is to capitalize upon the informal gatherings of people. For example, during Vice President Richard Nixon's trip to Caracas, Venezuela, crowds of students and other curious onlookers were turned into rioters by the adroit use of slogans, emotional contagion, and manipulations by Communist agitators.

internal command assumes the leadership role if an emergent leader does not arise spontaneously. The event which sets the crowd in motion may, like the precipitating incident that brought them together, be either factual or fabricated.

Small groups have face-to-face communications and interaction. In large groups, however, communications come through second- and third-hand sources. This is conducive to the spirit of rumor. It has been said that "no riot ever occurs without rumors to incite, accompany, and intensify the violence."²² Rumor tends to mobilize collective action. It may be communicated through gestures, casual conversation, or mass media. It may be triggered by an actor who sets an example by what he does and spontaneously becomes the leader of a group or it may be planned by the underground organization.²³ Precipitating events give generalized beliefs immediate substance. Rumors as they are related to beliefs tend to restructure the ambiguous and uncertain situation and to explain it for the individual who is participating in the crowd. They help to put facts into place.²⁴

The Civil Disturbance Phase

Maintaining Emotional Excitement

Once the destructive action of the crowd is under way, the agitator tries to maintain the level of emotional excitement. This can be accomplished in various ways. Cheerleaders can chant rhythmic and inspiring phrases or songs. Slogans can be displayed and banners unfurled. "Booster" incidents can be created or capitalized upon—a rather universal type of booster activity is the looting of stores and shops. Bank holdups and kidnappings are also carried out during the chaos. Other acts—such as the verbal abuse and stoning of police—which permit the individual to release aggression and hostility against the symbols of authority also increase the emotional involvement. In the Panama riots in January 1964, 400-500 people threw stones and Molotov cocktails when assaulting the home of Judge Guthrie F. Crowe. Later, they attacked the railroad station with the same weapons. The Molotov cocktails used during the rioting must have been made specifically for the riots, said the investigating committee appointed by the International Commission of Jurists—but where, where, and by whom was not disclosed.²⁵

Creation of Martyrs

The creation of a martyr has a sustaining effect upon destructive crowd activity. Subversive elements do not deplore bloodshed and violence. Attacks are made upon the internal security forces in order to provoke retaliation. If this fails, a rifle in the hands of a sniper can assure a victim. A martyr turns an ordinary grievance into an emotional crusade.

Individuals who cannot easily identify with abstract issues readily empathize with the emotional demands brought on by apparent injustice to or "brutal" attacks on innocent people.

The police are provoked by insults and attacks into hostile, aggressive responses which will lead to the injury of women, children, or other "innocents" who happen to be in the crowd. This is then dramatized and used as a new emotional issue for which the crowd must seek retribution. The accidental death of the 22-year-old daughter of a university professor was a major issue in the Tokyo riots leading to the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan in May 1960. The girl was trampled to death during a clash between a group of demonstrators and the police. The police were blamed for her death, and an elaborate funeral was staged at which thousands of demonstrators were present. Many Tokyo students and university professors took part in a large rally and in subsequent demonstrations at the Diet, the Prime Minister's residence, and at the Metropolitan Police Board to express their concern and indignation over the police and government actions. The demonstrations were not only instrumental in canceling President Eisenhower's trip, but probably had some impact upon the subsequent fall of the Kishi government. ²⁶

Counterpolice Activity

Police and army counterriot tactics are studied by the planners so that steps can be taken to circumvent them. Routes usually taken by internal security forces are blocked with barricades, overturned vehicles, and debris. Attacks upon police stations and their communications systems serve to disrupt police countermeasures. Cadres are usually guarded by strong-arm squads and avoid confrontation with the police so they will not be jailed. Appeals to army or police units not to attack their own countrymen are especially effective when there are children, women, war veterans, or students in the front ranks of the crowds. ²⁷

Post-Civil Disturbance Phase

After a civil disturbance has subsided, underground elements use a variety of means to capitalize on the situation. One way of maintaining the interest and emotional involvement of the population is a 24-hour general strike. Workers, especially those in key industries and utilities, are encouraged to protest against the government by staying away from work 24 hours. This is time enough to interrupt vital utilities and affect the entire population. Individuals and property owners are faced with the dilemma of going about their normal routine and facing violence or staying home for a day. Factory cells incite union members to stay off the job. They seek union sponsorship or usurp authority by making unauthorized announcements or by calling individual members.

To turn specific issues into grievances against the government, the underground makes appeals to all workers to join in a united front against the government. Cells in various factories, districts, zones, and businesses demand that their organizations support the strike in the form of a united front.

Agitators attempt to capitalize upon the contagious effect of civil disturbances by spreading the violence and creating new incidents in nearby areas. Attacks upon symbols of authority, such as police stations and the offices of local officials, increase the intensity of the disorder. If possible, radio stations, newspapers, water, and power services are seized. Newspapers and radios spread the rumors, and control of water and power plants spreads social disorganization and fear. In the Bogotá riot of 1948 and in the Bolivian riots of April 1953, appeals were made to workers, peasants, and trade unionists to form armed "people's militias" and correct the "injustices" of the government. ²⁸

In order to demonstrate the uncompromising position of the government, the demands against it are usually vague and impossible to meet. Original issues, such as higher wages or repeal of a sales tax, are now changed to antigovernment demands. A call is made for the release of political prisoners, and the police and army are asked to join the rioters. It is customary to insist on nothing less than the complete overthrow of the existing government. These demands can be articulated in protest meetings that keep the public aroused and involved. Committees are formed in every village or city to protest government action. Every attempt is made to get notable and respected citizens to lend their names to the protest.

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PART FIVE
PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

Many of the functions performed by the underground can properly be called military activities. The exigencies of present-day insurgencies preclude a monopoly of the performance of military functions by regular mainforce units. A member of a regional force or local militia is often a peaceful fisherman by day; only at night does he don his uniform and conduct raids. The political and military activities of an insurgency overlap both in function and in personnel.

Usually inferior to the government security forces in number and resources, the underground must use every opportunity and capitalize on every advantage. To do this requires careful planning, adequate intelligence, and effective means of escape-and-evasion. Intelligence relies on reconnaissance, underground infiltration, and on the cooperation of the part-time underground in the village; planning requires the intelligence provided by the villagers and a careful analysis of the enemy forces; performance of ambushes, raids, and sabotage depends on adequate intelligence, careful planning, and skillful use of well-trained underground elements. Once the raid or ambush is over, provision must be made for withdrawal, exfiltration, and dispersal. The escape-and-evasion nets provide for the safety and survival of the underground members after the mission is over.

The following chapter will discuss the activities of planning and intelligence and describe three areas of underground activity in which their operational aspects have been applied: ambushes and raids, sabotage, and escape-and-evasion.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

PLANNING OF MISSIONS

Although the underground avoids fighting when success is uncertain, some calculated risks must be taken to insure the continued growth of the organization. The underground, therefore, relies on careful planning to maximize success and minimize risk. As a Vietminh training manual states:

One must study the situation in the opposing camp, that is to say one must try to find out the dispositions of the enemy, the attitude of the cadres and the combatants towards one another, their morale and their fighting value. Follow closely the opponent's activities: the deployment of his intelligence service, transport, relief of pickets, all give evidence of his intentions and so make it possible to plan operations with every chance of success.¹

The manual goes on to point out the importance of determining the enemy's weak point—morale, provisioning, laxity—and states that "if the enemy protects himself carefully without presenting any weak points, we must create them before attacking."

PREPLANNING

Contingency Plans

In planning attacks, the underground develops contingency plans which can be implemented in the event the original plan proves impracticable. Thus, the failure of one action taken in the course of a mission would not necessarily jeopardize the security of individuals or compromise the mission itself or the underground organization.

The need for contingency planning is illustrated by the 1943 Otto Skorzeny attempt to kidnap Mussolini from an Italian mountain resort hotel. This stronghold on a jagged plateau in the Gran Sasso mountain region was 6,000 feet above sea level and considered invulnerable. There would be no chance for a second mission should the first fail. Therefore, on Hitler's instructions and based on limited intelligence, three plans were devised. Plan A called for a lightning air attack on the nearby Italian airbase in the valley. Minutes after the attack, three German transport planes were to land there, one of which would pick up Mussolini while the other two diverted groundfire. If this plan failed, Plan B provided for a small plane to land in the meadows in the valley directly below the stronghold, pick up Mussolini, and transport him to Rome. In Plan C, the most dangerous of the three, a light plane would land directly on the hotel grounds.

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In the actual operation, Skorzeny could not make radio contact with his headquarters in Rome to give the go-ahead for Plan A. Plan B automatically went into effect, but failed because the plane was damaged while landing. Plan C finally succeeded, and Mussolini was delivered to the German headquarters in Rome.²

Rehearsal

A second method for increasing the probability of success is to engage in extensive rehearsal for the mission. The success of this method depends to a large extent on adequate intelligence. In preparing a raid, intelligence information enables the underground to make a mockup of the military installation to be attacked.

All moves are preplanned. In the Philippines, on the basis of intelligence reports, a shopping list of certain items to be collected from the installation during the attack was prepared and issued to the members of the raiding party.³ In this way they were assured that the required items would be taken in the shortest possible time.

Enemy countermeasures and actions needed to cope with them must also be considered, planned, and rehearsed. Small attacks may be launched against a future target to determine where the reaction force will come from and how long it will take to arrive. This information is used to plan the timing requirements of the mission, the placement of blocking units to ambush reinforcements, and escape-and-evasion routes.

Exploitation of Vulnerabilities

- The vulnerabilities of the enemy can be determined by observing the established pattern of his trained troops. The underground knows that highly trained troops respond in a given manner and attempts to capitalize upon these patterns. The underground also looks for overconfidence on the part of regular troops, knowing that the most vulnerable part of an enemy system may be that which appears to be invulnerable.
- Communications systems can also produce vulnerabilities. There is a tendency to centralize most communications systems so that lateral communications between different military organizations are not as rapid as vertical communications within a single organization. Since requests for help usually go to the higher commands rather than to units of another command which may be physically closer, inordinate time delays usually result.* It is these interface problems which the underground planner seeks to exploit.⁵
- *In one Vietnamese province Viet Cong attacks were successful because the zone was situated between two corps of government troops who were unsure of their jurisdiction, and on the border of two provinces whose provincial chiefs suffered the same jurisdictional confusion. Poorly defined jurisdictional and communication responsibilities severely handicapped rapid response by government forces.⁴



NOT REPRODUCIBLE

(United Press International Photo)

The Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam meticulously prepare their attacks, frequently rehearsing the plan of action. Here, a guerrilla leader reviews a scale model of Ben Cau fortress near the provincial capital of Tay Ninh, approximately 60 miles northwest of Saigon, in preparation for a raid.

On the other hand, if government units have an especially efficient communications and response system, insurgents may capitalize upon this efficiency: they can divert government units by staging diversionary attacks or exhaust them through numerous false alarms or small raids on distant outposts.

Several distinct techniques have been used by insurgents to exploit vulnerabilities: infiltration, surprise, deception and diversion, and creation of fatigue through continuous harassment and provocation.

Infiltration

Prior to a scheduled raid, underground agents infiltrate an area and locate sympathizers who provide information about the target and government security forces. Frequently, infiltrators devise a screen of lookouts and a system of signals. The underground prepares the battlefield by moving in supplies and arms for use by units which will infiltrate later.⁶ If the target is a strategic hamlet, previously infiltrated members of the underground disrupt internal defenses at the time of the raid. They may cut holes in the barricade or barbed wire, move machineguns to prevent overlapping fields of fire, or sabotage weapons arsenals.

Surprise

According to one unconventional warfare expert, it is rarely possible to actually surprise a well-trained enemy through a single motion, such as catching him asleep. Instead, the key to successful surprise attacks is to retain the initiative. This can be done through a three-phase surprise operation: 1) initiate action against the enemy; 2) allow the enemy to fully develop his reaction; and 3) when the enemy's entire attention is devoted to the reaction, take advantage of his deployment and deliver a surprise counterattack. For example, if the enemy were in an installation with prepared defenses, its reaction must be foreseen. One tactic is to send a provocative force to within three miles of the enemy and set up a dummy bivouac. To draw attention to themselves, this force sends a small patrol which, after encountering the enemy, retreats to the bivouac. As enemy troops rapidly pursue them, believing them to be the only force, the remaining elements prepare an ambush. The principle here is that, although it is not normally possible to surprise and defeat well-trained and well-prepared troops, by diverting their attention to a false target they can be made vulnerable to attack or ambush.⁷ In South Vietnam, for example, one of the favorite plans of the Viet Cong is to have a small force attack a village while a large force waits to ambush the mobile reaction troops which rush to the rescue of the village.

Uncertainty is often a key element of surprise attack. Skorzeny found that even well-trained troops are vulnerable for a short time to direct surprise attack if the attack force can create a condition of uncertainty and confusion among the defenders. In a raid of this type, the attack force needs only a small amount of time to take advantage of the confusion.

In the Gran Sasso raid, for example, Skorzeny's troops were briefed to emphasize speed and timing. Skorzeny calculated that only three minutes of hesitation on the part of the defenders would allow his forces to gain the advantage and secure the target. To achieve this hesitation and confusion, a man in the uniform of an Italian general was used as a member of the raiding party. His presence and his shouting of orders distracted and confused the Italian guards long enough so that the garrison was taken without a shot being fired.⁸

During World War II, a Danish sabotage team informed a factory's security force of an expected sabotage raid on the installation, then saboteurs in regular police uniforms entered the factory on the pretext of being reinforcement guards, quickly assembled the entire guard force for an emergency briefing and disarmed and detained them.⁹

Well-trained soldiers are not likely to be surprised or caught off guard when faced with conventional situations, but in situations so uncertain or so unusual that they do not have a prepared response, they can be confused into inaction. This inaction can be exploited, or soldiers can be made to follow the orders and direction of someone who appears to have authority.

Deception and Diversion

To cover a major attack, various means of deception and diversion are used. The insurgents sometimes distract reinforcements or protective forces by attacking other locations or assembling large crowds. In Malaya small attacks and withdrawals were used to make the enemy believe that an attacking force had been driven away. Then a sudden, large attack caught the defenders off guard.¹⁰

10 Harassment and Provocation

Continuous harassment by means of hit-and-run attacks on distant villages can fatigue and reduce the morale of well-trained mobile reaction troops. The Vietminh manual states:

We resort to diversionary and harassing attacks in order to disturb and wear out the enemy; we encircle and split up his positions; we disrupt his lines of communication in order to make him come out to repair them, and then we attack him. In the course of battle we give the impression that we are forced to withdraw, so that the enemy takes up the pursuit and reaches our positions, where we wipe him out. We use stratagems and provocations to lead him on.¹¹

Other Considerations

Human Factors

In planning raids or other attacks on enemy installations, certain human factors are given special consideration. An attack has greater chance for success if the government morale is low, or if government forces are overconfident or alone, with no available assistance.¹²

Situational factors, such as time of day, are also significant. Night, for example, provides natural cover to prepare for a dawn attack. Adverse weather, such as heavy rain or fog, provides an excellent opportunity for attack. Holidays, weekends, fiestas, and paydays catch the protecting force at a psychological disadvantage.¹³

Tactical Considerations

All things being equal, the smaller the team the greater the security. Usually small teams are selected to carry out ambushes or raids. It is impossible to anticipate all circumstances, so each man must be fully briefed on the mission's goals and prepared to take initiative when appropriate.

The tactical principle of temporary superiority of force predicates the entire concept of small-unit actions. Mao Tse-tung said that strategy was one against ten and tactics ten against one—that a small body can gain temporary advantage over any larger unit. What the underground lacks in strength it seeks to compensate for by the utilization of surprise and rapid action.

Withdrawal Plans

10 — It is most important to plan for a safe withdrawal. A standard part of attack plans is the
9 — use of a blocking unit to hamper enemy reinforcements. During withdrawal, these blocking
8 — units are used to ambush pursuing enemy forces and enable the main group to escape.¹⁴

7 — During the withdrawal, casualties are carried away to prevent their identification and
6 — reduce intelligence leads for the security forces. Withdrawal is made over a route different
5 — from that used to enter in order to avoid ambushes.

For example, in Malaya, blocking units were set up to engage enemy reinforcements, to destroy communications such as bridges and radios, and to counterattack; they left the village last and engaged any counterforces. Their exfiltration routes varied and they rendezvoused after withdrawing from the area.¹⁵

Review of Mission

After completion, unit leaders review the mission as to successes and failures, sometimes forwarding a detailed report to the higher echelons of the underground organization.¹⁶

INTELLIGENCE

To plan and organize its activities an underground requires intelligence information. Effective evaluation of intelligence makes it possible to establish priorities among enemy targets and to expose, create, and take advantage of vulnerabilities. In planning psychological operations, intelligence can reveal the attitudes, grievances, and specific problems of a target group so that propaganda themes and agitation slogans can be appropriately developed. Intelligence information regarding trails, tunnels, safe areas and the location and capability of enemy forces is essential for evasion operations and escape networks.

Organization

One of the first tasks of an underground movement is to establish an intelligence network. The basic unit is the three-to-seven-man cell. For security reasons, cell members never learn the real names or addresses of other members and never come in contact with them.¹⁷ An agent gathers intelligence and transmits it to the cell leader through a courier or mail-drop. He never contacts other agents and contacts the cell leader only through intermediaries. Lateral communications and coordination with other cells or with guerrilla units operate on this fail-safe principle so that the compromise of one unit does not jeopardize the security of other units.¹⁸

Elaborate intelligence systems have been developed to carry on the underground intelligence functions. In Vietnam, for example, the Hanoi-based Central Research Agency directs Viet Cong intelligence. In its headquarters there are six sections responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. These sections are responsible for specialized activities within their purview. For instance, the research section has subsections which deal with political, economic, and military affairs.¹⁹

This agency coordinates the recruiting, training, and dispatching of underground intelligence agents and teams in South Vietnam. A 19-year-old Vietnamese youth, captured by government forces on his first mission, told a characteristic tale. He had been recruited, given a special political training course, and dispatched to infiltrate student groups in South Vietnam. To do this, he was to pose as a defector, move in with relatives living in South

Vietnam, and enroll in school. Specifically he was to observe his fellow students, study their personalities, capabilities and aspirations, collect biographical data on them, befriend potential recruits, and report regularly to his cell leader.²⁰

The organization and functions of the North Korean intelligence net, set up by zones in the northern half of the Republic of Korea, offer an elaborate and detailed example of how an intelligence net operates in a hostile environment. Its mission was to feel the pulse of the people. The net consisted of 3-member units. Three or more of these units covered a district, and ten or more units a province. Before being accepted, every individual underwent a screening process. Each agent had appropriate identification papers, code devices, and maps indicating places in which to make contacts. While operating in the South Korean Republic, he was to pretend to be a supporter of the government and to mingle with government sympathizers in the villages. Once accepted as such, he was to infiltrate political parties and military units to organize intelligence operations.

The information targets assigned to these intelligence cells included: 1) public opinion about the South Korean Government; 2) attitudes of political parties, social organizations, and governmental agencies toward the public; 3) intelligence activities of the South Korean Government, procedures of dispatching espionage agents, and names of people who were important in political and intelligence agencies; 4) intelligence on military units; 5) strategic intelligence on imports and exports; and, finally, 6) party strife.

Procedures for the delivery of intelligence to districts and provinces were also prescribed. If necessary, messages were hidden on the person and destroyed if there was danger of capture. Code words were used to identify messengers, and security measures were devised to protect messengers and the intelligence they carried. The political security chief was responsible for protecting the families of agents so that captured agents would not under coercion compromise the net.²¹

In Algeria, the FLN organized a rudimentary but effective intelligence net. It posted civilian auxiliaries to act as agents in the field. These auxiliaries infiltrated French-held villages, reconnoitered for guerrilla columns. They provided to the liaison intelligence officers of nearby units a steady flow of intelligence about such things as number of French troops, types of armament, and probable targets.²²

Sources of Intelligence Information

In typical underground operations an intelligence screen of two concentric perimeters is established around an area of operations. The outer perimeter usually consists of "innocents"—old men, women, and children—while the inner perimeter comprises members of the unit. When those in the outer perimeter spot an advancing government patrol or helicopter, they

alert the inner perimeter by some predetermined signal. Those in the inner perimeter in turn alert the unit.²³

The Huks in the Philippines depended upon the villagers for intelligence information and improvised techniques to relay this information. If government troops approached a village and a man chopping wood observed them, he would increase the rate of his swing. A woman noticing his increased pace would place white and blue dresses side-by-side on the clothesline. Other members of the security net would pass the warning on that a government patrol was in the area. At night, the Huks used light signals, such as opened windows on a certain side of the house. Each improvised signal always blended with the environment.²⁴

In Malaya, rubber tappers relayed intelligence to the Communist terrorists through signals. Pieces of strings hanging from trees or sticks leaning against trees indicated the presence or absence of security forces.²⁵

In South Vietnam, the Communist Viet Cong set up an observation system to warn of the takeoff and impending raids of helicopters. In some cases underground echo chambers have been constructed to listen for approaching aircraft. Other agents watched for aircraft arriving in a target area and sounded the alarm and opened fire as the helicopters descended.²⁶

Women play an important intelligence role because they appear to be "innocents" and because they can often get jobs in military installations as secretaries or in the homes of enemy personnel as servants.²⁷

People in certain professions have direct access to valuable information while carrying out their jobs and are particularly useful to the underground. Professions or jobs which require travel such as shipping, railroads, or trucking provide excellent covers for underground work. The French underground used a doctor as an agent. He made house calls within the German defense area, collecting pertinent information and passing it on to the net through "prescriptions" delivered to pharmacists. To gather intelligence on the coastline, the French underground organized a peat-collecting company which, having access to geologic maps, was able to plot German defense installations and observe the type of construction.²⁸

A German innkeeper and a British agent conducted another successful net. An inn located on the Kiel Canal near the Baltic Sea was the favorite hangout of German submariners. The innkeeper made every visit of the German submariners a big occasion and talked the guests into signing the guest register before their departure to sea. He then delivered the register to a British agent who sent the names of the submariners to the British Naval Intelligence. In this way, the British knew the name and departure time of each embarking submarine.²⁹

One valuable, though often overlooked, source of intelligence lies in open journals and newspapers. In 1935, the German journalist Berthold Jacob shocked the German intelligence agencies by publishing a book about the German Army, which was then in the initial stage of Nazi rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty. In his book, Jacob spelled out "virtually

every detail of the organization of Hitler's new army, . . . The command structure, the personnel of the revived General Staff, the army group commanders, the various military districts, . . . the names of the 168 commanding generals and their biographical sketches." ³⁰ Jacob had pieced together scraps of information from obituary notices, wedding announcements, criminal reports, and other such items and eventually compiled a comprehensive picture of the growing German military establishment. It was, as the German authorities agreed, a masterful job of professional intelligence. Hitler's aide reported at the end of the investigation: "This Jacob had no accomplice, My Fuehrer, except our own military journals and the daily press." ³¹

In another instance, an article published in a Japanese technical journal revealed details of the new and hitherto secret American U-2 reconnaissance airplane. The article raised questions in the United States as to the possibility of a breach in security. Investigation revealed, however, that the article was simply the result of a painstaking assembly of small items published in various U. S. journals. ³²

In contrast to the highly decentralized underground intelligence organization, the guerrilla force may develop a highly sophisticated, centralized intelligence organization. For example, the Vietminh in Indochina organized the Quan Bao (Military Intelligence) in 1948, to provide operational intelligence for its forces. The Quan Bao was responsible for the collection and coordination of all military intelligence. The Quan Bao was established as an elite corps and was made up of party members selected on the basis of their physical, mental, and moral qualifications.

The personnel selected went through a 12-week training course which emphasized physical conditioning, self-defense, techniques of sensory perception and memory, background information on the French, reconnaissance and interrogation techniques, and methods of accurate and complete reporting and evaluating of incidents and situations.

Special emphasis was placed on methods for obtaining prisoners. Units made up for this specific purpose had four subsections: (a) a fire group to create confusion in the enemy ranks; (b) a capture group to round up prisoners; (c) a support group to assist in retention of prisoners and to watch for enemy reinforcements; and (d) an escort group to take prisoners to an interrogation area.

Various methods were employed to elicit information from the prisoners. Though physical torture was seldom used, Vietminh agents interrogated individuals for long periods at times when the prisoner's resistance tended to be lowest. Sarcasm and irony were often used to make the prisoner lose patience and composure. Vietminh agents sometimes disguised themselves as prisoners and mingled with other prisoners in the compound.

At company and battalion level trinh sat sections were responsible for reconnaissance and security. In areas which were considered suspect, agents were assigned to keep the units

supplied with information. They investigated areas of operation, reconnoitered possible ambush positions, and determined ingress and egress routes. After a combat mission, the agents led the troops back to a regrouping area, took over prisoners, and authorized the local civilians to return to their homes. A report of the operation, complete with tallies of casualties suffered and inflicted, weapons lost and captured, and an evaluation of the unit's performance and mistakes in action, was made.

In the camp areas and villages, agents maintained close surveillance over Vietminh troops to guard against desertions and to insure that troop behavior would not damage relations with the local population. The agents were responsible for the security of documents and automatic weapons. They also maintained perimeter lookout positions to warn of enemy aircraft, and directed emergency evacuation procedures.

The efficiency and scope of the Quan Bao were revealed through captured documents which contained highly detailed and accurate surveys of French troop dispositions, habits, and activities. Surveys of areas of French operations included terrain trafficability for both vehicles and coolies, as well as loyalty and attitude estimates of nearby native populations.³³



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32 Margret Boveri, Treason in the Twentieth Century (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 330-31.

33 George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 70-83.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

OPERATIONS

AMBUSHES AND RAIDS

Ambushes

Ambush has been defined as a surprise attack upon a moving or temporarily halted enemy with the mission of destroying or capturing his forces. The surprise attack is usually from a concealed position and with sudden concentrated fire. Maximum effect is achieved when the ambushed force does not see the ambushing force and its area of movement is limited. The ambushing force usually has the advantage of a short field of fire and covered routes of withdrawal. Accordingly, a column of troops moving along a narrow jungle road is a prime target. An effective ambush is usually based on advance intelligence and detailed planning, and executed with imagination and boldness. ¹

Purposes of Ambush

Ambush is a tactic which is used extensively.* It plays a part in 60 to 70 percent of Communist combat actions. ³ It is an effective means of acquiring weapons, harassing and demoralizing government forces, delaying or blocking the movement of troops and supplies, destroying or capturing government troops (especially government officials and army officers), and undermining confidence among the populace toward the government forces.

Capturing Weapons and Supplies. Ernesto "Che" Guevara noted that the foremost aim of an ambush is the acquisition of weapons; only in special situations should attacks be made without the prospect of capturing weapons. ⁴

The Viet Cong has used ambush frequently for this purpose. In two ambushes in February 1964 they captured a total of 166 weapons. During the previous 8 months, the Viet Cong had inflicted other heavy weapons losses on government troops and had captured American-made radios and were able to monitor the government's communications network. ⁵

*In the Philippines the Huks ambushed the armed forces of the Philippines 1,864 times out of 2,145 armed engagements between April 1950 and January 1952. In South Korea, the National Police reported that out of 2,868 contacts during a 3-month period in 1958, 1,886 were classified as ambushes or raids. During the same period in Malaya, authorities recorded 1,890 ambushes out of 3,133 major incidents. ²

Blocking Movement of Troops and Supplies. The Vietminh in 1950-54 used the ambush effectively against French relief units. The Vietminh's customary tactic was to split their force into three groups and position them at strategic positions along the road where the relief column was expected to move. The first group blocked the road while the second and third groups hid at separate places along the approach road. After the French convoy passed the hidden second and third groups they encountered a roadblock. As the French got out of their vehicles to inspect the blockade, the first and second groups attacked while the third sealed off the rear, preventing retreat or the arrival of help. ⁶

Diversionary Use of Ambush. The ambush is also a widely used diversionary tactic. For example, underground units in danger of being encircled by security forces may ambush a portion of the encircling troops, diverting the attention of the security forces from the encircling operation. In addition, an ambush can attract security forces' attention long enough for numbers of troops to successfully cross important highways or other strategic areas. ⁷

Other Uses. A hit-and-run ambush tactic is generally used for harassment, capture, or destruction of enemy troops. In Vietnam, for example, a minor diversion may be created on a road near a security force camp by burning a passenger bus or stealing identity cards from civilians. Receiving information of the attack, the security forces proceed to the place of attack and are ambushed on their way while still in their vehicles. ⁸ Occasionally the Viet Cong use an attack on a government post as a decoy. The defenders ask for help while a much larger guerrilla force prepares to ambush the relief column on the anticipated route. ⁹

Ambush is also used to capture enemy personnel for interrogation¹⁰ or to kidnap or assassinate top government officials and army officers. In another variation, undergrounders dressed as government soldiers may ambush and rob innocent civilians to turn the populace against the government. The Vietminh guerrillas used ambush in an attempt to paralyze the French communications by denying them the use of roads, paths, and waterways. ¹¹

Government forces have, of course, found that the ambush can be an effective counter guerrilla tactic. British commanders in Malaya found it to be the most successful tactic used against the Communist terrorists. ¹²

Ambush Tactics

The basic tactic of ambush is the use of the smallest possible number of men employing the military principle of surprise and avoiding open combat with numerically superior forces.

An analysis of ambushes in Malaya, Korea, and the Philippines indicates that the ambushers were able to lay down a continued and effective line of fire against superior government forces, while maintaining their capability to disperse quickly. Adeptness at dispersal and withdrawal depends on optimal timing and placement of ambushers. Concealed attacks on main supply

routes were the most frequent kinds of ambush used in Korea, Malaya, and the Philippines. Of 82 ambushes recorded in 1951, 62 occurred along main roads, 14 against patrols in hills or jungles, and 6 in small villages. Instances of urban ambush consisted mostly of hit-and-run attacks or holdups of public conveyances, executed by groups of three to five men.¹³

In Malaya, motor transports were ambushed with impunity; vehicles were easy targets since the few available roads were winding, hilly, and cut through thick vegetation and narrow gorges. Most of the ambushes against government forces in Malaya occurred while they were moving through dense jungles where the attackers had the tactical advantage of concealment and close-range firing. In Korea, ambushers used the same tactics although the roads were not foliage-covered, but had boulder outcroppings for hiding places. Convoys and patrols were frequently ambushed in mountain passes where the road was cut through rock defiles.¹⁴

In Southeast Asia, ambushers frequently camouflage hardened bamboo stakes along the trails. When the enemy is ambushed by automatic-weapons fire and dive for cover in the undergrowth, they are impaled on the hidden stakes. The bayonet-like stakes can inflict as many casualties as the weapons fire.¹⁵ In South Vietnam, the Viet Cong strew hidden stakes along the trails to prevent rapid pursuit of ambushers by government forces after an attack.

A frequently used formation is the L-ambush (see figure 9), in which part of the ambush party is placed in front of the enemy and part on his flank. As the enemy approaches he is fired upon from both front and flank. This positioning requires only one route of withdrawal and permits the unrestricted use of automatic weapons. If the enemy were encircled in the ambush, the use of automatic weapons would be restricted and more than one route of withdrawal would be required. The V-type is another form of ambush which takes advantage of fields of fire that place the column in a crossfire¹⁶ (see figure 10).

Guevara recommends another tactic, the "ambush and vanguard." He notes that an enemy column advancing through an area of thick vegetation or woods is unable to secure its flanks. To guard against possible ambush, the government forces usually send out a reconnaissance vanguard column, which provides point-and-flank security by probing for hostile forces. However, by advertising its presence, the vanguard inevitably exposes itself to danger. Guevara suggests that the ambush be set for this vanguard: when the vanguard reaches an agreed-upon point, preferably at the highest terrain point, then the ambushers open fire. While a small force holds the main column back, arms, ammunition, and equipment are collected from the vanguard unit and then the ambushers quickly withdraw. Guevara believes that an attack on vanguard units is an ideal operation for small forces.¹⁷

It has frequently been claimed that the ambush is responsible for most of the casualties of government forces. It is estimated that in Korea ambushes inflicted 55 percent of the government casualties; in Malaya, 75 percent; and in the Philippines, 60 percent. Yet the ambushers, since they were on the offensive, suffered comparatively few casualties in the ambush operations.




Figure 9. L-Shaped Ambush




Figure 10. V-Type Ambush

Total casualties among the ambushers, including those killed, wounded, and captured, were only 15 to 20 percent in Korea and the Philippines and 10 percent in Malaya. By inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy at small risk, ambush operations proved to be an extremely effective tactic. ¹⁸

Ambush Countermeasures and Human Factors

Vietminh tactics eluded most French attempts to clear out ambushing forces. Vietminh manuals emphasized that encircling forces were never strong at all points and that a forceful and sustained attack could open an avenue of escape. It directed an ambushing force, caught in a tight encirclement, to concentrate all fire on the weakest point of the surrounding force in order to fight its way out. The manual also advised the ambushing force to withdraw if danger of encirclement was probable. ¹⁹

Reviewing their operations in Vietnam, French officials have plaintively observed that, in spite of air and other techniques of observation, they were consistently unable to detect ambushes in advance. They found that, at best, their defenses were only able to lessen the effectiveness of ambushes, not forestall them. One countermeasure employed was to extend convoys and columns for a longer distance than could possibly be covered by an ambushing force; thus part of the force could escape, while the other part could come to the rescue. Another technique was to equip columns with armor and artillery in order to assist in repulsing ambushers. ²⁰

U.S. Army advisers have suggested five methods of countering ambushes in Vietnam:

1. Government forces must not follow consistent patterns of movement. Any one road should be used infrequently, and the timing and size of the road patrol varied. Also, the security patrol should carefully check out suspected ambush sites.
2. Reaction of troops to an ambush must be fast and automatic.
3. Effective communications must be maintained with the base.
4. The ambushers must be pursued aggressively and not simply permitted to withdraw.
5. Village activity must be observed. Security forces should interpret such signs as an empty marketplace as notice of impending action. ²¹

Another instance of Viet Cong ambush emphasized this final point. The security force did not search a nearby village that was considered loyal. When it passed through, it did not interpret the absence of villagers as a sign of danger; subsequently, the Vietnamese troops were ambushed, the villagers having been bound and gagged by the Viet Cong. ²²

Australian Army research into the human factors involved in ambush countermeasures suggests that only 15 to 25 percent of soldiers faced with sudden danger respond immediately with fixed purpose or effective activity. A majority are stunned and bewildered. The Australian Army, therefore, has developed a special counterambush drill.

The counterambush drill is an attempt to train soldiers to force an ambush—that is, rush through the ambushers and envelop them from the rear. At first it was difficult to persuade

soldiers to advance against a concealed position defended with automatic weapons. Even when instructors who had used this tactic in battle reassured them, they did not gain confidence, so a new training technique was devised. The first step was to diagram for the trainee an ambush situation and to stress that the natural reaction is to run away after the first contact. Training, however, conditions the soldier to be positive and aggressive and not to flee from or attempt to bypass an ambush. They then learned that speed was essential to their self-preservation, and that the quickest way to extricate themselves from the ambush was to concentrate their fire and run through a single point along the ambusher's line. In time a marked change in the attitudes occurred. Trainees no longer faced ambushes with fear and adopted instead a tough-aggressive posture. They also developed a pride in their fearlessness. 23

Raids

The raid is a sudden attack against a stationary enemy force or installation. It is characterized by secret movement, brief but concentrated combat action, rapid disengagement, and swift withdrawal.

The purposes of the raid are: (1) to destroy or damage supplies, equipment, or installations; (2) to capture supplies, equipment, or key personnel; (3) to inflict casualties on the enemy and his supporters; and (4) to harass or demoralize the enemy.

As in ambush, a key to success in raids is surprise: to attack the enemy when and where he is least prepared, and to take advantage of weather, visibility, terrain, and other environmental factors.

A study of raids in Malaya, Korea, and the Philippines indicates that raid techniques followed a definite pattern: the majority were aimed at civilian villages and military or police outposts. Village raids in Korea generally sought to terrorize the people. In the Philippines, the Huks conducted raids primarily to destroy military posts and such guarded targets as railroad trains and powerplants, as well as to terrorize village inhabitants, kill enemy forces, and destroy support facilities. 24

Raiding units were usually divided into two groups: one to secure the approach and withdrawal routes, and one to accomplish the raid mission. In raiding villages, the raiders usually withdrew along a different route from the one they approached on, thereby facilitating escape and permitting the group that secured the approach to be mobile. By moving through hills and jungles, the raiders outmaneuvered police posts on roads leading to villages. The raiders generally were able to infiltrate guarded villages and to disarm the police by surprise. Available casualty reports indicate that in seven out of ten raids the raiders had fewer casualties than the government forces. 25

In South Vietnam, the Viet Cong have frequently used raid tactics.* In January 1964, for example, they raided the village of Thuah Dao, 15 miles southwest of Saigon, in a typical fashion. The guerrillas killed the head of the militia, set fire to the village administrative office, and forced the villagers to tear their homes apart. Forty homes were destroyed while the terrified militia radioed nearby units for help to no avail; demoralized, the militiamen surrendered their weapons. Such Viet Cong raids have spread terror among local officials, undermined the morale of government soldiers, and have been useful for capturing equipment and supplies. In a raid on a U.S. Special Forces training camp high in Vietnam's central plateau on July 5, 1965, the Viet Cong killed 41 soldiers, seized the camp's arms and ammunition (including a 60-mm. mortar, 4 heavy machineguns and more than 100 other weapons) and withdrew before the arrival of government troops.²⁸

A typical Viet Cong raid designed to destroy important South Vietnamese equipment occurred shortly after midnight on November 1, 1964.²⁹ Using American-made ammunition and six 81-mm. mortars, the Viet Cong attacked the Bien Hoa airbase for 20 minutes. Targets were the control tower, the quarters of military personnel, and a cluster of B-57 aircraft on a parking ramp. Six men were killed and 21 injured, with five B-57 aircraft destroyed and 15 damaged. Despite a counterattack by artillery and aircraft, the Viet Cong were able to escape.

The effectiveness of this attack rested on careful planning and intelligence. Vietnamese who had previously lived in the area had been forced off when the base was constructed. A number of these local villagers reportedly aided the Viet Cong in infiltrating the base area and obtaining enough information to make a life-size model of it. This preparation permitted the mortar squads and covering infantry units to conduct practice raids. Ranges, azimuths, and positions were determined for the mortars to insure direct hits on three prime targets in the minimal amount of time.

The mortars were set in place piece-by-piece by small squads of infiltrators. The actual shelling lasted only 20 minutes because no targeting rounds were necessary. With the infantry blocking unit covering against possible government reaction forces, the mortar squads infiltrated in small groups with their weapons.

The success of the Bien Hoa raid illustrates a number of human factors involving timing, security, and local attitudes. In executing the attack the Viet Cong worked all of these factors to their advantage. The raid occurred the day after payday, early Sunday morning, following a national holiday celebrating the first anniversary of Diem's overthrow; and it occurred during

* One interesting technique the Viet Cong followed during raid operations was to demand that villagers kill all their dogs so that their barking would not betray the guerrillas when they made subsequent raids.



(Photo courtesy of U.S. Army)

Guards inspect damage to U.S.-supplied aircraft after an effective Viet Cong raid on the Bien Hoa airbase. Using captured American-made ammunition, Viet Cong mortars destroyed a cluster of B-57 aircraft and killed six men. The effectiveness of the raid rested on careful planning and on intelligence, much of it obtained through infiltrating the base area.

the monsoon season when combat operations generally cease. Further, the raid coincided with the change in guard, during a period of uncertainty, following the installation of a new government in nearby Saigon. Also the division of responsibility for internal and perimeter security between United States and Vietnamese forces, respectively, was unclear for certain functions such as establishing perimeter patrols and providing reaction troops. The Viet Cong infiltrated the Vietnamese perimeter with mortars and fired into the American zone. Since the attack was in the Vietnamese area, the Americans could not respond, and since the Vietnamese were not being attacked, they did not respond.

The Huk insurgents in the Philippines also capitalized upon certain human factors in planning their raids. Generally raids occurred at night or dawn; daytime raids took place only in isolated areas or where some feature of weather or terrain provided cover or concealment.³⁰ Raids frequently took place immediately before a holiday festival when most villagers were preoccupied and garrisons weakly defended.

SABOTAGE

Sabotage is an attempt to damage the resources of the government's war effort—military and economic organizations, industrial, food, and commodities production, and public morale and law and order.

In most instances, material damage inflicted on the enemy by sabotage is relatively small. However, in some cases, sabotage by a trained underground team can be more effective and less costly in manpower and material resources than large unit operations or aerial bombings. For instance, the destruction of the German heavy-water plant at Telemark, Norway, was assigned to undergrounders after aerial bombing raids and a glider-borne commando attack had failed.³¹

Organized sabotage attacks do indicate to the population that the underground movement has the will and the strength to perform these acts in spite of the government and its security forces. General sabotage and planned attacks can create temporary disruption of transportation and communications, causing the government or occupying force to garrison more troops for security duty. Finally, sabotage can lower morale among the security forces. Repeated acts can induce fear that such acts will be repeated on a larger scale.³²

Strategic Sabotage

Strategic sabotage involves direct action by specially trained underground units against such key targets as factories and military installations. The units depend on intelligence reports to establish priorities among these targets.

The underground in occupied Denmark established an "industrial council" to compile and analyze information about prospective target installations, and assign priorities for sabotaging efforts.

Underground agents infiltrated targets to contact sympathetic employees and acquired blueprints, diagrams, charts, and defense plans. They then determined the vulnerable points of access, critical and irreparable machinery, guard procedures, searchlights, dogs, and so on. A close surveillance of the installation verified and augmented this data.

The units then planned their attack, taking into account the following factors:

1. The method of entry, which should have an element of surprise, and so requires a thorough understanding of the guard force and security procedures of the target.
2. Amount and type of explosive and its placement considering the access routes, the time involved in placing the explosive and withdrawing from the target, and the timing of the fuse on the explosive.
3. A covering unit, situated to observe ingress and egress routes, to intercept or ambush a pursuing ground force and insure the withdrawal of the sabotaging unit.

After an attack, the group leader made a detailed report of the operation, which he forwarded to officials in the underground organization and to the Allied supporting units in England.³³

One noted strategic sabotage operation was carried out against a heavy waterplant near the town of Vemork, in Telemark Province, Norway, on February 28, 1943. The Allied forces of Great Britain, Canada, and the United States had acquired information that this plant was valuable to German atomic energy experiments and, to prevent further German progress in this field, the Allies gave high priority to its destruction. First, a Norwegian parachuted into Telemark Province to collect intelligence on vital elements of plant operation such as the number, hours of change, and behavioral pattern of the German guards; the layout of the plant; and routes of ingress and egress. The undergrounders made contact with the plant's chief engineer, a Norwegian, who gave them information about the floor plans and the location of critical machinery. In order to plan and rehearse their attack, they built an exact model of the heavy-water plant in England.

After nearly a year's planning, an 11-man team infiltrated the area for the actual attack. The team divided into two groups, blocking and demolition. The time for the strike was set for 12:30 a.m. to insure that the off-duty guards would be asleep and to allow the undergrounders 3 hours of darkness to escape.

In the actual attack, the blocking unit forced the entrance and covered the German guard barracks, while the demolition unit entered the plant itself through a cable tunnel and set the charge at a predetermined location. Although the explosion was so small it did not arouse the German garrison, it destroyed key apparatus in the plant and 3,000 pounds of heavy water, nearly half a year's production.³⁴

An underground may spare potential targets. During World War II the Yugoslav underground spared three particular ones—vital public utilities, lumber mills, and certain railroads. Utilities were excluded because the underground was dependent upon the support of the population, and disruption of such a facility as a water supply would impair, not enhance, the underground's support. Although the lumber produced in the local mills was being used by the Germans, the destruction of these mills would impair the livelihood of the population, not only alienating people but, since much of the underground's funds came from the local population, cutting off the supply of money. Finally, they did not raid those German-operated railroads which were as vital to the underground as to the German forces for communications and transportation.³⁵ It was probably as effective to misroute the railroad cars through a change in their manifest as it was to destroy them through sabotage.

General Sabotage

General or nuisance sabotage is closely related to passive resistance in that it requires neither trained sabotage teams nor carefully selected targets. Sabotage acts in this category usually express individual resistance and take the form of noncooperation, such as deliberate slowdowns on factory production lines, or harassment, such as telephoned bomb threats that force the evacuation and search of buildings and plants.³⁶ In German-occupied Russia during the later stages of World War II, nuisance sabotage and partisan actions against the German soldiers forced them to travel only in groups and to remain on main arteries.³⁷

Noncooperation sabotage was used extensively in Belgium during the German occupation. Workers slowed their pace of production, went on strike, and refused to help Germans apprehend rebel patriots; postal workers intercepted letters addressed to the Gestapo. The Belgian underground used camouflaged pamphlets to prompt the patriots to sabotage the German occupation. One such pamphlet was a small booklet containing instructions on how to slow down production in factories and sabotage the mines.³⁸ Also, in Belgium, sharp metal objects called crabs were put in the streets to puncture auto tires. This technique, which virtually halted traffic, was very effective because the only people who had automobiles were German officials and Belgian collaborators.³⁹ The Polish underground pressured doctors into signing medical certificates stating that certain people were unable to work.⁴⁰

Other techniques included failing to lubricate machines in accordance with maintenance schedules, hiding repair parts, and dropping tools and other foreign objects into moving parts. It has been stated that the 250,000 workers in Italy's metallurgical industries at one time cut production by as much as 16% through indirect sabotage.⁴¹

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ESCAPE-AND-EVASION NETS

Objectives

Escape-and-evasion nets in underground movements are established for the infiltration and exfiltration of an area of operations by underground members or agents. Such a system is needed for clandestine operations in which couriers with messages and funds, organizers, or training instructors must move through government-controlled security areas.

To provide maximum security for leaders of the underground organization, escape-and-evasion networks incorporate the fail-safe principle. In the planning of raids, sabotage, and intelligence missions, methods of escape-and-evasion or withdrawal are of primary concern. Accordingly, operations planners usually consider alternative ingress and egress routes and establish contingency plans for withdrawal and rendezvous.

Organization

Escape Routes

Escape-and-evasion networks usually consist of escape routes and hideouts or "safe houses." There are three general categories of safe houses: the temporary stopover, the emergency hideout, and the permanent refuge. 42

Couriers and traveling agents use the temporary stopover to facilitate travel. Escapees and persons in danger also use temporary safe houses along escape routes for food, rest, and directions to the next stopover.

An agent who becomes suddenly ill, is wounded, or is sought by the police can use the emergency hideout. Such safe houses are usually private homes of loyal and reliable persons who are supporters of but not identified with the underground movement. Other facilities have also been used as safe houses; in Algeria, physicians loyal to the FLN put evaders in the Algiers Municipal Hospital as patients. 43

The permanent or long-term safe house can be an isolated farm or cabin, a distant encampment, or a location in a nearby nation sympathetic to the underground movement.

In the 1930's the Soviet comintern utilized extensive auxiliary offices and bases for their agents abroad. The Seamen's and Port Workers' International, for instance, controlled seamen's clubs in every major port in the Western Hemisphere. These clubs served as reporting and relocation bases for agents operating in or traveling through the country. Personnel at these auxiliary bases arranged contacts, passports, cover addresses, and funds for agents. When an agent lost contact with his organization he simply reported to the nearest auxiliary base for food, shelter, funds, and instructions. 44

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In planning riots and demonstrations, the Viet Cong established safe zones in sections of the city where they would store weapons and assemble agitators. They identified shopkeepers and homeowners willing to provide shelter for the demonstrators. The agitators hid in these safe houses until the police had completed their postdemonstration search.⁴⁵

The safe houses along an escape-and-evasion network are usually within one day's travel of each other. The person maintaining the safe house seldom engages in any other subversive activity which might draw attention to him. The underground supplies him with extra food, clothes, and any identification papers or documents as needed. Each person on the route knows how to reach only the next link, and no one person knows the identity or location of every link. Guides generally escort the escapee from one link to the next. The guides meet at a pre-arranged spot half-way between the two safe houses and neither guide knows the location of the other's safe house.

The Viet Cong infiltration process from North Vietnam to South Vietnam illustrates the safe-house and fail-safe concepts. After completing training in the North, Communist infiltrators are trucked to the Laotian border just above the demarcation line where they rest for several days before beginning their move southward. An infiltration group usually numbers 40-50 men, but once they reach the border they break up into smaller groups. Each man carries a 3-5 day supply of food, a first-aid packet, hammock, mosquito netting, and similar items. No one may carry personal papers, letters, or photographs that might be used by the enemy to identify him. The infiltration routes along the Laos-South Vietnam border include way stations. A chain of local guides leads the units along the secret trails. Each guide knows only his own way station and conveys troops to the next way station just as the network conveys escapees between safe houses. Conversation is discouraged in transit and only the leader of the group may speak with the guide. In this manner the network maintains a relative degree of security and is not necessarily compromised if one guide defects or is captured.⁴⁶

Some Communist agents operating in non-Communist countries periodically travel to Communist-controlled areas for obtaining supplies, training, and planning. In order to evade government travel controls to Communist countries and to conceal their operations, these agents often travel first to a neutral country and contact a Communist embassy. Communist agents from the various Latin American countries covertly traveling to Castro Cuba used to go first to Mexico. The Cuban Embassy there reportedly gave the agent papers that served as a visa but were not entered into the agent's passport. He then took a Cubana Airline flight to Cuba under an alias. However, the Government of Mexico has begun to keep extensive records, including photographs of all people traveling to Cuba by commercial means. The Mexican customs authorities make these records available to other governments. Thus, agents now must travel to Cuba via eastern European Communist countries to prevent the recording of their travel.⁴⁷

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During World War II, underground escape-and-evasion nets devised some unusual techniques to pass escapees beyond checkpoints. Police members of the net would handcuff escapees and pass them through the checkpoint as prisoners. Underground members also hid escapees in maternity homes until their passage through the escape route could be secured. In one incident, an escapee was passed through a checkpoint by placing him in an ambulance and having him feign insanity.⁴⁸

Escape Techniques

A number of successful prison escape techniques were developed in World War II. Popular techniques included traversing tunnels under prison walls; climbing over walls or cutting barbed wire fences; and impersonating military personnel, local workers, and prison working parties. Escapes were frequent, but escapees were not so successful at evading recapture. A prisoner's best chance to escape is on his first day of imprisonment or soon thereafter. As his physical condition weakens from prison food and routine, his chances of escape diminish. Surveillance and planning are the first steps in effecting an escape. Precautions must be taken to keep conflicting plans from compromising any escape attempt. In one prison, an officer was assigned to coordinate and register all escape plans.⁴⁹ In another prison, permission of the senior officer had to be obtained. The officer relayed the escape idea to an escape committee which approved the idea and coordinated its execution. This committee included a representative from each barracks, as well as expert tailors, forgers, and intelligence informants. It also maintained an escape book in which all details on escapes, whether successful or not, were recorded.⁵⁰

Once an escape plan is devised, a long period of preparation and surveillance is necessary. An example illustrates the painstaking planning of an escape attempt. Detailed studies were made of the prison layout and behavior of the guards. The committee observed that one window was a blindspot for sentries on a nearby catwalk and at a gate in a barbed-wire fence. Observations of the guards' behavior patterns revealed the length of the posts they walked, the length of time spent walking, the exact time they were relieved, and the length of time it took to return to the guardhouse, alone or in squad formation. One prisoner was to be disguised as an officer of the guard and two other prisoners as sentries. At a fixed time, the disguised officer would relieve the two legitimate guards with the disguised guards, after which the prisoners would attempt to escape protected by the disguised guards. Critical to the escape act was the time required by the sentry relieved by the disguised officer to walk back to the guardhouse and notice the real officer, react, and rush back to his post. The time was calculated to be three-and-a-half minutes to, at most, four-and-a-half. In this time 20 prisoners could slide down the rope and escape through an opening in the fence.⁵¹

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A number of factors are involved in successful escape-and-evasion techniques. Planning, for example, must be based upon careful observation of the prison environment, of the habits and modus operandi of guards and staff. Successful escape has frequently been dependent upon astute use of disguise, paying careful attention to detail, using the suggestibility of enemy personnel and the element of surprise to advantage.

A common device used in escape is the employment of disguise. For example, at one camp, prisoners skilled in tailoring secretly manufactured a chimney sweep's uniform, complete with top hat, tails, black trousers, and weighting ball and brush. Dressed in this and with a pass reproduced from that of a legitimate chimney sweep, a prisoner was permitted to pass through the gates unquestioned.⁵²

In another instance, a prisoner disguised himself as a foreign naval officer, complete with decorations and colorful insignia. Police guards and army officials are not apt to question an unfamiliar but official-looking uniform, especially when papers and letters of introduction (forged) look imposing. In this disguise, the escapee was able to travel in broad daylight on regularly scheduled trains.⁵³

Another escapee capitalized upon his guards' respect for authority. Dressed as an army general, he approached a prison gate just after the change of sentry (timed to make the new sentry believe that he had checked in with the previous sentry). The general berated the sentry because his chauffeured automobile was not there. When the sentry said he would call about it, the general told him to forget about it, he would walk.⁵⁴

A similar technique was used in another escape. Two prisoners wearing the overcoats of officers approached the prison gate at twilight. When they reached the first sentry, one of them spoke in a forceful voice to the effect that it was intolerable that a colonel should be the object of whistling and hooting by a detestable prisoner. He concluded by saying he would discuss the insolence with the general. The sentry took this discussion as proof of the officers' identity and came to attention. The invective was continued as the escapees approached the second sentry, who asked a timid question, but opened the gates when the disguised colonel growled an answer. The third sentry thought the first two sentries had checked the officers' identity and password so said nothing, but stood at attention, saluted, and opened the gate. The last hurdle was the guard at the moat. He asked for their passes, but they irritably told him that it was the third time they'd been called upon to show their papers and brushed him aside. He allowed them to move on.⁵⁵

An escapee must have the presence of mind to exploit the suggestibility of individuals in a critical situation. One escapee took refuge in what he had thought was the railroad station waiting room. To his consternation it was an enemy officers' mess. Instantly reacting to the situation, he boldly walked over to the electric light switch, took it apart, and then replaced it. No one paid any attention to him.⁵⁶

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Evasion Techniques

Once an escape has been effected, the escapee is faced with the problem of getting out of the area and reaching a friendly border. The safest and best solution is to make contact with the local underground escape-and-evasion network. One escapee kept asking questions about how the war effort was going; when he met with favorable responses, he then inquired about the local evasion network.

Underground resistance organizations have certain security precautions in order to establish the reliability of persons requesting assistance. One common procedure is to interview the requester several times. The cross-examining technique is designed to bring out any discrepancies in his story.⁵⁷

In many cases, however, escapees have had to rely strictly on their own resources. When traversing a country and evading security forces, a person seeks aid only from individuals and isolated homes, never from groups. When crossing a guarded bridge, or checkpoint, he should mingle with a large group of people crowding through.⁵⁸

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FOOTNOTES

¹See Capt. Franklin A. Hart, "Jungle Ambush," Infantry, LII, No. 2 (March-April 1962), p. 25. In army tactical doctrine ambushes are included under the category of raids. Included in this category is the assault, an open attack on troops, barracks, bivouacs, etc. However, the literature on this subject uses the word "raid" interchangeably for an "assault."

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⁵The New York Times, February 7, 1964.

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⁷Barton, Paramilitary Warfare, p. 206.

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⁹Malcolm W. Browne, The New Face of War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 76.

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²³Maj. J. O. Langtry, "Tactical Implications of the Human Factors in Warfare," Military Review, XXXVIII, No. 11 (February 1959), pp. 85-89.

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PART SIX

GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

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INTRODUCTION

Governments have successfully employed a number of strategies and tactics to counter underground movements. Communist governments have usually resorted to immediate application of force to eliminate underground activity as soon as it appears. Poland, North Vietnam, and Tibet are examples. When coercive force is maintained, resistance eventually diminishes and the people become compliant and accept the existing situation. To date there has not been one successful insurgency against a Communist government.

However, countries with representative or constitutional forms of government are restrained in their response by moral, legal, or social considerations. Usually, an attempt is made to win the people to the active support of the government through social, economic, and political reforms. But all too frequently a government does not detect the underground's subversive activities in time. As positive programs fail, either because of the advanced stage of the underground movement or because of inadequate resources or time, a government must organize for more direct and forceful countermeasures involving police and military actions. This has been notably successful in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, and Kenya. In Algeria, Palestine, and Indochina it has failed.

Counterinsurgency operations generally commence with separate civilian and military commands, each of which has separate lines of authority. A unified command is then organized in order that all activities may be coordinated under a single commander. This was the pattern in Palestine, Malaya, the Philippines, and Algeria. Even when centralized direction of countermeasures is necessary, each area commander retains a certain amount of tactical autonomy. Because local conditions vary widely and changes inevitably occur, administrative control is kept flexible. Area commanders are frequently authorized and encouraged to independently effect civic improvements, pay informers, and take on-the-spot action to adjust deficiencies in either military or civic action programs.

Although the entire governmental apparatus is involved in the counterinsurgency effort, when the situation reaches a certain critical level the major responsibility rests on internal security forces--the civilian police and the military and paramilitary forces. The primary burden lies with the civilian police, who are charged with responsibility for maintenance of public safety and law and order. The armed services become involved when the insurgency reaches the militarization phase. Traditionally, the national army serves as a reserve internal security force. It has an inherent and implicit function as a psychological deterrent to the use of internal violence against the government, and military forces usually are assigned at least a part in maintaining law and order when the threat to the government is critical. In

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Malaya during the Emergency the members of the armed services were empowered to function in the same manner as civilian policemen in the interest of public safety.*

A critical feature of nearly all insurgencies, and a major problem in countermeasures, is that the movement's subversive activities and physical structure remain largely invisible—that is, underground—throughout the early phases of its organization. The appearance of guerrillas or paramilitary units are relatively late manifestations, as they are organized only when a broad underground base of leadership and support has been established.

Typically, the process of building a revolutionary base is characterized by various stages of recruitment of cadres, organization of clandestine cells, penetration of mass organizations, and acquisition and storage of military supplies. In conjunction, the underground usually launches a psychological offensive of agitation and propaganda designed to discredit the government and intensify and channel existing population discontent. In proper perspective, then, the first ambush of a government convoy or attack by a band of guerrillas is predicated on years of quiet, invisible preparation and organization.

Hence, in planning and conducting counterinsurgent actions, it is extremely important to recognize that although a guerrilla war is not evident, the insurgency may be well under way. Countermeasures which fail to take cognizance of the underground and the large amount of preparation necessary for an insurgent movement but focus only upon the guerrilla activity will be ineffective. Eliminating only the guerrillas leaves untouched the roots of the enemy's revolutionary structure. Counterinsurgency measures must be designed to simultaneously attack the entire structure—underground cells and leadership as well as the military arm—if more than a temporary and partial victory is to be achieved. It is basic to the planning and implementation of countermeasures against undergrounds that the vulnerabilities in their organizational structure and operational methods be identified.

ORGANIZATIONAL VULNERABILITIES

Operating clandestinely, undergrounds necessarily emphasize security. In organizing to meet their security requirements, they are implicitly committed to certain vulnerabilities in organizational structure. For example, undergrounds with a high degree of compartmentalization have little, if any, horizontal communication between cells. All written communications go through a slow system of cut-outs and intermediaries. Although this system is generally effective in providing some security for clandestine organizations, it has disadvantages. A defector can be reasonably sure there will be no reprisal against him if all of the other members of his particular cell (who alone have knowledge of his membership) are eliminated by the

*Federation of Malaya, The Emergency Regulation Ordinance, 1948, with Amendments Made up to 31st March 1953 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press), p. 27.

security forces. This can be used to encourage defectors to inform. If the government can convince an underground that it has been infiltrated, the underground will normally take increased security precautions. The more severe the security restrictions, the more passive the underground and the less likely it is to perform dangerous overt activities against the government.

The organizational structure for intraunderground communications is also a potential vulnerability. Most underground communications are accomplished through the use of couriers and mail-drops. When they are discovered by security forces, they are usually not immediately apprehended but placed under surveillance so that other contacts can be identified. Continuing surveillance also often leads to the exposure of key functionaries and organizers of the underground. Where time and distance are factors, undergrounds may communicate through rapid systems such as the double-language technique in which apparently simple propaganda radio broadcasts contain messages and instructions coded in key words and phrases. Such broadcasts can be interpreted by security police to supplement other intelligence information.

Undergrounds often rely on mass organizations for legal facades and support. It is possible for a relatively small number of people to capture control of a mass organization through infiltration and manipulation of elections, but security forces who are aware of such techniques can alert organizations accordingly. Once police recognize that all members of an infiltrated organization are not necessarily members of the underground, actions can be taken to apprehend the cell members without antagonizing or alienating the innocent.

Underground administrative agencies such as finance, training, and supply are normally centralized and often located in a nearby country. Governments may attack such international activities by cooperating, wherever possible, with neighboring countries in planning effective countermeasures or setting up points of surveillance in order to identify the underground agents and follow them to internal supply caches.

Underground organizations have an advantage over police in that they need not be restricted by administrative or territorial jurisdictions. Underground operations are often planned to take advantage of organizational interface problems of communication and coordination among government jurisdictions. Careful countermeasure planning can reduce this advantage by insuring that counterinsurgent forces are flexible and cooperate with each other at all levels. Government forces must reduce jurisdictional differences to a minimum and provide for local initiative.

OPERATIONAL VULNERABILITIES

The effect of underground revolutionary activity may be minimized if government police exploit the operational vulnerabilities in underground activity. Most undergrounds, for example,

resort at some stage to mass recruitment, which increases the underground's vulnerability to infiltration by government agents. Also, undergrounds are a "normative-coercive" movement, and not all its members are voluntarily associated with it; indeed, many would leave or defect if provided a safe alternative by the government. If the personal and situational pressures that the underground member faces are understood, government appeals may effect high-level defections.

Vulnerabilities in underground propaganda and agitation operations depend on local conditions which determine whether the government should answer the underground's propaganda or remain silent. The British in Malaya, for example, attempted to distinguish between legitimate and fabricated grievances. Realizing that labor unions had been infiltrated by the Communist underground, the British imposed the restriction that they could deal only with legitimate labor problems. The Communists were robbed of a propaganda and agitation platform, but legitimate labor grievances were not overlooked.

Underground terror operations may be countered by either establishing effective and visible demonstrations of the government power to protect the populace from terroristic threats or by organizing mass neighborhood or worker groups to provide group protection and act as informers.

Government forces can minimize the extent to which an underground organization can manipulate a crowd if they are able to identify and suppress essential pre-riot preparations, and photograph or otherwise identify the agitators in the crowd.

Government countermeasures against underground-sponsored shadow governments must focus on the coercive structures which support them. The hidden elements of control—such as the clandestine cells for surveillance and terrorism—as well as the visible institutional coercive structures, such as courts, group organizations, and tax collections, must be destroyed. If the underground shadow government basically rests upon coercive sanctions, it is particularly vulnerable to countermeasures which substantially reduce their threatening force.

10 — There have been as many counterinsurgency programs as there have been insurgent move- 10
9 — ments, but no one formula has emerged as being totally successful. All programs have certain 9
8 — common patterns of organization and operation, however. These elements of intelligence, 8
7 — population control, defection programs, and civic action are discussed in the following pages. 7

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE

TYPES OF SYSTEMS

The importance of intelligence to all counterinsurgent operations is unquestioned, but there have been several approaches used in developing intelligence organizations. A common type of intelligence organization is the unified system, where all collection and processing of intelligence are coordinated within one group under one command. In the Malayan insurgency, the intelligence efforts of the British Armed Forces and Malay security police were coordinated under the command of the British High Commissioner. All data and information were sent directly to one command for processing. Similarly in Algeria, French Army intelligence staffs performed all intelligence functions under a unified collection command.

The advantages commonly cited for the unified collection system are that intelligence information can be processed more rapidly, there is no duplication of effort, and fewer agents and staff personnel are required. However, a single channel for communicating intelligence is more vulnerable to compromise by underground infiltration, and in the unified system there is no independent source for confirming or cross-checking intelligence information and estimates.

The multiple organization of intelligence divides responsibility for intelligence collection and assessment functions among the various branches of government—the armed services, the civilian police, and the security police. For example, during the counterinsurgency operation against the Huks in the Philippines, intelligence functions were divided between the Military Intelligence Services (MIS) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, the National Bureau of Investigation, secret agents of the Philippine president, and intelligence agents of other countries. When Defense Minister Magsaysay initiated his program against the Huks, intelligence functions in the field were made the responsibility of the MIS, which assigned permanent intelligence teams to the Battalion Combat Teams; other agents operated out of MIS headquarters to augment a team or to work independently of the military commander in the area.

The multiple intelligence system has the advantage of providing independent cross-checks on intelligence and on the reliability of information, and it is less vulnerable to compromise. The diverse number of agencies serves to stimulate competition in the collection and dissemination of intelligence, which in turn improves the quality of output.

Coordination of the various arms of an intelligence organization is an essential prerequisite for the efficient and meaningful collection of information. The problem is, of course, always more difficult in a multiple system of intelligence organization. To coordinate their army and police efforts, the British in Malaya adopted a "war council" consisting of the chief officials of

the civilian administration, the police, army, and air force, and headed by a director of operations. The day-to-day planning and coordinating sessions among the police, military, and civil authorities did much to bring about concerted political and military action. In order to develop a countrywide intelligence system, a map of the Malayan Federation was drawn up which showed the areas in which the terrorists were operating, the distribution of Chinese and Malays, and the areas in which squatters were living. The map, known as the "Briggs Map," was posted with information from every possible source and also showed specific terrorist targets such as lumber camps, rubber estates, and mines. Drop zones for aircraft were indicated. Resettlement sites were chosen on the basis of the information gathered.¹

There are a number of advantages in assigning intelligence responsibilities to local police instead of solely to military personnel. Usually the police possess more information about complex factors in a local situation, since they are permanently located in the area, as compared to military forces who come into the area on a patrol mission, make a few contacts, and then leave. The police are also better able to collect local political intelligence.

Further, there are some psychological dangers in using soldiers as substitutes for policemen. Insurgents may gain prestige by broadcasting the fact that the government finds it necessary to employ its strongest armed force against them. Soldiers are an alien force in the daily life of most people and their appearance lends itself to unfavorable propaganda by the underground.

In Malaya, for example, the British authorities believed that the average villager would be more inclined to entrust information to a policeman he had known all his life than to a strange soldier. On the other hand, a villager might have personal reasons for distrusting a policeman or might be impressed with the army's efficiency and ability to protect him. Under such circumstances, a villager would be more inclined to give information to the army.²

Hence, the balance sheet is mixed: although the police are a small organization, they nonetheless seem to be able to collect quality intelligence at the local level; on the other hand, the size of a military force's organization makes it more useful for mass intelligence collection.

CONCEPTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence organization and collection during an insurgency place new demands on conventional concepts of intelligence. Requirements for effective countermeasures add a new dimension to intelligence functioning.

In conventional war, a combat unit learns the location of the enemy from contacts between units on an established line of resistance, and intelligence is reduced to the standard technique of providing "essential elements of information."³ In counterinsurgency, underground and

guerrilla targets are elusive and transitory, and the life cycle and usefulness of intelligence are brief. A few hours determine the success or failure of an action. In short, rapid response to intelligence is of crucial importance in counterinsurgency.

In conventional warfare, intelligence is not primarily concerned with individuals, whereas in counterinsurgency activities it focuses on individuals and their behavior patterns. The identity and whereabouts of the insurgents are usually unknown and their attacks are unpredictable. The underground lines of communication and the areas of underground logistical support are concealed from view. It is to these highly specific unknowns that counterinsurgency intelligence must address itself.

Another feature of counterinsurgency warfare that makes intelligence collecting difficult is that the underground operates autonomously or in small, compartmentalized units. Finally, because of the improvised nature of insurgent organization and the crudeness of its operations, counterinsurgency intelligence does not easily fit into standard categories.

Long-Range Intelligence

The parameters within which a revolutionary movement operates must be considered. Frequently a centralized intelligence processing center is established to collect and coordinate the vast amount of information required to make long-range intelligence estimates.

Long-range intelligence focuses on the stable factors operative in an insurgent situation. For example, various demographic factors such as ethnic, racial, social, economic, and political characteristics of the area in which the underground movement takes place are useful in identifying the members of the underground. Since the activities of an underground are clandestine and covert, it is important to have descriptive data as well as predictive information in order to identify causes, groups, and individuals who are or who may become members.

Information about the underground organization, on all levels—national, district, and
10 local—is fundamental in counterinsurgency, as is also data about underground recruitment,
9 training, and supply. Other stable factors that must be considered include strategies and tactics
8 of the underground; previous successes and failures of underground operations; data on the
7 areas controlled by the underground; the characteristics of those who are recruited into as well
6 as those who defect from the movement; and, finally, a thorough understanding of various en-
5 vironmental features such as terrain, borders, climate, and communication-transportation
4 routes.

Short-Range Intelligence

The collection of specific short-range intelligence about the rapidly changing variables of a local situation is critical. Information on the identification of members of the underground,

their movements, and their modus operandi must be gathered. Biographies of suspected underground members, containing photographs, detailed information on their places of residence, their families, education, work history, and associates, are important features of short-range intelligence. Usually this information is circulated at the sector-level command.⁴

During the Malayan insurgency, the British depended for short-range intelligence on the cooperation of villagers in furnishing information to local authorities. Ways of protecting informants from risk of underground terrorist counteraction had to be devised. In one approach, police visited each house in a village and gave its inhabitants a sheet of paper on which they were to anonymously write any information about underground activity in their village. The following day the police returned with a sealed ballot box and collected all papers, blank or not. Since every house was visited, the underground had no way of knowing who the actual informants were.⁵

In another technique, used in the Philippines, government forces leaked information to a village that a raid was to be made against the Huks. Such news generally prompted the insurgents in the village to leave. No raid would be made; the soldiers simply took group pictures of everyone in the village. On a subsequent, unannounced, visit to the village, the soldiers could identify those who did not appear in the earlier picture as possible Huk members and question them.⁶

Occasionally, parties or festivals were sponsored for village children at their school. While they were occupied with the festivities, an intelligence agent would pass among them asking innocent questions about their parents, their father's name, family birthdays, and if there were anticipated births, as well as other related social information. This revealed a great deal of information about Huk members; birthdays and expected births gave intelligence officers an indication of when certain Huk members might return home and be vulnerable to arrest.

To get intelligence about the method of underground communication between agents in the villages and forces in the jungles, Philippine army intelligence agents moved among the villagers disguised as fishermen, peddlers, or deliverymen to keep watch on the movements of suspicious persons.⁷

Search-and-cordon operations are also a common way of obtaining short-range intelligence. To protect the identity of informants, the British in Palestine interrogated everyone in an area separately in a private booth. Cordon operations are also useful in identifying outside elements within a village or town.⁸

Contact Intelligence

In conventional warfare, contact with the enemy is usually well established through front lines or patrol action. In counterinsurgency, the problem is to identify and then locate the

enemy. As frequently stated, in an insurgency "the front is everywhere." Even after members of the underground have been identified and their pattern of operations established, they must be located before they can be captured. Once a body of background knowledge has been developed, there are essentially four methods of obtaining contact intelligence.

Patrols

When some knowledge of the underground or guerrilla behavioral patterns has been developed from study of their past movements, patrols or police squads can search for physical evidence such as tracks or campsites. If there is a consistent pattern, patrols can be selectively dispatched on the basis of anticipated movements of the insurgents.

Low-Level Informants

All tips and leads, no matter how unreliable, are sought after on the assumption that the information may be helpful to cross-check or compare with other background information. Leads which are obviously false are eliminated, and those which are probable are followed up. Eventually the bits and pieces give a composite picture of the individual or cell and its pattern of behavior.

Forced Contact

Through the strategic hamlet program in Malaya, the British were able to force contact between the underground and the guerrilla. When people along the jungle fringes were relocated in hamlets, the guerrillas were cut off from their underground supply. This forced the guerrillas into the open to contact their underground support arm, the Min Yuen. The British set up observation posts in an area that showed increased activity in supplying food to the terrorists. Thus, farmers who were members of the underground were identified. Security forces then arrested some of these farmers, purposely ignoring other members of the underground. The insurgents were forced to go more frequently to the remaining farmers and obtain larger quantities of food. Then, when the police had identified each insurgent, they set up an ambush on the route normally followed.⁹

Informants

The use of informants is one of the most reliable and rapid means of obtaining the specific data required in contact intelligence. In Malaya the British commonly placed informants within

important villages. Through a process designed to protect their identity, informants were able to pass information about the movement, position, and activity of insurgents almost immediately. This intelligence was received by the local security forces, whose commander was authorized to take immediate action* under his own authority with no requirement to seek approval from higher authorities.¹⁰

COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE

Informants

Informants from among the general populace can be induced to assist the security forces through various motives—civic-mindedness or patriotism, fear, to avoid punishment, out of gratitude, for revenge or jealousy, or for remuneration. The British counterinsurgency forces in Malaya offered large rewards for information leading to the capture of Communist underground members and guerrillas. In the Philippines, the security forces placed a bounty on captured Huks. The bounties ranged from \$50 to \$25,000; in 1961, a top Communist leader in the Philippines had a \$50,000 price on his head.¹¹

A major inducement to informants is the assurance of protection from reprisal. The anonymity of the informant must be maintained and the transfer of information from the source to the security agent must be concealed. Many techniques and devices have been employed to minimize the risk to the informant. The security agent and the informant may prearrange signals to coincide with everyday behavior. In the Philippines, the government forces used light aircraft to spot such signals—a certain arrangement of colors on a clothesline, windows or gates left open to a particular angle, a specified household item or farm tool placed in a certain spot in the yard.¹²

Informants also protect themselves by anonymously mailing information about insurgent activities directly to the police. In one such method, the informant tears a strip of paper from his letter. At the end of the emergency he can present his strip of paper to the police; if it matches the torn part of the letter, he can receive his reward.¹³

Agents

In addition to regular government agents who attempt to infiltrate the underground organization, intelligence agencies often attempt to persuade or coerce captured members or prospective defectors into working for government forces while remaining ostensibly loyal to the

*Because contact intelligence is a highly perishable commodity, a 2- or 3-hour delay in response is critical. Hence, contact intelligence is not generally processed through normal intelligence organizations or procedures.

movement. A corollary technique is to place a trusted agent in a critical job where he has access to classified information; this position makes him a prime target for recruitment overtures by the underground organization and he can subsequently serve as a double agent.

In recruiting agents the security police consider the various motives which lead people to serve in such a dangerous capacity. Money, adventure, and revenge are perhaps the primary motives. The security forces can, however, create another motivating factor by revealing to a person incriminating evidence of his low-level involvement with the illegal organization and offering him the alternatives of cooperating or facing public exposure and arrest.

In Malaya, for example, a rubber plantation worker was observed smuggling supplies to the Communist terrorists. The police let him continue until they had enough information on the operation and sufficient incriminating evidence. Then, one evening the police stopped on a lonely road and exposed their evidence. The worker was faced with a dilemma: he could receive a 10-year jail sentence for aiding the terrorists, or he could be executed by the terrorists if they learned he had cooperated with the police. Because of clandestine security precautions, only five terrorists knew the worker's name. The police suggested that he could resolve his dilemma by giving them the names of these terrorists, thus collecting a reward and removing the threat of revenge at the same time.¹⁴

The underground usually places new, untried recruits in positions where they have no access to compromising information; only after thorough testing does a new member receive responsible posts. The government may be able to circumvent these security precautions. In an effort to find a suitable person for infiltrating the Huk organization, the Philippine military covertly contacted the relatives of several Huk commanders until they found a cousin who was willing to cooperate. After two months of special training, the cousin was sent to meet his Huk relative. As a relative he would have an entree, but to justify his desire to join the Huks, the Philippine military burned his house, imprisoned his brother, and evacuated his parents. The government, of course, agreed to pay for all damages and inconvenience, but it could not inform his family until the project was completed. Because of these obvious grievances against the government, the cousin was accepted and made collector for the Huks' national finance committee (the underground supply arm of the organization). To enable the infiltrator to advance in the Huk ranks, the government helped him collect medicine, ammunition, and weapons. For two months the Huks received supplies from the government through the infiltrator. His ability as a collector and his relationship to a Huk commander won him a promotion and a new assignment as a bodyguard to Luis Taruc, the Huk leader. Through an elaborate system of signals and contacts, the agent was able to relay vital information to the security forces concerning the elite corps surrounding Taruc at his headquarters and information on members of the National Finance Committee.¹⁵

Unit Infiltration

Government security force units and teams of varying size have been employed in infiltration operations against underground and guerrilla forces. They have been especially effective in obtaining information on underground security and communications systems, the nature and extent of civilian support and underground liaison, underground supply methods, and possible collusion between local government officials and the underground. Before such a unit can be properly trained and disguised, however, a great deal of information about the appearance, mannerisms, and security procedures of enemy units must be gathered. Most of this information comes from defectors or reindoctrinated prisoners. Defectors also make excellent instructors and guides for an infiltrating unit.

In Kenya (1954-55), the British used "pseudogangs" successfully against the Mau Mau terrorists. The pseudogangs were composed of ex-terrorists, loyalists, and occasionally, disguised Europeans. Through instructions from the ex-terrorists the pseudogangs learned Mau Mau handshakes, oaths, and prayers. These teams, once thoroughly briefed and oriented to Mau Mau characteristics, went into the jungle and contacted the genuine Mau Mau gangs. The infiltrating team then either moved on after relaying information on the Mau Mau to regular security forces or took advantage of their position and captured the gang themselves.¹⁶

In the Philippines a volunteer force of 3 officers and 44 enlisted men was secretly trained to resemble a typical Huk squad down to the most minute detail. All items that would identify them with the army were removed from their persons and they were given items generally carried by the Huks: ill-kept weapons, reading material, indoctrination booklets, propaganda publications, and mementos from girl friends. Clothing taken from captured Huks was distributed to the men to insure against any giveaway in consistency or uniformity of dress. Captured Huk weapons were issued to these simulated Huks. As a final note of realism, two wounded enlisted men volunteered to join the force.

During their 4 weeks of intensive training, the trainees addressed themselves as brothers and comrades and sang Huk songs. Reindoctrinated ex-Huks who had been captured in the area where the infiltration was to take place served as instructors and around-the-clock critics of the methods and mannerisms of the simulated guerrillas.

While the unit was in training, another disguised army unit made a reconnaissance tour through the area selected for infiltration. This reconnaissance patrol noted trails and defiles along the route and attitudes of inhabitants in order to incorporate them into the cover story.

The kickoff of the operation was a sham battle between the simulated Huks and a Philippine army unit. This battle set up the impression the simulated unit was driven from its own area into the Huk area selected for infiltration. The local Huk underground bought the story and for four days the simulated Huks fraternized with the local Huks. They learned the identity of the

Huk leaders, their modus operandi, and the names of civilian government officials who were secretly collaborating with the Huks.

The infiltrating group had made one mistake, however; they had more ammunition than the regular Huk units, a consideration which had been overlooked in the preparation. When the infiltrators realized they were under suspicion, they acted at once, attacking and wiping out two guerrilla squadrons. As a followup to this operation, two companies of the battalion combat team moved into the village and spent 3 weeks screening the inhabitants and arresting members of the underground. This operation had serious effects on the Huks; thereafter when two Huk companies met, they were stringent in their requirements of identity.¹⁷

In employing a disguised team, the selected men should be trained, oriented, and disguised to look and act like an authentic underground or guerrilla unit. Defectors and reindoctrinated prisoners often make good instructors and guides. The unit should have a cover story and a reason for being in a certain area. Each man in the unit should be briefed on the cover story so that no contradictions will arise. Obviously, a high degree of secrecy is necessary in training and deploying such units. In addition to acquiring valuable intelligence information, the infiltrating units can demoralize the insurgents to the extent that they will be overly suspicious and distrustful of their own units.

Cordon and Search

The cordon technique is often used for gathering intelligence when the populace does not cooperate for fear of reprisal from the underground, or if informers have not been developed or are difficult to locate. In the most common type of cordon operation, security forces surround a specified area, seal off entrances and escape routes, and search the people and property within the area. Two factors work for the success of the cordon: the element of surprise and the anonymity it affords possible informants. Usually, once the area is sealed off, the people are removed from their houses which are searched. They are then taken one by one into an interrogation booth. If the surprise has been effective, there will have been no time for prearranged stories, and people will tend to be confused and uncertain of what to do. The identity of those who actually inform will be unknown to others, and chances of reprisal will thus be reduced. By careful interrogation of this large number of people, contradictions will be discovered and a meaningful pattern of information can be developed.

Sometimes the cordon can be employed successfully in large cities. For 6 weeks in the fall of 1947, a British battalion successfully cordoned and searched 10 areas in the heart of Jerusalem. The cordon troops appeared before daylight in separate columns and surrounded the selected area. Through perfect timing and control, the cordon was set up before the men of the area awakened and had a chance to leave. Over 70 wanted men and a number of weapons



(Photo Courtesy of U.S.A.I.D.)

South Vietnamese Security Police conduct regular search-and-seizure operations both to detect suspicious persons and to control the movement of supplies to the guerrillas. Search-and-seizure laws are a common technique of population control.

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

were captured, and the remaining underground terrorists in Jerusalem were forced to lie low or leave the city.¹⁸

One of the most successful cordons was carried out in southern Johore, Malaya, in November 1956. Before daylight, 10 villages were simultaneously surrounded. The cordon was a complete surprise to the villagers, and the police seized 278 suspects. In this one operation, all the Communist supporters whom the villagers feared were removed, and information from the villagers was more easily obtained by the police. The terrorists, deprived of their usual suppliers, were forced to turn to others who were willing to report their contacts. This operation became the wedge that led to the eventual ridding of the terrorists from the whole of southern Johore.¹⁹

In Palestine, the British discovered that the Jewish underground, the Haganah, was acquiring detailed intelligence about British plans. The Jewish underground often had advance knowledge of British moves, presumably obtained from civilians employed at British bases. On other occasions Jewish communities sounded alarms that would bring hundreds of nearby villagers into a cordon area, defeating British attempts to identify strangers within the village. The British began sealing off bases where civilians worked until the cordon operations were completed, and made elaborate cover plans to conceal the purpose of various preparatory activities. Reconnaissance was usually not possible without tipping off the populace, so planning depended on maps and photographs of the village area. Written orders were kept to a minimum and usually distributed only hours before the mission; participating troops were alerted at midnight or later. No telecommunications were used in assembling troops for the cordon, since they might be monitored by Jewish underground agents. Finally, troops were assembled only under cover of darkness and the operation carried out just before dawn.

The success of these operations depended on speed, coupled with detailed coordination and specific instructions. Roadblocks were immediately established. An inner cordon of soldiers surrounded the area to be searched in order to seal it off and prevent escape. An outer cordon was placed at important points around the village to prevent interference from neighboring villages and to act as reserves. Special enclosed areas or "cages" were established and suspected persons were brought there for interrogation. Search parties rounded up the other villagers and detained them in a separate area, while other troops searched for hidden arms. Screening teams checked identification cards and photos against lists of suspects. After these search operations, suspects were transported to permanent detention camps.²⁰

There are obvious limitations on the use of cordons; for example, in jungle or mountainous terrain, cordon and search may not be successful because of the difficulty in sealing off an area. There are dense areas of jungle or underbrush where insurgents can hide and a soldier in a line of searchers cannot leave the line long enough to make a thorough search. In the jungle, insurgents can hear the approach of an advancing patrol and go into hiding. Cordon-and-search

operations were not successful in areas of the Malayan jungle or in the mountains of Cyprus and Arabia.²¹

One of the principal limitations of cordoning operations is the difficulty of catching the underground or guerrillas by surprise. Local underground agents or sympathizers can warn of approaching patrols through prearranged, inconspicuous signals. In addition, large bodies of police or soldiers inevitably advertise their presence, giving the insurgents time to camouflage or conceal themselves. Another disadvantage of the cordon-and-search operation is that if security forces fail, the underground propaganda units can spread doubt among the people about the government's ability to enforce its security responsibilities. When people lose confidence in the government, intelligence sources dry up and one failure leads to another.

Surveillance

Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places, is one of the principal methods of gaining and confirming intelligence information. Surveillance techniques naturally vary with the requirements of different situations; the basic procedures, however, include mechanical observation—such as wiretaps or concealed microphones—observations from fixed locations, and shadowing subjects.

In Jerusalem in 1947, a special unit of 12 army men was organized for surveillance operations. The surveillance unit placed known and suspected underground terrorists under continuous observation. The persons whom the suspects contacted were also identified and placed under observation. This continued until the pattern of underground organization was pieced together. One surveillance team was able to identify and arrest as many of the underground in one 6-week period as an entire army battalion could in the same period with cordoning operations.²²

If an intelligence agent plans to employ shadowing, he should learn as much as possible about the person before undertaking the mission.²³ Particularly important is a description of the subject, his habits of dress, and his manner of walking. The description should stress how the person appears from behind since the surveillant will be observing the person from that angle. The agent must dress to blend with the environment, and must give the impression he is interested in local activities and not the person being shadowed.

The security agent should avoid nervousness and haste, and should have a cover story prepared in the event he encounters the subject. It is also important to be familiar with the transportation system and the pedestrian routes in the area. If the security agent loses his subject, this type of information may help him to pick up the trail again. Any number of agents can be employed on such operations; the use of more than one allows agents to alternate positions, thus minimizing the possibility of recognition by the subject.

The same tactics apply in shadowing by automobile. The number of automobiles and persons used in the surveillance task depend upon the difficulty of the tail. It is more effective to use two cars than one. The risk of detection can be greatly lessened by frequently changing position. There should be at least two persons in each car. If one car is doing the shadowing, it should stay about 100 yards behind the car being shadowed; if a second car is used, it should follow the same distance behind the first. If the shadowing is to take more than one day, a different vehicle should be used each day.

In surveillance of fixed places, a preliminary survey of the surrounding area should be made. The character of the neighborhood, the inhabitants, and the buildings should be observed. The observation point should be chosen after careful reconnaissance. Likely spots include a room in a nearby house or business establishment. A person may disguise himself as one who would normally be in the area—a street vendor, a building employee, or an artisan. An effort should be made to photograph visitors. Descriptive notes should be kept on the identity of persons and their times of arrival and departure. All movements of the security agent to and from the observation post should be made unobtrusively; if it is necessary to have confidants, they should be kept to a minimum.

Intelligence agents conducting surveillance have numerous opportunities to obtain information without raising suspicion. In urban insurgency, particularly, there are many sources of information. As an example, in a country that has developed industrially to the degree where there is mass consumption, credit-rating agencies are a possible source of information. Intelligence can be obtained from telegraph messages, telephone toll-call records, hotel registration cards, military personnel dossiers, and employment records.²⁴

Intelligence information is frequently obtained from the trash output of homes and the wastepaper of business establishments. Arrangements can be made with contractors to get the trash, or the trash bags can be switched at night.

The contact is an important person in intelligence. Contacts can be established with clerks in barbershops, grocery stores, and drugstores, deliverymen (milkmen, mailmen, laundrymen, newspaper boys), and repairmen. Servants, friends, and neighbors are also a source of information.

In some instances more than one contact is maintained within an organization; this affords cross-checking of information. Multiple contacts insure the flow of information in the event that one is absent. Using contacts for information requires the establishment of proper security measures because each source has opportunities to desert to the other side.

Ruse

The ruse is another common technique in collecting intelligence. It may be described as a form of inquiry in which the security agent assumes an identity which helps him win the confidence or allay the suspicions of a potential informant.

The essential tactic of a ruse is to create a front which makes it legitimate (and therefore not suspect) to inquire about a person. Since most people are reluctant to inform on others, a ruse can be used to make it appear that the agent is seeking help rather than information. For example, most people, if asked to watch for suspects who just robbed the agent, are willing to comply in order to help a person needing assistance. Agents have used this ruse in numerous situations. For instance, to get information about a person from the registration card at a hotel, an agent can approach the hotel manager and report that he has received a bad check from a guest and wishes to compare the signature with that of the hotel registration card. Although such checking is not usually permitted, most hotel managers comply under these special circumstances.

Furthermore, the ruse gives potential informants some reason to avoid telling the suspect and alerting him to the fact that he is under surveillance. Were an agent to directly and openly seek information, the fact that an official was conducting an investigation would become known to the suspect and give him a chance to escape or take other measures to conceal his activities.

The ruse can so camouflage the nature of an agent's questioning that second parties may be induced to provide information or to observe suspect persons without either making them feel that they are spies or that they should warn the suspect.

Suggestion is one of the simplest forms of ruse. This was demonstrated in the famous case of the "North Pole" underground radio operation from Holland to London in World War II. 25 German Army counterintelligence in The Hague learned of the clandestine radio, and after months of patient search, located, raided, and captured the Dutch operator along with his radio and codes. Although this operator was a patriotic Dutch underground member, he succumbed to German threats that his punishment would be severe unless he cooperated in continuing to make his scheduled transmissions to London under German direction. He agreed, partly because he knew the Germans were unaware that he had been taught how to notify London if his operation were compromised. The agreed signal was for him to make certain mistakes in letters of the Morse code. However, London failed to catch the signal and assumed that the clandestine operation was progressing as planned. The Germans had the operator transmit messages requesting additional agents, as well as supplies and sabotage equipment. British authorities complied, and over a period of about 20 months more than 50 British and Dutch agents and literally tons of supplies (including brandy, coffee, and cigarettes) were parachuted into the hands of the waiting Germans.

To keep the operation running smoothly it was necessary to send to London a safe arrival message after each drop. The Germans knew that every agent had a special code signal for London; the problem was how to get this code before the agent learned he had been captured. To accomplish this, the Germans used suggestion. They dressed Dutch-speaking Germans in Dutch civilian clothes and sent them along with Dutch collaborators to welcome the agents and

supplies in the drop zones. As soon as the agents landed they were hurried to a Dutch farmhouse where they were heartily welcomed by their supposed friends. They were told that they would have to wait there until it was safe to transport them to the headquarters of the Dutch underground. They were advised of the necessity of immediately informing London of their arrival and were requested to reveal the code message. The agents, relaxing after the tension of the night drop, would freely give this message to their "friends" and it was promptly transmitted to London. At that point, of course, the real nature of the reception committee was revealed and the agents were sent to prison for interrogation. To deflect suspicion from the radio operator, the Germans dropped hints during the interrogations that made the captured agents believe the real traitor was someone in the London establishment.*

Through this simple use of suggestion the Germans were able to obtain important code messages from a large number of highly trained agents. The agent who found himself in a highly unstructured situation was susceptible to subtle pressure.

Interrogation

The interrogation of agents, informers, suspects, and captured or surrendered members of the insurgent organization plays an important part in government countermeasures. The types of information sought by interrogation include identity of insurgents; location of contraband items such as arms, ammunition, radio transmitters, and printing equipment; plans and operations; and the organizational structure of underground groups.

In the process of interrogation,²⁷ the interrogator's personality must command respect from and dominate his subject. His attitude and performance must be professional. To inspire full confidence, the force of the interrogator's personality should be tempered by an understanding and sympathetic attitude. The person interrogated must feel confident that he is talking to someone who is concerned about his viewpoint and problems. The villager who has been forced to cooperate with the underground will tell his story much more readily if he feels that the interrogator both understands his helplessness and seems inclined to take his plight into consideration.

The interrogator must be alert, able to analyze the material he collects, and quick to detect gaps or contradictions. Perseverance is required to complete a successful interrogation,

*In 1943 two of the captured Dutch agents escaped and reached Gibraltar via the escape-and-evasion net which operated through Holland, Belgium, and France. The Germans promptly sent a message stating that the two were collaborating with the Nazis, so that if they reached London anything they said would be viewed as false information. When the two loyal agents arrived in London, they were confined in a maximum-security area and treated as if they were double agents. When the British and exiled Dutch authorities finally realized that the escapees were telling the truth, the transmissions were terminated and the operation ceased.²⁸

and self-control must be exercised. Acting ability is helpful, for the interrogator must sometimes show anger or sternness to induce the interrogated to talk, while at other times he must feign the sympathy, kindness, and friendliness of a helpful adviser.

When conducting an interrogation, the interrogator establishes the atmosphere and dominates the interview. He must take care to have no distracting mannerisms. The interrogator and the interrogated should sit face-to-face, without intervening furniture, in as sparse a setting as possible. The interrogated should be deprived of every psychological advantage: the door should be at his back, there should be no window, the walls should be bare, and there should be no distractions for him to take refuge in. There should be no way for him to avoid the interrogator. It is the responsibility of the interrogator to create a mood conducive to a confession, and he must provide the emotional stimuli that will prompt the interrogated to tell what he knows.²⁸

Techniques of Interrogation

There is abundant evidence that coercive practices have never been particularly effective in eliciting information.²⁹ An individual who is deeply committed to an underground organization is highly motivated to safeguard the information he possesses. Frequently, however, individuals who say "go ahead and shoot" in the face of threat of death later reveal the same information under seemingly mild pressure.

Interrogations during insurgencies take place in a variety of environments ranging from the traditional police or intelligence situation in urban areas to the interrogation of individuals under field conditions. Regardless of the situation, time is usually a critical factor. In many instances, questioning conducted as soon as possible after contact deprives the interrogated of certain psychological advantages and capitalizes on his anxiety before he can prepare adequate psychological defenses.

10 — There are many ways of gaining information from a resistant deceptive person, depending — 10
9 — upon the ingenuity of the interrogator. Some of the techniques practiced by experienced inter- — 9
8 — rogators include emotional appeals, pretending to have physical evidence or other incriminating — 8
7 — information, and demonstration of sympathy for the interrogated. — 7

6 — Where two or more individuals are being interrogated, the one who appears to be most in- — 6
5 — clined to talk can be told that another has already given the pertinent information. He may then — 5
4 — be persuaded to talk since he now has no reason to withhold information. If two persons known — 4
3 — to have vital knowledge are each permitted to give statements containing deceptive information, — 3
2 — the discrepancies may furnish a means of getting additional information. In another commonly — 2
1 — used technique, two interrogators may work with the same subject, with one assuming a stern — 1
attitude while the other seems permissive. In many instances the individual being interrogated

over a period of time will give information to the permissive interrogator when he is alone with him.

The technique frequently followed in interrogating a large number of suspects in an area, such as a village or cordon, is to arrest and question them individually. The anonymity and safety found in a group can be used as an inducement to give information.

A variation on the above technique was employed by the French in Algeria: suspects would not be immediately interrogated, but would be kept waiting for long periods of time. When they were tired and apprehensive, as well as protected by the anonymity of a group, they were more inclined to talk.

In the Philippines a person was taken away from his home area to be interrogated. Removed from the local environment, individuals more readily offered information about people in the village. Occasionally, interrogators visited villagers on holidays while they were feasting and drinking and were thus prone to respond to seemingly harmless questions. Another practice followed in the Philippines was to divide prisoners to be interrogated into four categories:

1. Prisoners captured in combat. The first few minutes of interrogation are usually the most informative when dealing with persons just captured. The prisoners are usually confused and unable to develop cover stories.
2. Prisoners who surrendered because they feared reprisals by their comrades.
3. Prisoners who were serving jail sentences for serious crimes. These long-term prisoners were interrogated mainly to obtain information about their associates and contacts. The Huks were known to actively recruit people with prison records.
4. "Special prisoners." These were usually friends or close relatives of Huks or government informers who were placed in protective custody.³⁰

It is important in interrogation to use a technique that guards against giving information to the subjects. Usually the interrogator employs an oblique approach or a ruse to avoid giving clues as to the real object of the interrogation.

0 Polygraph

9 The polygraph or lie detector measures human physiological responses to emotional or
8 stressful stimuli and has been used to detect deception or knowledge of crime-related informa-
7 tion. The polygraph does not indicate whether or not a subject is lying but only measures the
6 physiological responses which are related to deception. It must be interpreted by an inter-
5 rogator and a trained operator. The interrogator asks the subject a question pertaining to some
critical event, usually phrased to obtain a "yes" or "no" answer. The subject's physiological
reactions are recorded and compared with his normal response pattern to neutral questions.
Measurements related to the autonomic nervous system are preferred, since the subject has
little or no voluntary control of these responses. Although there are many devices used to

measure deception, the term "polygraph" is usually reserved for that device which measures cardiovascular, respiratory, and galvanic skin responses.

The polygraph has been used extensively in criminal investigations and has been suggested for field interrogation in counterinsurgency operations. The use of the polygraph in the field is fraught with difficulties, however, because of the need for time and skilled operators.*

Even after assembling many skilled operators and consuming many hours interviewing thousands of persons, only one agent may be identified. For example, at the close of World War II, when German prisoners were tested by polygraph for political reliability, one interrogator was able to examine only eight POWs a day.³²

There are other problems in the use of the polygraph. Since lie detection depends upon eliciting a characteristic emotional and physiological response to critical questions, those individuals who do not respond in a characteristic manner cannot be detected. Psychotics or neurotics, pathological liars, and persons who do not feel that they have violated any normative or moral behavior (such as children who do not yet have a concept of right and wrong) will not react characteristically.³³ Other individuals who respond to critical questions with the characteristic emotional patterns associated with deception are not necessarily lying; a variety of extraneous factors, such as anger or fear, may cause a deception pattern. Some persons do not have a stable response pattern, and, when nervous or upset, their responses to neutral questions are so variable as to make it difficult to determine if the response is related to the critical question.

There is only a limited amount of information available on the biological and physiological differences of people in various cultures. It is known that culture influences the physiological behavior of individuals, but precisely what influence culture has upon how deception affects physiology is yet unclear. In some Oriental cultures, truth and falsehood are not considered so black-and-white as in Western cultures, and there is a tendency to think in degrees of truth and falsity. Hence, cultural variables must be considered when interpreting the results obtained from the polygraph.

In general, the polygraph is accepted as an aid to investigation and not as a substitute for other investigative techniques. In counterinsurgency, the polygraph may aid security forces in locating caches of ammunition or supplies, screening individuals for underground activity, and may potentially be useful in acquiring contact intelligence.

*In South Vietnam some success has been recorded in using portable lie detectors in the field. In experimental tests on 10 government soldiers suspected by an American adviser of being disloyal, one proved to be an agent of the Viet Cong, another had once been a Viet Cong member, and a third had occasionally assisted the first two. The lie detectors used were spring-operated from batteries and small in size, one pocket-sized. More important, their operation was so simplified that the average soldier could use them after only a week's training.³¹

FOOTNOTES

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²⁶Ibid.

²⁷See O'Hara, Criminal Investigation, pp. 95-114, and Albert D. Biderman and Herbert Zimmer (eds.), The Manipulation of Human Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1961).

²⁸For an interesting example of the effect of magic and superstition, see Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), pp. 62-75.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

DEFECTION PROGRAMS

Defection programs have played a vital and significant role in the successful outcomes of both the Philippine and Malayan counterinsurgency efforts. The psychological impact of defection on the underground is significant, and, in addition, information derived from defectors can provide counterinsurgency forces with intelligence for both military and psychological operations.¹

TARGETS

Many insurgents join the movement for specific, situational reasons, rather than for ideological and political beliefs. Many others are coerced into joining. Thus, even though factors which keep such people in the movement—loyalty to fellow soldiers, political indoctrination, threats of retaliation, and simple inertia—must be combatted, there is ample reason to believe that in any underground there are many potential targets who can be persuaded to defect.

FACTORS RELATED TO DEFECTION

Defection is related to certain long-range factors, such as the insurgents' estimate of the probable outcome of the insurgency. If they feel that there is little hope for an insurgent triumph, the tendency to defect is more widespread. Individuals who have families are more prone to defection; in many cases, family loyalty comes before political loyalty. Another factor is the length of service in the organization. New troops defect more frequently than do older troops, and the most critical time for defection is after 6 to 18 months of service. Other factors, such as being wounded or being a member of a minority group, are also related to defection.

Short-range factors, such as adverse weather conditions, casualties, and disagreements with superiors, are also related to defection, as are heavy losses during an encounter. Defections are most likely to occur in areas where the movement has suffered reverses. Lack of food and other hardships, along with the necessity of continually moving about in order to evade government forces, often raise the defection rate. Poor health contributes to individual decisions to defect.

At the point of decision, defectors are usually most concerned with the treatment they would receive if they defected. They seek reliable information and most report that they do not believe government broadcasts or propaganda messages until they have tested them against

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word-of-mouth information from the civilian populace. Persons with firsthand information are considered most credible.

No matter how widespread the information about amnesty and rehabilitation may be, the insurgent is still uncertain and doubtful about the intentions of the government forces. Will he be punished if he surrenders? Next, he is concerned with the dangers inherent in the act of defection itself. Will he be shot trying to leave the underground? Will the underground carry out its threats against him and his family? Uncertainty about the future and fear of retaliation are the chief inhibiting factors.

COMMUNICATING WITH POTENTIAL DEFECTORS

Opportunities to surrender must be presented in such a way that an individual has some degree of confidence in the offer. Defectors should be seen in public and can be sent in teams to various villages to tell the inhabitants why they left the movement, and news from the villagers will reassure potential defectors that the actual defectors are well treated. Families and friends of known insurgents are especially good channels of communication because they relay information to their relatives through letters or meetings. It is important to assure defectors that they will not be punished. Pictures of government camps and photos of both early and recent defectors in groups should be publicized to convey the message that defectors are alive, well, and have not met with bad treatment.

Leaflets aimed at potential defectors should be small enough to be easily hidden. They may be printed in the form of safe-conduct passes and should contain both information on how to defect and reassurances of good reception by government troops as well as information for the government soldier on how to treat the defector. Air broadcasts have not been effective in convincing insurgents to defect, as they doubt the credibility of this source; appeals made through families, friends, and other civilian channels are more likely to be believed.

Contents of Appeals

Broad, general themes designed to induce defection on ideological grounds have been ineffective; the potential defector is more interested in factual information. News of local tactical defeats and losses makes a greater impression than word of nationwide gains or losses. Thus, defection can be induced even when the insurgents are winning on a national basis, if the counterinsurgents take advantage of the psychological impact of local losses.

Divisive propaganda themes such as "soldiers make all the sacrifices while their leaders get preferential treatment and favors" help aggravate dissatisfaction. All themes should contain reassurances about the individual's safety and future legal status. Even when an insurgent

wishes to defect, the mechanics of doing so can inhibit him. It is important to tell him how to escape, how to surrender, and where to surrender. Since defectors are afraid of being shot by soldiers, appeals should inform them of specified civilians to whom they can safely surrender, and describe the location of defection points. *

Information From Defectors

As a routine part of defection programs, defectors should be systematically interrogated to determine the specific factors that led them to defect. Their means of escape and their reaction to appeals can provide information for campaigns in particular areas or regions. Systematic monthly records should be kept, so that trends can be observed. It is important to determine whether defectors were in political or military organizations, whether they were Communist or non-Communist, their level of command, and what geographic area and ethnic group they represent. This information will be useful in planning future efforts against the insurgents.

ORGANIZING DEFECTION PROGRAMS

In carrying out a program for defection, a concentrated effort should be made to coordinate psychological and other military operations. If the government tells the insurgents that defectors will be given fair treatment and government soldiers shoot a man who is trying to defect, this will deter other defectors. Therefore, combat troops must be indoctrinated and trained to perform their duties in a manner which will encourage insurgent defection. If, during the course of a battle, the insurgents find themselves confronted with superior weapons, such as artillery, aircraft, or napalm, or suffer heavy losses, potential defectors are likely to take some immediate action. Therefore, battles should be followed by psychological operations campaigns which are equally hard-hitting and which contain offers of amnesty to those who surrender.

RELOCATION CENTERS

In the Greek insurgency, many young people who defected were placed in jails with hardened Communists who re-recruited them into the insurgent movement. Others were placed in camps with inadequate facilities and programs and, becoming bored, went back to the insurgents. One solution to such problems is to place young defectors on parole in a distant city. Since the

*One defector in Vietnam reported that he felt he had no choice but to defect to a government-controlled town, for the countryside and the fortified hamlets were vulnerable to the Viet Cong. There were political agents in the villages, and the countryside was patrolled by small Viet Cong units who shot suspected deserters or collaborators.²

identity of a lower-level insurgent is not known outside of his immediate cell or unit, the young insurgents are protected from retaliation by relocation to areas distant from the ones in which they had operated.

If a relocation center is established, it is important to ensure it against insurgency attack, or the whole defection program will suffer. A primary fear of defectors is recapture. The undergrounds try to infiltrate relocation camps to carry out acts of terrorism and coercion, and large centers are more vulnerable than small ones to this threat. One answer is to establish widely distributed small reception centers where defectors can be screened initially into three groups: bona fide defectors, dubious defectors, and potential infiltrators. The bona fide defectors can be relocated and reintegrated with a minimum of processing and indoctrination and the suspect defectors can be kept under surveillance.

Insurgents may try to flood the camps with sick insurgents or civilians who need medical aid, and facilities of the camp must be adequate to handle this. Food, clothes, and other facilities must be provided to ensure minimum comfort for the camp inhabitants and to provide for any large influx of defectors.

It is important that defectors be treated with respect and not as prisoners of war. No stigma should be attached to their defection or their former activities, and the camp personnel should be trained in fair and appropriate treatment of them. Civilian visitors, especially relatives of insurgents, should be permitted to visit the camps to get a first-hand view of the treatment given to defectors. Attempts should be made to clarify the future legal status of defectors. To allay suspicion and fear, a brief government indoctrination program should be set up to inform the defectors of the government's efforts on their behalf and to tell them what will happen to them in the future. It is important that the program be designed not to seek retribution but to induce others to defect.

Defectors are anxious to talk to anyone about their problems, plans, and worries, so camp personnel should be instructed to be sympathetic listeners. Recreational activities can also provide some emotional release. Lectures obviously intended to transform defectors into loyal citizens are usually neither effective nor necessary. The defectors are committed to the government by the mere fact that they are in the camp, and lectures on the vices of communism are not required. A better approach to securing their loyalty, and one which provides emotional release for the defectors, is to permit defectors to participate in guided group discussions on their common experiences and the reasons which led to their defection. This tends to reduce latent fears or doubts; listening to other defectors reinforces each person's reasons for defection and builds new loyalties to replace former loyalty to the insurgents. The enthusiasm generated by such sessions is reflected in their attitudes and behavior after they leave the program and can have a significant psychological impact upon the civilian community and, through them, on potential defectors.

Training programs to help develop skills have been effective in past counterinsurgency efforts. Since a lack of the necessary skills for earning a living in modern society often contributes to a man's decision to join an insurgency, an opportunity to acquire skills that will provide for his future financial security gives assurance that he will not rejoin the insurgents. Such programs are also an inducement for others to defect in order to benefit from them.

In summary, one of the most effective tools for undermining underground and guerrilla morale is a defection program which is aggressively carried out and thoroughly coordinated with counterinsurgency military operations. Many have joined the insurgents through coercion or for highly specific grievances and can be persuaded to defect if they are convinced that they will not be severely punished. The most effective way to communicate this fact to the insurgents is through well-functioning, fairly operated defection programs. It is as important to advertise the program to the populace as it is to attempt to reach the insurgents directly. Residence at the center should be brief and aimed at the rehabilitation of the defector.



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FOOTNOTES

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²Seymour Topping, "Portrait of Life with the Viet Cong: A Defector's Story," The New York Times, May 23, 1965, p. E-3.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

POPULATION CONTROL

A fundamental feature of insurgency is the competition between government and insurgency for the support and allegiance of the local population. If the underground expands its control over the population, inevitably the government's authority is reduced. If the government controls the population, the underground is deprived of its principal source of supply, intelligence, and refuge; in short, they are isolated and their survival capability is severely reduced.

Population control seeks to accomplish two different, but integrally related, counter-measure objectives: to restrict the movement of the insurgents and to separate them, both physically and psychologically, from the general population. Although government psychological operations attempt to achieve population control largely through persuasion and the natural predilection of people to conform to laws and normative rules, there is a coercive element in many population-control measures.

TECHNIQUES OF POPULATION CONTROL

A number of important techniques have been developed in population control: collective responsibility, resettlement and relocation programs, legal controls, registration requirements, and food controls. Various organizational patterns have also been established.

Collective Responsibility

A common technique is the institution of collective-responsibility measures, which holds a group or group representatives responsible for antigovernment acts such as collaboration or sabotage. The random nature of collective-responsibility reprisals not only discourages the population from supporting antigovernment activities themselves, but makes the citizenry oppose all underground activity, lest they be punished. Further, it makes the underground hesitant to commit antigovernment acts when the probability of harm to its own people is present.

The practice of collective responsibility as a means of population control appeared as early as 221 B.C. in the Chinese Empire. Called the pao chia system, this form of control evolved over several centuries as the population was divided into progressively larger groupings of families—tens, hundreds, and thousands. Through these groupings, government authority was extended down to the family, the basis of Chinese society. The groups were supervised by the Emperor's district magistrate through the headman of each family. More important, the members of each group were held mutually responsible for one another's actions and theoretically

practiced mutual surveillance and denunciation. It was a criminal act to fail to report a crime against the state, and failure to do so automatically incurred punishment upon both the offender and his group.¹

Another technique of collective responsibility was used during the American occupation of the Philippines in 1901. To stop Philippine insurgents from receiving support from various towns and villages in Batangas Province on Luzon Island, the U.S. military commander implemented a policy of "reconcentration" and retaliation. Around each town in which U.S. troops were stationed a boundary was set up within which was sufficient space for Filipinos living outside to move in and build their homes. These boundaries were then patrolled by U.S. troops, a curfew was established, and no male adults were allowed to leave except by special pass. Further, no food was to be taken outside the boundaries. Whenever any property, such as telegraph lines, was destroyed, native houses in the zone were burned in retaliation. A proclamation was issued throughout the province warning that if any American soldier or cooperating native was harmed, a captured insurgent would be chosen by lot and executed.²

Throughout nearly all of occupied Europe, the Germans in World War II took reprisals against the civilian populace for acts of sabotage. Hostages were frequently taken to ensure good behavior. In Poland, for example, the German Army established a system of collective responsibility whereby a list of village leaders would be periodically posted in public with the threat that if any act of sabotage occurred in the village every individual whose name appeared would be summarily shot. This, of course, worked as a forceful deterrent since no member of the village underground wished harm to befall one of his relatives or friends. To circumvent this, the Polish underground brought in outside agents, who knew none of the listed villagers, for sabotage activities.³

Resettlement and Relocation

6 A common population-control measure is resettlement or relocation. When successful, 10
9 resettlement effectively seals off the insurgents from the populace and denies them material or 9
5 intelligence support. Close surveillance in the resettlement projects also protects the populace 8
7 from terrorist retaliation and coercion by underground groups. 7

6 One form of resettlement is detention or banishment. During World War II, Nazi occupa- 10
5 tion forces frequently employed this control technique, shipping scores of suspected under- 5
4 ground agents or collaborators to concentration camps or forced-labor camps.⁴ Elaborate re- 4
3 settlement programs were set up by the British in Kenya and Malaya. In Kenya, British Army 3
2 forces relocated Mau Mau family clans to seal off the collection of food and intelligence by ter- 2
1 rorists and to provide an opportunity for observation of contact agents. The famous resettlement 1

program of General Briggs in Malaya brought together widely dispersed elements into specially relocated villages that could readily be observed and defended against Communist attacks.

Between 1950 and 1952, under the Briggs Plan, 400,000 people were resettled into 410 defended villages. The British cut off outside sanctuary of the terrorists, closing the Thai border and patrolling the sea, while through aerial observation they made it nearly impossible for the insurgents to grow food in the jungle. To combat Communist propaganda efforts to disrupt the massive resettlement program, the British persuaded settlers to move voluntarily by offering tangible benefits of health and school facilities, and improved living conditions.⁵

Algeria provides another example of relocation techniques. In April 1965, the French Army resettled a number of villages from zones along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders, which had been sealed off in an effort to cut underground supply lines. In addition, the French declared areas with heavy activity to be special security zones, and resettled their inhabitants into camps.⁶

Legal Controls

In Malaya in 1953 the British High Commissioner promulgated emergency regulations that imposed a number of legal controls on the population. These regulations restricted the use of firearms and weapons and forbade possession of underground terrorist documents, association with people carrying weapons or acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety, and disseminating false information. Imposition of collective punishment on an area was legalized. British police were given authority to detain subjects for two years without trial, to search without warrant, and to deport and banish suspected subversives. Unique legal controls were devised to counter Communist infiltration of labor unions. Unions were required to register; if a union participated in political activities or demonstrations, it lost its registration certificate and was forcibly disbanded. Another regulation required a union officer to have 3 years of work experience in the craft or trade; this effectively eliminated most Communist infiltrators and protected long-time union officers.⁷

Other legal control measures include restriction and regulation of organizational or public meetings and licensing and censorship of printed publications and radio broadcasts. Controls are often set up on a country's borders to eliminate over-the-border sanctuaries. The issuance of scrip and frequent changes of currency prevent the accumulation of large sums of money to finance undergrounds or insurgent movements.⁸

In occupied areas, German authorities confiscated radios and set up public address systems to broadcast only the news the government wanted the people to hear.⁹ Search-and-seizure laws have been promulgated to prevent the underground from obtaining weapons.



NOT REPRODUCIBLE

(Photo courtesy of U.S.A.I.D.)

South Vietnamese villagers complete construction of a bamboo barricade in a strategic hamlet. Relocation of villagers into hamlets was a population-control device adopted by former President Ngo Dinh Diem to cut off village support of the Viet Cong and to protect rural communities from guerrilla terrorism. Patterned on the British Malayan experience, the hamlets have met with only partial success.

The Philippine Government, as a control measure, instituted a large-scale program to buy up all weapons from the population.¹⁰

Registration

Government surveillance and control of the population can be exercised through various forms of registration--individual and group registration, transient control, and population census. The national registration program adopted by the British in Malaya required every person over 12 years of age to be registered; identity cards were issued with a photograph and thumbprint.¹¹

In South Vietnam, identification cards, complete with photograph and identification details, are mandatory for all persons over 18 years of age. To obtain an ID card, an individual must appear in person at the district headquarters with two witnesses, a birth certificate, and a letter of verification from the village chief. There he must fill out a questionnaire which is forwarded to the district security police where it is checked against his files. A complete dossier is then prepared. However, a program that registers only persons over 18 misses one group--the 12 to 18 year olds--who are prime targets for underground recruitment as couriers and purchasing agents, as well as jungle fighters.

Loss or theft of cards is a problem in any registration system. A familiar underground tactic is the confiscation of identity cards of all villagers. A government countermeasure used in South Vietnam is to require the payment of a substantial fee for the replacement of lost or stolen cards. This promotes individual precautions against loss and creates resentment against the insurgents for confiscating the cards.¹²

Another common problem in the ID system is that of underground forgery. One countermeasure is periodic reissuance of cards on a different format. Another is affixing group, instead of individual, photographs on the cards. For instance, a family group is photographed and each of the family's individual cards bears this picture. In order to forge such cards, the underground is forced to gather a similar group together for ID photographs.

Another example of registration is found in the Chinese system of posting placards on houses, listing all the adult males of the household. When the Japanese occupied China during World War II they introduced a similar system, using wooden plaques for the names of residents, and organizing the populace into family groups, in accordance with the ancient custom.¹³

A similar technique of population control is seen in the South Vietnamese organization of Mutual-Aid Family Groups. Each family group receives a number from 1 through 8, depending upon how many houses are in the lien gia (five to eight households). This number is placed on a plaque outside the house along with the number of households within the khom (25 to 35 households). If, for example, the household number is 4 and that of the family 38, the plaque is

inscribed 4/25. When a new house is added it becomes integrated into the family group within which it is located and receives the next number. The plaque also indicates the number of people in the house, their relationship to the head of the household, and, by use of circles, their sex and their education. Red circles indicate male adults, yellow circles represent females, and green represents children. If any resident is illiterate, his or her circle is only partially colored. In the villages, family declaration forms are registered under hamlet names, house number, and family group to facilitate the census, and a copy is forwarded to the district office. All of this information provides the police with a means for checking on the inhabitants, and can aid in detecting hiding insurgents. In the urban areas a similar system for the organization of the population was established in February 1960.¹⁴

Transient control is also an important facet of population control. Homes of peasants and villagers have always served as refuges or safe houses for transient guerrillas and underground members, as well as for stragglers and deserters from government forces. In China during World War II, households were forbidden to lodge strangers, and were required to report to village authorities the presence of suspicious persons. Further, an individual who wished to move from one village to another had to make application through a village population officer. Population movements in South Vietnam are controlled through use of exit visas issued by the district chief after a villager's request has been authorized by his village chief. This system has been a source of discontent for many villagers, who wish to go to other districts for seasonal employment. Similar emergency regulations issued by British authorities in Malaya in 1953 required an inhabitant to apply for a permit before he could travel from his home.

Censuses also are used to support population-control measures. In South Vietnam, for example, the yearly census includes three categories of data: one for all families, another for all males 18 years of age and over, and a third for all reservists. The census of families facilitates the organization of the Mutual-Aid Family Groups, while the data on reservists and male population are used by military agencies.¹⁵

Food Control

Underground food supplies depend upon clandestine purchases, thefts, and collections from the populace. To exploit this vulnerability, governments usually institute control measures on the production and distribution of food. Tight food controls force the underground to spend an inordinate amount of time seeking food.

To separate guerrillas from their source of supply, villages are sealed off. Many food-control measures have been used. In Algeria, the French Army specified that the food reserves in any one place must not exceed enough for 30 days, so as to lessen the opportunity for the underground to pilfer supplies from a large inventory.¹⁶ The British food regulations in Malaya

provided for the establishment of a central distribution depot and rationing. The rice ration was closely supervised and limited to a week's supply. Villagers were forbidden to take any food out of a village. These controls were reinforced with the threat that the village's ration would be further reduced and a rigid curfew established if any terrorist was found to be obtaining food in the village. As a result, the British frequently received information from villagers on the identification of those in the village who attempted to supply the Communist underground. Smuggling food out of villages became the Communists' most vulnerable activity. As a last resort they cleared jungle areas to grow their own rice. However, these areas were easily spotted by aircraft and then eliminated by ambush.¹⁷

IMPLEMENTATION OF POPULATION-CONTROL MEASURES

South Vietnam

Population-control measures in South Vietnam have been implemented through Mutual-Aid Family Groups, Village Self-Defense Corps, hamlet chiefs, and National Security Police. Mutual-Aid Family Groups were first organized in 1957 by the government, not only to counter Communist insurgents, but primarily to create a spirit of unity, mutual assistance, security, and achievement in reconstruction and social works. Another purpose was to promote an understanding of government policies and to carry out government orders concerning tax collection. In setting up the program, emphasis was put on obtaining politically reliable hamlet chiefs and on the propagandizing and training of group chiefs as well as individuals within the groups.

Village Self-Defense Corps have also been organized under the direction of village police officers. Applicants for membership must present birth certificates, police records, and a certificate of good character. Each is then given a security check by the National Security Police and undergoes a month's training at the provincial self-defense headquarters. His training covers weapons familiarity, basic military instruction, basic law enforcement, and political indoctrination. The corps patrols the area around its villages, aids in tax collection, escorts village officials, and generally protects the village.

The village hamlet chief also plays a role in population-control measures. Usually it is his responsibility to explain and carry out government policies, to carefully watch the activities of the people, and to maintain security and order.

One of the principal agencies for the implementation of population-control measures in South Vietnam is the National Security Police (formerly called the Sûreté). Maintaining offices at each level of government down to the district, it provides coherence, direction, and surveillance. At the district level three agents are assigned who, while primarily concerned with

the acquisition of political information, also process requests for identification cards and clear prospective government employees.

In summary, it is largely at the district level that the security and population-control system of South Vietnam is administered—through the army, the district National Security Police, the hamlet and local village chiefs, and the district administration of the Mutual-Aid Family Groups.¹⁸

North Vietnam

As in other Communist countries, in North Vietnam a combined government-military-party directorate has been established to institute strict physical, ideological, and economic controls. The most important control organization in North Vietnam is the Lao Dong Party (Communist Party). It prevails over and permeates all organizations of state control. The organizational structure of the party parallels the entire system of government and is intertwined with it. Officials of the Lao Dong Party dominate all organs of the central government. At the village level the members of local branches of the party are also the leaders in local government. Party members are in charge of police and militia, as well as youth and women's groups. In the army, political commissars function down to the lowest unit level and are responsible for the political attitudes of their units.

The primary intent of this party duplication and permeation of official governmental organizations is to make the people feel the persistent presence of the party and to educate the masses in "correct thinking." The Lao Dong exercises great influence over both the official and unofficial organs of state control.¹⁹

In 1961 a People's Supreme Inspection Institute was set up to cope with problems of "destructive antirevolutionary elements," to protect the economy, and to secure law and order. An additional responsibility of this agency, and possibly its primary one, is the inspection of law enforcement in government offices, work camps, enterprises, farm camps, and cooperatives. The Inspection Institute is the North Vietnamese version of the Communist Chinese People's Supervisory Committee, the channel for the mutual surveillance and denunciation of waste, red tape, and corruption of negligent state officials by the people. In the performance of their duties, the Inspection Institute teams rely upon their investigative personnel and on "denunciation letters" which are used to investigate and scrutinize various government agencies. These denunciation letters provide the authorities with a massive network of informers.

In rural areas, the cooperatives are also used for the implementation of population-control measures. The size of cooperatives, operating below the basic administrative unit of local government, depends upon such factors as population density, topography, and location. Generally, they range in size from between 150 to 200 families in the Delta region to 20 or 30

families in the mountain areas. The effort to establish cooperatives, and to extend them by re-locating thousands of villagers from the Delta to mountain regions, has made little progress because of peasant opposition. The government has attempted to make the cooperatives more attractive by providing economic inducements and civic action programs. They have tried to provide better management, have agreed to set aside 5 percent of the cooperative land for private use, and have set wage rates based on work performance rather than on needs.

To facilitate control in the urban areas of North Vietnam, special protection committees have been established. In order to make the people more cognizant of government orders and to maintain public order and safety, in Hanoi alone 4,600 block chiefs and deputy chiefs, plus 3,000 committee members, have been appointed to properly control the urban population.

Militia and self-defense units have also been organized as a major means of population control in North Vietnam. As in Communist China, these units are organized into platoons, companies, and battalions; they are formed at all levels of government in both urban and rural areas, and extend into the base of the society.

The political mission of the military is to indoctrinate the civilian population and to aid in the establishment of cooperatives. Through its powerful political directorate, the army conducts indoctrination programs, especially for the individual soldier. The army fulfills its economic mission by helping with the planting and harvesting of crops, developing cooperatives, and cooperating with civilians in organizing public works projects.

The major civilian security control agency in North Vietnam is the Cong An—the secret police—who operate both overtly and covertly under the immediate direction of the Ministry of Public Security, and ultimately under the Lao Dong Party. Although little is known about the secret police organization, it is believed that, like its Communist Chinese counterpart, it operates at every level of government. There are several province-level sections, one of which is the political protection section that deals with identity cards and travel regulations.²⁰

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FOOTNOTES

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¹⁶Richard L. Clutterbuck, "The Cold War," The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, LXXXI, No. 2 (January 1961), pp. 161-80.

¹⁷Molnar, Undergrounds, pp. 172 and 245-62; Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Communist Defeat in Malaya-A Case Study," Military Review (September 1963).

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²⁰Ibid., p. 13.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

CIVIC ACTION

The general target for government civic action is that vast majority of the population which does not officially participate in an insurgency. An additional target is the large, nonpolitical portion of the insurgent movement itself which can be persuaded to support the government through offers of amnesty, rehabilitation, and opportunities for a better life.

Civic action programs take many forms. The governmental administrative apparatus and social services may be strengthened to aid victims of the insurgents, and inequities in the distribution of social services can be corrected through employment and welfare agencies. Public health programs and medical aid have frequently been used to win support among the population, as has the extension of educational opportunities. Price controls and rationing have been used to protect the population from inflation. In areas where farming is important, methods of improving agriculture and land distribution programs have been used to win support.

The coordination of military and civilian tactics among the civil populace is important because a lack of coordination can undermine a whole program. In carrying out publicity for civic action programs, mass communications alone are not sufficient. In an environment where the individual may be under stress and fear, face-to-face communications are more effective.

OBJECTIVES

There are several considerations in determining overall objectives of civic action projects. Programs designed to gain popular support and cooperation for the government will differ from those designed solely to prevent cooperation with the insurgents. The ability of civilian administrators to carry out the program without the help of the military will influence the scope of the project. There is the question of whether the program should concentrate on purely civilian projects such as schools or on projects which also aid the military, such as roads. Another consideration is whether or not to provide civic action in insurgent-controlled areas. One author says that political, social, and economic reforms, no matter how much they may be wanted by the populace, cannot be effective in such areas. In Algeria, for example, the FLN killed Arabs who took advantage of land reforms.¹ The government must be able to provide security before civic action can be effective.

PROGRAMS

In Algeria the French carried on a major pacification program. The Army had over 1,000 special service units in the rural areas. Each unit was headed by a French officer of company

grade and staffed with an assistant and a secretary. The officers established residence and headquarters in the midst of the Arab settlement or village and prepared to administer to the needs of the people. The main effort centered on improving living conditions. French Army volunteers organized and taught school classes, helped build houses, sanitary facilities, and water supplies, and demonstrated improved agricultural and health practices. They provided medical services and took the ill and injured to hospitals for surgery. French women physicians and civilian employees taught Muslim women how to care for their babies. This program won the support of the populace in many areas.²

The French made certain that each soldier realized that psychological actions which he might undertake were no less important than military ones. The soldiers were to be the agents of pacification: they were indoctrinated and kept informed by weekly sessions in which current developments and plans were discussed and the successes and failures of each week's efforts were reviewed. Written and oral arguments to be used among the civilians were carefully prepared and kept up to date.

The essential elements in the program were 1) reassuring the population that everything possible was being done to bring peace and to protect them; 2) visiting people and showing them sympathy and help; and 3) respecting their customs and traditions. The troops were briefed on local customs and officers often visited marketplaces to talk to the people. The French found the spoken word to be more effective than pamphlets or slogans, and deeds to be the best form of propaganda. Overly stringent demands were avoided and promises were carefully kept. Corrupt local officials and those of dubious morality were removed.³

In the Malayan counterinsurgency program, after the labor movement had been cleared of Communists, the strengthening of public morale and the winning of support by involving the people more directly in the struggle were undertaken. Malays who feared the Communists provided ample support. In order to get the commitment of the Chinese community, the authorities urged them to join legal organizations as a means of expressing indignation against Communist activities: a non-Communist, Malayan-Chinese association was established, as well as the Independence of Malaya Party and the Malay Labor Party. In addition, political figures were brought into direct working relationship with the British Armed Forces and the Malayan Security Police. In this way, the populace was made to feel that it shared formulation of government policy. This program allowed for day-to-day coordination between local civil and military authorities. Despite the obvious lessening of security, the government made more information available to the public; the government felt that the support thus gained was sufficient compensation for any reduction in military security.⁴

In the Philippines, the political, military, and economic reforms instituted by Ramon Magsaysay were instrumental in ending the Huk insurgency. In the 1951 election, government authorities stationed teachers as poll clerks, used ROTC cadets to guard polling places, and

placed soldiers at ballot boxes to prevent intimidation of voters. These protective measures were announced in advance, and Magsaysay served notice that any officials who abused their responsibilities would answer in court. He urged all citizens to report directly to him and his personal staff any complaints that they might have.

Magsaysay reorganized the Armed Forces. Officers who were not performing their duties were removed, promotions were made on the basis of merit, and soldiers who were caught stealing were punished in the presence of the villagers. The determined effort to rid the Philippine Armed Forces of inefficient, unreliable officers resulted in the dismissal of personnel of all ranks, from the Army Chief of Staff to local battalion commanders who were slow in carrying out counter guerrilla operations. Magsaysay's success in ridding the armed services of undesirable elements increased public confidence in the national government. Magsaysay had the military perform civic and social welfare missions in addition to their military operations against the Huks. Each military unit was assigned a civil affairs officer who maintained liaison with the local barrio police officials in civilian home guard units.

Judicial reforms were also carried out. Before 1952 the Communists exploited the fact that small landowners rarely gained justice when abused by the large landowners; Magsaysay made provisions for the peasant to have the right to legal counsel at the government's expense if he so desired.

The economic reforms were the most spectacular. Initially, rural civic betterment activities were conducted under the army's psychological warfare group but later they were administered as civil affairs. At the battalion level, battalion commanders and their civil affairs officers met with barrio heads and other civilian leaders to plan the defense of the farmers in the fields and the barrio self-defense procedures. This led to further discussions of needs and to the initiation of army support measures. Army personnel escorted agricultural agents into rural areas to introduce newer agricultural techniques; troops were used to construct barrio schools, drill water wells, and carry out public works projects; civilians wounded in any battle between the government and the insurgents were treated at army hospitals.

The major civic action effort was undertaken by the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR). This project aimed at inducing defection from the Huks by rehabilitating and resettling Huk prisoners and their families. EDCOR formed four communities for former Huks and established a vocational training center. Troops helped the settlers clear land and build houses. Village centers, school buildings, chapels, and dispensaries were set up. The army also assisted the settlers by handling the legal matters involved in land ownership.

Although the program was not large, the psychological effect of the EDCOR operations upon the Huk movement and the general populace was great. It provided new respect for the government and offered the rebels an alternative to resistance. Already assured of amnesty and protection from fellow insurgents, the rebels now had, through EDCOR, hope for future economic

security. Huk defections eventually provided the government forces with the intelligence necessary to break the movement. ⁵

PLANNING

In designing a civic action program, local conditions—political circumstances, cultural values, ideology, and technical and managerial skills—must all be considered. Those segments of society which would be most affected by the program should be consulted to determine the impact of the program. If interest groups are involved—trade unions, professional or women's groups, youth, peasants—they should also be contacted and, if possible, involved in the planning.

How should the program best be carried out? How will the people be informed and persuaded: leaflets? word-of-mouth? broadcasts? If people cannot be persuaded to voluntarily take part in the plan, what sanctions will be imposed: licensing? rationing? punitive measures? Is there a present crisis situation which predisposes the people to cooperate, or will it be necessary to create a crisis? Will the program be hindered by illiteracy, lack of social discipline, draft evasion, or underground sabotage? Will there be periodic review? Is the plan flexible? What side effects may occur? Will prices go up? Will attitudes change?

In Malaya, squatters were relocated to villages in which they received schooling, housing, electrical facilities, and other benefits they had never had before. This was a step up the economic ladder for them, and many remained even after the Emergency was over. In Vietnam, on the other hand, individuals were awakened in the early hours of the morning by military troops and taken at bayonet point to their new location, while their houses were burned and their fields destroyed behind them. At the new hamlets they had to build their own houses and fortifications. They were often not compensated for the land and property left behind and even when they were, in many cases the new areas were not as desirable as the areas they had left. ⁶

In Malaya, the villagers lived on large, easily enclosed plantations and did not have to leave their local areas. In South Vietnam, the fact that the population was scattered made it difficult to relocate people into strategic hamlets. Further, the value they placed on land left to them by their fathers made them reluctant to leave it. ⁷

It is important to anticipate complaints. People living under stress often react aggressively; civic action programs should capitalize on normal human tendencies to seek prestige, and redirect aggressions in this way. ⁸

Most civic action programs are more positive than coercive by nature, but most involve some element of force. In the Philippines, Magsaysay's reform program was called the "Iron Fist in the Velvet Glove": the people were given positive incentives to support the program, but there were penalties against those who did not. The program tried to make individual goals coincide with national goals and to offer some alternatives to resistance or apathy. Another

characteristic of the program was the high degree of specific direction. Civic mobilization, and the use of the organizational incentive and similar controls, is one method of developing support for government goals.

In many civic action programs the government undercuts underground propaganda by offering many of the same things: for example, land reform or, in the colonies, independence. In addition, individuals not firmly committed to the insurgency were won to the government side by asking their cooperation in efforts to correct grievances or inequities in the system. In Malaya, there were restrictions on direct criticism of the government, but union leaders were permitted to make demands or complaints about union matters. Another way used to overcome resistance was to legalize nonsubversive opposition. The creation of political parties and labor groups in Malaya was one way of accomplishing this.

If special areas are set up in which civic action programs can be tested before being used on a national basis, the effect of errors will be minimized and they can be corrected more easily. Also, critical side effects can be discovered by such testing. In Vietnam, for example, in order to combat inflation in the urban areas, price-control measures set the ceiling on pork so low that farmers refused to deliver their animals to Saigon; in thus attempting to satisfy one segment of society another segment was alienated.⁷

In addition to winning support from the civil populace, programs such as EDCOR and relocation camps can be attractive to the insurgents, and this should be recognized and exploited in planning civic action programs. Defection programs must consider the safety of the defectors. (In the Philippines and Malaya, defectors were relocated to areas which were pacified or within government control.) Another factor in inducing defection seems to be the importance of reeducation which offers a hope of a better position within the society.

COMMUNICATION

A basic part of civic action programs is redirecting the frustrations and aggressive feelings that people experience during the stress of insurgency into channels of action favorable to government purposes. To discover and manipulate such feelings require communication, and communicating with people under stress involves some peculiar difficulties.

Need for Reliable Authority

In a crisis or previously unexperienced situation, the scope of information that the individual is interested in is greatly reduced: he wants specific information bearing directly on the crisis. Information about vague, abstract future threats has a very low attention value, and people respond to it apathetically.



NOT REPRODUCIBLE

(Photo courtesy of U.S.A.I.D.)

A South Vietnamese health official vaccinates village children as part of a government civic action program. Medical aid and public health activities are frequently stressed by governments as a means of winning support among the population.

People want reliable information, and authoritative figures or emerging leaders can be highly effective in communicating in emergency situations. In addition, such people can assist the individual in making decisions.⁸

Need for Positive Action

Prolonged conditions of unresolved crisis lead to emotional depression; people feel a need to take positive action. In seeking a basis for action, the individual tends to rely upon the familiar, to integrate the crisis event into a past frame of reference. His tendency to act in familiar ways which have proven reliable in the past can lead him to take actions which seem illogical to others but which appear perfectly logical and appropriate to him. Government programs can take advantage of these tendencies, and overcome some of the difficulties they pose, by drilling people in actions to be taken during emergency situations. With such training, people can perform adequately; without it, they are highly receptive to suggestion.⁹

Need to Communicate

In changing or controlling attitudes during a crisis situation, free verbal expression serves to vent strong emotion and provides a catharsis. It gives the individual the chance to state his own position, opinions, fears, and desires.¹⁰ The creation of some mechanism for this purpose is important and can take many forms.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERMEASURE PROGRAMS

Since the insecurity and frustration generated by a crisis situation can be used by the insurgents to direct aggressive behavior against the government, it is important for the government to establish channels of communication with the people. The channels can provide the needed catharsis. The search for a reliable authority also lends itself to government purposes: the local government agent can fill this role and usefully spend his time listening to the hopes and fears of the people. The most effective way to alter the individual's perception of the situation is to direct him into constructive action, rather than simply to lecture him. Decisions made by a group carry more weight with the individual than those made independently; the individual who has shared in the decision of the group is more likely to go along with it.

In Malaya, the British had an unexpected bonus in their hamlet programs: local officials were bombarded with complaints and so began a dialogue between the villagers and the government which satisfied the former's psychological needs.¹¹ In the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay made it known that anyone could send him a telegram for 5 cents complaining about anything and

that within 24 hours his office would take action on the complaint.¹² In South Vietnam, in April 1964, Prime Minister Khanh ordered the establishment of a complaint agency to be called the General Office for People's Suggestions and Complaints. This agency was to investigate complaints and report the findings to the Prime Minister with appropriate recommendations. The director was given the authority to contact any military or civilian agency within the government and swiftly settle any claims. All other government agencies were required to help with suggestions and complaints.

Besides setting up protest mechanisms, it is important to have a feedback on how well a program is doing, so that rapid responses can be made to complaints, grievances, or inequities in the civic action program. The government's intent is most credibly conveyed through personal experience and word-of-mouth. In addition to information campaigns, the British in Malaya sent defectors around to the various villages to lecture the people. Mayors from the various areas were brought to Singapore to see the reforms and actions the government had taken. Word of these projects filtered back to the villagers and had a greater credibility than anything that could have been said in a mass communication program.

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FOOTNOTES

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GLOSSARY

ACTION PROPAGANDA. Immediate, observable action which follows propaganda promises: one form being specific action to alleviate hunger and suffering, thereby demonstrating insurgents' ability to accomplish set goals, and another which focuses on retaliatory acts of violence, sabotage, and punishment of so-called traitors among the local population.

AGITPROP. Communist jargon for agitation and propaganda, the principal forms of underground psychological operations. Propaganda refers to the dissemination of many ideas to a few people, usually the cadre. Agitation means the dissemination of a few ideas to the many, usually the masses.

ARMED PROPAGANDA. The coordination of political propaganda with military force.

BELIEFS, VALUES, AND NORMS. Beliefs are ideas, knowledge, lore, superstition, myths, and legends shared by members of a society. Associated with each cultural belief are values—the "right" or "wrong" judgments that guide individual actions. Norms are acceptable patterns of behavior which are reinforced through a system of rewards and punishments dispensed within the group.

CADRE. This term applies to the small groups of professionals or Communist vanguard who are to lead the revolution.

CELL. The basic unit of an underground organization consisting of a cell leader and cell members, with its size depending upon its specified function. The operational cell is usually composed of a leader and a few cell members. The intelligence cell is one whose leader seldom comes into contact with its members except through intermediaries such as the mail-drop, cut-out, or courier. The auxiliary cell is commonly found in front groups or in sympathizers' organizations, and contains an underground cell leader, assistant leaders, and members. It is structurally larger than other cells, has an intermediate level of supervision, and has little or no compartmentalization. Parallel cells are set up to support a primary cell and serve as backup cells.

CELLS IN SERIES. Used to carry out such complex functions as the manufacture of weapons, supply, escape and evasion, propaganda, and printing of newspapers.

CHIEU-HOI. The "open arms" program of South Vietnam, whereby Viet Cong defectors are offered amnesty and assistance after a short indoctrination and retraining course.

CIVIC ACTION. Any action performed by military forces of a country, using military manpower and skills, in cooperation with civil agencies, authorities, or groups, that is designed to improve the economic or social betterment of that country. Civic action programs are designed to enhance the stature of indigenous military forces and improve their relationship with the population.

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS. Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

COMINFORM. The Communist Information Bureau.

COMINTERN. The Communist International.

CONSENSUAL VALIDATION. The device of confirming facts or norms through group approval or consensus.

CONTACT INTELLIGENCE. Immediately usable intelligence which provides information as to the immediate whereabouts and identity of a subversive individual or group. There are essentially four methods of obtaining contact intelligence: 1. Patrols. Patrols or police squads search for physical evidence such as tracks or campsites, and for consistent patterns

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in enemy movements. 2. Low-level informants. These members look for even the smallest tips or leads and bits of information that might help to complete the background information on the insurgents. 3. Forced contact. An example of this tactic might be cutting off the guerrillas from their underground supply source, thereby forcing them into the open to contact their support arm. 4. Informants. The use of informants to gain intelligence about the movement, position, and activity of insurgents.

COOPTATION. The practice of utilizing the special talents or qualifications of individuals who may be indifferent or opposed to the goals of the organization by giving them a position of nominal importance on the periphery of the organization.

CORDON-AND-SEARCH TECHNIQUE. A method of gathering intelligence when the populace does not cooperate for fear of reprisal from the underground. Usually the security forces seal off the entrances and escape routes and search all people and property within the area.

COUNTERINSURGENCY. Those military, paramilitary, political-economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

COVERT OPERATION. Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial of subversive operations. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis in clandestine operations is placed on concealment of the operation rather than the concealment of personal identity.

CRITICISM, SELF-CRITICISM. The actual activities of criticism and self-criticism sessions consist of conferences, discussions, and meetings within the party in which personal performance is evaluated by the individual and the group to determine and correct any weaknesses in the work of the party or party members.

DOUBLE LANGUAGE. A technique by which instructions to the Communist cadre are concealed in propaganda materials.

EDCOR. In the Philippines, the government's Economic Development Corps.

ESCAPE-AND-EVASION NETS. A system established by undergrounds for purposes of infiltration and exfiltration of the area of hostile operations.

FAIL-SAFE PRINCIPLE. Principle by which if one element or operation fails or is compromised the consequences to the overall organization or operation will be minimal.

FRONT ORGANIZATION. Commonly refers to political activities carried out behind the facade of an apparently non-Communist organization.

GRU. The Soviet Military Intelligence Directorate.

GUERRILLA FORCE. The relatively small visible element of a revolutionary movement organized to perform overt armed military and paramilitary operations using guerrilla tactics.

INVULNERABILITY CONCEPT. The practice of frequent assignments and a high degree of activity have the useful side effects of keeping the individual so engrossed in his work that he loses any fear of harm coming to him, and unconsciously considers himself invulnerable.

KGB. The Soviet Committee for State Security.

MAIL-DROP. A mail-drop is placed where a message may be left by one person to be picked up later by another.

MAIN FORCE, REGIONAL FORCE, AND LOCAL FORCE. The military elements of an insurgency. The regular main force is organized along conventional military lines, such as platoons, etc.; the regional troops have responsibility for an area comparable to a province or state; and the local militia is composed of villagers operating at the village level. Generally the main force uses conventional tactics while the regional and local militia use guerrilla tactics.

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PASSIVE RESISTANCE. This method implies a large unarmed group whose activities capitalize upon social norms, customs, and taboos in order to provoke action by security forces that will serve to alienate large segments of public opinion from the government or its agents.

POLITBUREAU. The principal policy-making and executive committee of the Communist Party.

POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL. That aspect of the counterinsurgency effort designed to control human and material resources. Objectives of this effort are to sever the relationship between the population and the guerrilla; identify and neutralize the insurgent apparatus and activities within the population; and create, within the population, a secure physical and psychological environment.

POLYGRAPH. A device which measures cardiovascular, respiratory, and galvanic skin responses, used extensively in criminal investigations and interrogation in counterinsurgency operation.

PSEUDOGANGS. A team of infiltrators highly trained and indoctrinated in local mannerisms, attitudes, speech and dress, down to the minutest detail, to simulate an insurgent group for purposes of infiltration and intelligence collection.

REVOLUTIONARY OR INSURGENT MOVEMENT. A subversive, illegal attempt by an organized indigenous group outside the established governing structure to weaken, modify, or replace an existing government through the protracted use or threatened use of force.

SABOTAGE. An attempt by insurgents to withhold resources from the government's counterinsurgency effort by acts of destruction.

SAFE HOUSES. Hideouts which are part of an escape-and-evasion network.

SELECTIVE EXPOSURE. The tendency on the part of individuals to hear only information congenial to their own tastes, biases, and existing attitudes.

SELECTIVE INTERPRETATION. Information understood only in terms of prior attitudes.

SURVEILLANCE. The covert observation of persons and places, including mechanical observation such as wiretaps or concealed microphones.

0 | **TERRORISM AND TERROR.** Those coercive acts of violence utilized by a subversive movement and usually directed toward disrupting government control over the citizenry and
9 | creating a state of mind—terror—which makes the citizenry acquiesce to subversive demands.

UNDERGROUND. The clandestine or covert organizational element of an insurgent movement.

UNITED FRONT. A common Communist tactic which creates an alliance against the government of all organizations or forces of discontent.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The study of motivation and behavior in controlled environments is always difficult. Analysis based upon data which is incomplete and often biased, and which was recorded in an uncontrolled, hostile environment, is even more difficult. When insurgencies are in process, it is impossible to determine the actual motives of the individuals involved. The best evidence available appears in the reasons given by the people concerned: why they did things, what they did, and what consequences ensued for them.

In analyzing the organization, motivation, and behavior of insurgents, the following sources of data were used:

1. Historical accounts of underground movements. The accounts of various insurgent underground movements were reviewed to establish the environmental context within which the events occurred.
2. Organization charts. Although organization charts are only formal statements of the organization, comparisons were made among various insurgent movements in an attempt to identify similarities and differences in structure and functions, command and control, and communications.
3. Training materials. Although it is difficult to establish exactly what went on at various insurgent training centers, a review of the materials used suggests the behavioral patterns instilled in the recruits.
4. Propaganda. It was possible to evaluate propaganda messages and isolate those commonalities which undergrounds agreed upon as appealing to human motivation.
5. Interrogations. Records of interrogations of defectors were reviewed to discover the reasons they gave for joining, remaining in, and leaving the movement.
6. Autobiographies. By using autobiographical material it was possible to identify critical incidents and individuals' interpretations of the insurgent situation.
7. Interviews. Interviews were conducted with ex-underground members, former insurgents, and counterinsurgents in an attempt to obtain information not available in written documents.
8. Captured communications. Captured documents and afteraction reports also provided insights into the motivation and behavior of the insurgents.
9. Mission analyses. An attempt was made to determine the objectives of the various missions, the steps that were taken to accomplish the objectives, what alternate solutions were used at various times, and the consequences of the actions.


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Although each of these various sources of information is suspect in and of itself, consistency among the various approaches leads to some degree of confidence in the conclusions.

In evaluating the various accounts, events, and data, the following criteria were used:

1. Was it possible that the event could have occurred?
2. Was it credible? Was there agreement among several sources who reported the event?
3. Was it possible to establish the occurrence of similar events, behavior, or motivation in other movements in different parts of the world?
4. Was there internal consistency (compared with other missions and operations)?



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APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF 24 INSURGENCIES

The following seven tables present background data on countries that have experienced insurgencies since World War II. Most of the insurgencies have occurred since 1946, and all but two have been major ones in terms of disruption of government control, number of persons involved, or length of time covered.

The intent has been to describe in gross terms certain background information about each country. Thus, countries are ranked in quartiles for comparison with other nations and the world average. The data were drawn from Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,⁴ and is presented in table I. Comparisons are made using this data in subsequent tables (II through VII).

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Table I. COMPOSITE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON COUNTINSURGENCIES SINCE 19

	Country	Dates of Insurgency	GNP Per Capita (\$) 1957	QUARTILE RANK	GNP Per Capita % Annual Change	QUARTILE RANK	% Urban (+20, 000)	QUARTILE RANK	Higher Ed. per 100,000	QUARTILE RANK
1.	Algeria	1954-62	178	II	4.7	II	14.1	II	70	III
2.	Angola	1961-	60	IV	—	—	4.7	IV		
3.	Burma	1948-60	57	IV	8.9	II	10.0	IV	63	IV
4.	Cameroon	1955-62	105	III	—	—	4.1	IV		
5.	Colombia	1948-	263	II	2.2	III	22.4	II	296	II
6.	Congo	1960-	92	III	2.8	III	9.1	IV	4	IV
7.	Cuba	1958-59	431	II	—	—	36.5	I	258	II
8.	Cyprus	1954-58	467	II	1.4	IV	13.6	II	78	III
9.	Greece	1946-49	340	II	5.3	II	38.4	I	320	II
10.	Haiti	1958-64	105	III	—	—	5.1	IV	29	IV
11.	Hungary	1956	490	I	4.8	II	37.0	I	258	II
12.)	Indonesia	(1946-49	131	II	1.5	IV	9.1	IV	62	IV
13.)		(1958-61								
14.	Iraq	1961-64	156	II	—	—	23.6	II	173	III
15.	Israel (Palestine)	1945-48	726	I	5.8	I	60.9	I	668	I
16.	Kenya	1952-60	87	III	—	—	3.8	IV	5	IV
17.	Laos	1959-62	50	IV	—	—	4.0	IV	4	IV
18.	Madagascar	1947-48	88	III	—	—	7.6	IV	21	IV
19.	Malaya	1948-60	356	II	0.6	IV	22.7	II	475	I
20.	Philippines	1946-54	220	II	2.4	III	12.7	II	976	I
21.	Vietnam (RVN)	1956-	76	III	—	—	—	—	83	III
22.	Vietnam (DRV)	1956	55	IV	—	—	—	—	—	—
23.	Yemen	1962-	50	IV	—	—	0.1	IV		
24.	Venezuela	1958-	648	I	4.4	II	47.2	I	355	II

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QUARTILE RANK	GNP Per Capita % Annual Change	QUARTILE RANK	% Urban (+20, 000)	QUARTILE RANK	Higher Ed. per 100,000	QUARTILE RANK	%Military (ages 15-64)	QUARTILE RANK	Outcome of Insurgency
II	4.7	II	14.1	II	70	III	—	—	Ins. Won
IV	—	—	4.7	IV	—	—	—	—	Unclear
IV	8.9	II	10.0	IV	63	IV	0.49	III	Gov. Won
III	—	—	4.1	IV	—	—	—	—	Gov. Won
II	2.2	III	22.4	II	296	II	0.27	IV	Unclear
III	2.8	III	9.1	IV	4	IV	—	—	Unclear
II	—	—	36.5	I	258	II	0.84	II	Ins. Won
II	1.4	IV	13.6	II	78	III	—	—	Ins. Won
II	5.3	II	38.4	I	320	II	2.52	I	Gov. Won
III	—	—	5.1	IV	29	IV	0.29	IV	Gov. Won
I	4.8	II	37.0	I	258	II	1.14	II	Gov. Won
II	1.5	IV	9.1	IV	62	IV	0.24	IV	Ins. Won
II	—	—	23.6	II	173	III	2.02	I	Gov. Won
I	5.8	I	60.9	I	668	I	4.84	I	Ins. Won
III	—	—	3.8	IV	5	IV	—	—	Gov. Won
IV	—	—	4.0	IV	4	IV	2.52	I	Unclear
III	—	—	7.6	IV	21	IV	—	—	Ins. Won
II	0.6	IV	22.7	II	475	I	1.37	II	Gov. Won
II	2.4	III	12.7	II	976	I	0.28	IV	Gov. Won
III	—	—	—	—	83	III	2.00	I	Unclear
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.90	I	Gov. Won
IV	—	—	0.1	IV	—	—	0.73	II	Unclear
I	4.4	II	47.2	I	355	II	0.49	III	Unclear

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Table II: OCCURRENCE OF INSURGENCY AND GROSS
NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA FOR 24 INSURGENCIES³

Quartile Rank Based Upon 122 Countries	GNP per capita (\$ - 1957)	No. of Insurgencies in Which			Totals
		Insurgents Won	Gov't Won	Undecided (1965)	
I	479-2,900	1	1	1	3
II	106-478	4	5	1	10
III	71-105	1	3	2	6
IV	45-70	0	2	3	5
	Total	6	11	7	24

Table III. OCCURRENCE OF INSURGENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL
INCREASE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA FOR 13 INSURGENCIES⁴

Quartile Rank Based Upon 68 Countries	% Annual Increase GNP per Capita	No. of Insurgencies in Which			Totals
		Insurgents Won	Gov't Won	Undecided (1965)	
I	5.5-7.6	1	0	0	1
II	3.3-5.5	1	3	1	5
III	1.7-3.7	0	1	2	3
IV	-2.2-1.6	2	2	0	4
	Total	4	6	3	13

Table IV: OCCURRENCE OF INSURGENCY
AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS FOR 22 INSURGENCIES⁵

Quartile Rank Based Upon 120 Countries	% in Urban Areas (+20,000)	No. of Insurgencies in Which			Totals
		Insurgents Won	Gov't Won	Undecided (1965)	
I	33.2-81.9	2	2	1	5
II	12.1-33.1	2	3	1	6
III	10.1-12.0	0	0	0	0
IV	0.0-10.0	2	5	4	11
	Total	6	10	6	22

Table V: OCCURRENCE OF INSURGENCY
AND PERCENTAGE OF ADULT LITERACY FOR 22 INSURGENCIES⁶

Quartile Rank Based Upon 118 Countries	% of Adult Literacy	No. of Insurgencies in Which			Totals
		Insurgents Won	Gov't Won	Undecided (1965)	
I	93.8-95.8	0	1	0	1
II	47.6-93.7	3	2	2	7
III	19.4-47.5	1	3	1	5
IV	1.0-19.3	2	4	3	9
	Total	6	10	6	22

Table VI: OCCURRENCE OF INSURGENCY AND NUMBER
OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN HIGHER EDUCATION FOR 20 INSURGENCIES⁷

Quartile Rank Based Upon 105 Countries	Students Enrolled in Higher Education (per 100,000 population)	No. of Insurgencies in Which			Totals
		Insurgents Won	Gov't Won	Undecided (1965)	
I	461-1,983	1	2	0	3
II	194-460	1	2	2	5
III	70-193	2	1	1	4
IV	3-69	2	4	2	8
	Total	6	9	5	20

Table VII: MILITARY PERSONNEL AS PERCENTAGE
OF POPULATION IN COUNTRIES WHERE INSURGENCIES HAVE OCCURRED⁸

Quartile Rank Based Upon 88 Countries	% of Military in Population (Aged 15-64)	No. of Insurgencies in Which			Totals
		Insurgents Won	Gov't Won	Undecided (1965)	
I	1.05-5.86	1	3	2	6
II	0.40-1.04	1	2	1	4
III	0.18-0.39	0	1	1	2
IV	0.00-0.17	1	3	1	5
	Total	3	9	5	17

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FOOTNOTES

¹ Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).

² Adapted from Russett, World Handbook, pp. 293 ff.

³ Russett, World Handbook, pp. 149-57.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 158-61.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 49-55.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 221-26.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 213-16.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 72-81.

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APPENDIX C

SUMMARIES OF WORLD WAR II UNDERGROUND RULES OF CLANDESTINE BEHAVIOR

In almost all underground movements, a set of guide rules is published for members. During World War II, these lists were used to indoctrinate underground members in the rules of clandestine and covert behavior. The following are summaries of the rules put forth by five undergrounds during World War II.

DUTCH UNDERGROUND

In the Dutch resistance, techniques of underground work were specified in detail. Members were to refrain from any activity which might draw attention to themselves or their coworkers. They were to learn as little as possible about any illegal activity beyond their own jobs. They were instructed not to tell their family or friends about anything which they were doing. Any communications which might be easily intercepted, such as mail or telephone conversations, were to be avoided. If a telephone had to be used, a public telephone could be used and a pre-arranged code used instead of a clear message. Members were instructed never to keep subversive literature, such as newspapers or messages, or any compromising material, on themselves or in their homes. They were to carry on a normal routine and engage in only one activity at a time.

All written material, such as lists and addresses, were to be memorized or, if this was not possible, the information was to be coded. All unnecessary contact between members was to be avoided. Agents were instructed to avoid anyone whose reliability was in doubt. The greatest single factor for the destruction of the underground organization, the directives said, was penetration by security forces. In the event of arrest, members were to remain calm and give no cause for suspicion. They were also instructed that it was imperative for them to notify their contacts in case of arrest so that the others could change their addresses and cover names and sound a warning. The Dutch underground assumed that the Germans could get whatever information they wanted through third-degree methods. However, they instructed members who might be captured to assume that the police did not know anything unless they provided unmistakable proof of guilt and to speak as little as possible so that the police could not entrap them by contradictions in their story. The worst offense that a member could make would be the betrayal of the names of others. The most important thing that he could do in the event of capture was to stall for time so that his fellow members could escape.

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BELGIAN UNDERGROUND

The Belgian undergrounder was instructed that during first contacts for recruiting he should feel out the sentiments of the individual to find out whether he was in favor of the occupiers or not. He was told that it was important to have an alibi wherever he went, especially when meeting someone. The members prepared a subject of conversation in advance, such that if they were captured and questioned separately that they would agree upon the alibi. If they were to meet in public, they would agree in advance on a signal to indicate danger or that it was dangerous to talk. For meetings in homes, prearranged signals were agreed upon to warn of danger. The undergrounder was instructed to examine the meeting place before any appointment. Appointments were not to be scheduled exactly on the hour and were to be kept punctually. If meetings were scheduled between contacts who met repeatedly, one individual should leave after the other so as not to be seen in public together too frequently. Meeting places were to be varied to be sure that the individual was not followed. If he was followed, he was to walk to some isolated spot so he could check to see if he was under surveillance. He was admonished to select clothes to fit the environment and his occupation. Organizational contacts were to be limited to those within the cell or the leader or chief of the cell. All blackmail threats were to be reported immediately. He was also instructed to beware of telephone taps and postal censorship on any correspondence.²

DANISH UNDERGROUND

In Denmark, members were instructed to meet in parks or public places so as not to arouse suspicion. Meetings of two or three people were to be held in flats of friends or sympathizers to the movement. Members were instructed to be punctual. If captured, a member was not to give his real name but only his cover name and allow enough time for other members of his cell to flee.³

GERMAN ANTI-NAZI UNDERGROUND

New Members were not told the exact goals and as little as possible about the organization of the movement. Seminars were conducted in which information was passed out and each new member had to apply certain views and interpretations to the information. In this manner, the individual's thinking processes were determined. Each member had a pseudonym and was instructed to change it frequently. A member received only enough information to do his job. The first five minutes of every meeting were devoted to the lesson of conspiracy: that is, members agreed upon certain facts in case the meeting was discovered and they were arrested. The

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story might be that a few friends had gotten together for a poker game or that they were a group of stamp collectors. One member was always directed to arrive a few minutes early or a few minutes late in order to observe the house where the meeting was taking place. If a uniformed or plainclothes policeman was in the area, the meeting would be postponed or changed to an alternate meeting place. In meeting other members, if one was more than ten minutes late, the first was to leave in order to avoid conspicuous behavior on the street or in a restaurant. Any member thought to be compromised was immediately isolated from all contacts with the organization and especially his cell. Such an individual could contact a deputy of the organization through special precautionary measures in order to reestablish contact with the organization; if he was unmolested for a long period of time, he would be taken back into the group. The conspiratorial training of the members during peacetime conditions paid off handsomely during the Nazi regime. Their organization was never infiltrated.⁴

FRENCH COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND

The Communist Party of France laid down certain rules and habits that members were expected to acquire and some habits that they were expected to rid themselves of. They were instructed that legal activities provide excellent cover for underground work. Members were warned against disclosing their identity to strangers and to beware of such shortcomings as vanity and curiosity. They were warned about complete secrecy to outsiders, and even coworkers and subordinates were only to know what they needed to know to perform their tasks. Members were to refrain from asking unnecessary and indiscreet questions of anyone within the organization. Anyone who violated this rule was to be regarded with suspicion. No meeting was to be held in which more than three members were present. No meeting was to last more than 60 minutes and the participants were expected to arrive precisely on time. Places which were likely to be under suspicion—homes of members, for example—were to be avoided in favor of such places as theater lobbies, spots in the country, or the seashore. No group was to meet at the same place twice. The plans for the meetings were never to be discussed in the mails or in the presence of third parties. The telephone was to be used only in case of emergencies. Every member who attended the meeting was to be sure that he was not followed. A member must never reveal his address, even to other members of the group. They were warned that printing and duplicating materials were not to be stored at an address known to more than two members of the group. Lists of individuals or locations were forbidden, unless in code. Members were to avoid routinized behavior, but told not to surround themselves with an atmosphere of mystery. The individual was warned that all these precautions were not easy to adopt; it would be a matter of gradually developing them over a period of time into a set of reflexes.⁵

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FOOTNOTES

¹Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch Under German Occupation, 1940-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 201-202.

²George K. Tanham, "The Belgian Underground Movement, 1940-1944" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1951), p. 226; also E. K. Bramstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 213-14.

³Jens Lillelund, "The Sabotage in Denmark," Denmark During the German Occupation, ed. Borge Outze (Copenhagen: The Scandinavian Publishing Co., 1946), pp. 50-60.

⁴Hans J. Reichhardt, "New Beginnings: A Contribution to the History of the Resistance of the Labor Movement Against National Socialism" (unpublished mimeographed manuscript, c. 1961).

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